

DISSENT

BLACK RAGE

Martin Kilson

The New Black Intellectuals

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Black Reparations: Two Views

Oliver Henry

A Negro Student on Campus Turmoil

Carl Gershman

Separatism: the Shock of Integration

SANFORD GOTTlieb

THE REVOLT AGAINST MILITARISM

ALICE ROSSI

ABORTION AND SOCIAL REFORM

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THE HIPPIES AS CONTRAMERITOCRACY

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JULY-AUGUST 1969

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

THE REVOLT AGAINST MILITARISM —by Sanford Gottlieb	291
A WAR AGAINST THE YOUNG? —by I. H.	293
BLACK SEPARATISM: SHOCK OF INTEGRATION —by Carl Gershman	294
A NEGRO STUDENT ON CAMPUS TURMOIL —by Oliver Henry	297
BLACK YOUTH AND THE NAACP —by George Eckstein	300
DEADLY HARVESTS IN THE GRAPE FIELDS —by Nicolaus C. Mills	301

ARTICLES

Black Rage

THE NEW BLACK INTELLECTUALS —by Martin Kilson	305
SOUL STILL ON ICE? THE TALENT AND TROUBLES OF ELDRIDGE CLEAVER —by Stanley Pacion	310
BLACK REPARATIONS—TWO VIEWS —by Michael Harrington and Arnold S. Kaufman	317

HARVARD—FEINTS AT REVOLUTION —by Robert Lekachman	321
THE HIPPIES AS CONTRAMERITOCRACY —by Jesse R. Pitts	326
ABORTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE —by Alice S. Rossi	338
THE COLD WAR AND THE THIRD WORLD —by Michael J. Brenner	347
IMPRESSIONS FROM JERUSALEM —by Abraham Friend	353

BOOKS

IDEOLOGY AND TERROR —by Erazim V. Kohák	358
FATHER STRIKES BACK —by Murray Hausknecht	361
VIVA ZAPATA —by Michael Maccoby	363
THE FAILURE OF LYNDON JOHNSON —by Richard Robbins	365

LETTERS

367

The Limits of the Criminal Sanction

Herbert L. Packer. Crime in the streets, marijuana in the schools, civil disobedience—these are aspects of what seems a breakdown of social control. The criminal sanction, the imposition of punishment for the violation of criminal statutes, constitutes our primary control over behavior defined as anti-social. But how do we decide whether certain kinds of conduct, such as prostitution and narcotics offenses, ought to be subjected to it? \$8.95

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Sanford Gottlieb

The Revolt Against Militarism

*Sanford Gottlieb has worked for SANE in Washington since 1960.
He is SANE's Executive Director.*

TWO PILLARS of the military establishment in the House, Mendel Rivers and George Mahon, clashed heatedly on the chamber floor on May 20. Rivers is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Mahon Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. Traditionally, the two had worked hand-in-hand to anticipate (and often surpass) the desires of the military for new weapons systems, bases, force levels, and other appurtenances of the most destructive war machine in the history of man.

Their clash, triggered by Mahon's support of a spending limit on all federal expenditures, including military ones, reflected the new and growing mood of skepticism toward the military on Capitol Hill.

Mahon, a conservative Texas Democrat, warned: "The military has made so many mistakes, it has generated a lack of confidence." Rivers, who is unaccustomed to challenge in his sphere of influence, retorted: "You are playing into the hands of the enemies of the military, and the other body is full of them. . . . Keep on saying it and the enemies of the military will love you for saying it." Rivers then stalked from the chamber, later deleting his unparliamentary remarks from the Congressional Record. Although the two conferred after the public exchange, Mahon did nothing to alter his statements.

No different in this regard from the House until quite recently, the Senate has been accustomed to little discussion of military bills. The promilitary control of key committees, the fear of confronting the Pentagon "experts," who use secrecy classifications to good advantage, and the general tendency to equate military hardware with national security have always assured rapid passage of "defense" bills

in both Houses. Senator Richard Russell's Armed Services Committee may have been handled in a more courtly manner than its House counterpart, but its hearings were just as closed to the public, and its reception for the armed services just as cordial. When Russell relinquished the chairmanship to John Stennis this year, the Committee barely changed. Under the pressure of the ABM controversy, the Committee did hear a few dissenting scientists for the first time but refused to hear the spokesmen of religious, peace, and other voluntary organizations.

As for the other key unit in the Senate, the Appropriations Committee, a former Senate staff aide has characterized it as "hostile to civilian control." Reed Martin, now with the Urban Institute in Washington, told a SANE-sponsored conference of academics on May 3 that senators critical of the military had difficulty securing answers about defense bills from the Committee. Martin charged that the aides of such senators even had trouble gaining access to the Committee's hearing rooms.

Only since the latter stages of the Vietnam war has the military establishment begun to lose its privileged status in Congress. After watching the military and military-minded civilians tell President Johnson for three full years that just a little more military pressure would bring "light at the end of the tunnel," some senators began to worry that the light could well prove to be a Viet Cong campfire.

One of these senators was Stuart Symington of Missouri. A former Secretary of the Air Force, member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, and a towering figure of support for the military establishment, Symington moved from hawk to critic during the war—perhaps the most important nonre-

ligious conversion of recent years in this country. Today Senator Symington heads a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, which is expected to delve most thoroughly into the international commitments of the United States. We are now pledged to defend 42 countries and operate over 3,000 bases throughout the world.

Spurred on by the political energies released by the young, the rebellious, and the supporters of Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and George McGovern, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has become the main carrier of the new antimilitary heresy. While only two senators, John Sherman Cooper and Philip Hart, organized the nearly-successful anti-ABM drive in 1968, it is the Foreign Relations Committee which exercises the leadership in 1969.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION to deploy the Safeguard ABM system ranks immediately behind Vietnam as a specific catalyst for the antimilitary opposition. The fight against ABM provided for the first time the possibility that Congress would actually defeat a new weapons system proposed by the Executive Branch. But one should not overlook as contributing factors the "mistakes" made by the military, as Congressman Mahon suggested. Among these "mistakes" are:

- The accidental killing of 6,400 sheep by nerve gas in Utah.
- The venting of radioactive debris from underground nuclear tests in Nevada, debris that was monitored in Canada.
- The insensitivity of the Navy to Commander Lloyd Bucher and the men of the Pueblo.
- The aborted effort to ship tanks of nerve gas across the country by railroad, then to sink them off the New Jersey coast.
- The stepped-up military pressure in Vietnam, which led to the bloody encounter on "Hamburger Hill."
- The accidental sinking of a nuclear submarine in San Francisco Bay.
- The enormous cost overruns on such items of military hardware as the C-5A cargo plane.

The list is impressive. It indicates that the military, grown arrogant and careless by vir-

tue of a \$1 trillion national investment since the end of World War II, plays fast and loose with the environment, human lives, livestock, and the public treasure—a politically volatile combination.

THE ANTIMILITARY revolt has gained in both Houses. Probes are under way or planned by Senator Albert Gore into the economics of the ABM, by Senator William Proxmire into military procurement practices, by Senator Symington into international commitments, and also by Representatives Henry Reuss, Cornelius Gallagher, and Richard McCarthy into various aspects of chemical-biological warfare. Members of Congress for Peace through Law, a bipartisan group in both Houses, has hired its own staff to explore specific means of cutting the military budget.

Clearly, the revolt faces formidable obstacles. The \$1 trillion investment in the military, including the \$80 billion-a-year budgets since the Vietnam war, has produced a monster that could more accurately be called the military-industrial-labor—union-congressional-academic complex. The "complex" of 1969 has already dwarfed the phenomenon against which Dwight Eisenhower warned in 1961. In calendar year 1968, of all the funds voted by Congress 66 percent went to the military and to pay the costs of past wars. Agencies which, at best, can be called semiautonomous—the Defense Department, AEC, CIA, National Security Agency—spend most of these resources. Giant defense-dependent firms such as General Dynamics and Lockheed—which have difficulty competing for civilian markets—receive a lion's share of the public funds.

Much of the rest goes to installations such as the following, all of which happen to be located in the South Carolina district represented by Mendel Rivers: an Air Force base, Marine Corps air station, Polaris missile facility, naval shipyard, Navy fleet ballistic missile, submarine training station, naval supply center, naval weapons station, naval station, Army depot, two naval hospitals, and a Marine Corps recruiting depot.

Unions whose members work in the defense firms and on military bases constitute a powerful force for the maintenance of the status quo, as they have shown whenever contract

cancellations or base closings threatened. International unions that take advanced positions on social legislation are often countered by some of their locals which agree with Russell, Stennis, and Rivers on such questions as base closings.

Nor should one think that the secret ties with the military about which there is a growing uproar on the campuses is pursued furtively in sealed-off laboratories. George Wald of Harvard, Nobel prizewinner in biology and medicine, recently recounted how he was called on the telephone by a man in Chemical Warfare who asked him to become a consultant on temporary blinding agents. When Wald demurred, he was asked: "Wouldn't you rather temporarily blind people than kill them?"

A society degenerating into war between races and generations in the ghettos and on the campuses can put its skills and resources to better use. There is another alternative, one for which we have only the beginning of a national consensus: *improving the quality of life at home*. And precisely because of America's agonizing, interlocked and potentially fatal internal problems, this alternative will gain support in coming years. When Americans begin to ask themselves the hard questions, namely, how to finance the job that must be done to keep the country whole, they will necessarily confront the military-industrial complex. For example, the recommendations of the Kerner Commission Report were issued without a price tag, but Hyman Bookbinder, a former official of OEO, has estimated that they would cost \$50 billion a year for 20 years. That equals \$1 trillion, the amount invested in the military during the postwar generation.

The military has no intention of surrendering its power or claims. It is already pressing for ABM, multiple warheads for land-based and sea-based missiles, a new manned bomber, long-range cargo planes, fast deployment logistics ships, a manned orbital laboratory, and other costly goodies of the Buck Rogers age. When peace finally comes in Vietnam, the military intends to absorb the "peace dividend." Melvin Laird has already announced that the military will not have its budget cut as long as he is Secretary of Defense. This statement, of course, lends itself to certain inevitable conclusions. . . .

The military will be challenged to some degree by the business community, which has become disenchanted with the Vietnam war. But the business community's traditional answer to the disposal of available resources—cutting taxes—will do nothing to solve social problems or to give income to those who don't earn enough to pay taxes.

The struggle over resources will be three-sided. The third point of the triangle will be those who feel deeply about a decent life at home and peace in the world. They are just starting to organize. The Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy has been established in Washington, encompassing 25 national religious, peace, liberal, and scientific organizations which are dedicated to fighting military influence. The Brookings Institute plans to issue an annual critique of the military budget. The Urban Coalition will publish surveys of domestic human needs with itemized costs.

This struggle could last a decade and largely shape the future of the country. It will be quite a brawl.

A War Against the Young?

SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN has expressed the fear that the might of American institutions will be rallied in "a war against the young." Irritated with campus dissent, itching for a chance to crack down on radicals, handed convenient pretexts by the irresponsible tactics of certain sections of the New Left, the powers-that-be in Washington, as well as in many state legislatures and local governments, are preparing, says Senator McGovern, a counteroffensive of repression.

Subpoenas have gone out to several Ivy League colleges from the McClellan Committee demanding that records of dissident and disruptive students be turned over for inspection. The number of bills presented before state legislatures aimed at students is enormous; some have passed. And in certain localities un-

Carl Gershman

Black Separatism: Shock of Integration

warranted penalties and excessive force have been used against student demonstrators—e.g., at Dartmouth where students who had engaged in a campus sit-in were sentenced to 30 days in jail and at Berkeley, where a conflict over a park resulted in large-scale official violence by the National Guard.

That there is a problem of disruption on the campus, that segments of SDS have become infatuated with violence, that such tactics play into the hands of the Reagans and McClellans, that the backlash against which we have been warning seems now to be gathering force—all this is true. But there is no comfort in having been “right” on this matter. Once begun, repression becomes a blight on the entire society, as those who remember the era of McCarthyism know only too well. Repression will not silence campus protest, which runs far more deeply and extends far more widely than any similar mood in previous American history. Repression is certain to exacerbate the already dangerous “generational split.” Repression will only lead to a further and disastrous “polarization” of the society such as can benefit neither social progress nor liberal values. And repression will reinforce those students who have succumbed to left-authoritarian views and try to persuade their fellows that democracy is “a mere sham.”

The remaining liberal voices in Congress have an immediate obligation to speak out—Teddy Kennedy’s claims to liberal leadership will be tested by his candor on this issue. University teachers, even as they resist disruption within, should continue to resist intervention from without. (When the Congress begins to attack such problems as the Vietnam war, poverty in the ghettos, and pollution in the cities, then it will be time enough for it to worry about the campus.) And finally those teachers on the Left who have some influence with student dissidents ought to have the good sense to speak, in a tone of friendly criticism, against some of the self-destructive excesses in which New Left students have indulged.

The problems of the American campus are not going to be solved in a hurry; and if reactionary legislators start butting in, they won’t be solved at all.—I. H.

PESSIMISTS WHO PREDICT a racial apocalypse in the United States base their judgment largely on two assumptions. First, they assume a rigid polarization of blacks and whites. This means viewing each racial group as an undifferentiated mass that is not subject to internal conflicts out of which might emerge new and unforeseen political strategies. Second, they assume that the evils leading to such a polarization are irremediable: the society, even if in the past it has accepted significant reforms, is seen as no longer capable of responding to the demands now being made upon it.

There is some truth in each assumption. America is more racially polarized today than at any time in its history, and one result is that there hardly exists a political consensus that the country needs a massive social reconstruction. Without such a reconstruction, polarization will probably increase. Blacks will become more frustrated and violent, whites more resistant and repressive.

But one difficulty with this analysis is that it underestimates the forces for democratic social change within the black community. And the pessimists, sometimes with ill-concealed delight, fail to recognize the processes of change to which the overwhelming majority of black people are responding today. Social change can come about nonviolently, but rarely without tension and stress. Much of the conflict we are seeing is likely to have reactionary consequences, but some of it is also a response to improved conditions and, thus, to a new relationship between the races. And this, in turn, is creative and may serve as a basis for future social progress.

Consider the turmoil over black studies on campus. The violence at Cornell and CCNY seems certain to be counterproductive for the blacks themselves. But underlying the separatist mood on campus is an adjustment process, one aspect of which has been called *the shock of integration*. Many black students have literally been uprooted from the ghetto and placed in an alien and threatening environ-

ment. At Colgate, for example, 40 Negro students, who occupied the faculty club in order to press demands for an Afro-American Center, explained that *"the psychological trauma that black students face in a school such as this is criminal."* They wanted the Center because they needed a place where *"we can retire from the white community."*

Yet this very shock of integration, despite its short-range troubling effects, is evidence of mobility. It is a natural human reaction, and it occurred among white ethnic groups as well during their adjustments to new social conditions created by upward mobility. It reflects a tendency in all individuals who encounter a challenging new reality to withdraw and revert back to an environment that had previously provided them some security. It also indicates a need to preserve a sense of identity in the midst of a changing world.

Many blacks demanding separatism on campus would thus like to recreate, in the small, the ghetto from which they have sought to escape. Hence, the exaggeration of blackness in behavior and attire, the desire for separate living quarters, and the demand for a separate program of black study which is, in effect, an attempt to transfer the ghetto school—with its lower standards, less qualified teachers, and less exacting academic requirements—to the university.

This phenomenon of withdrawal is, of course, by no means the only explanation for the separatist mood, for students at predominantly black Howard University are acting in a similar way. What all these students share is a new bitterness and militancy which result because of a genuine liberation from old racial stereotypes. And their response to this liberation is, like the phenomenon of withdrawal, a *process*. In its stridency and contempt for complexity, as well as in its tendency toward an indiscriminate rejection of established patterns of behavior, this response resembles the generational rebellion of the New Left. But the black students, unlike some of the white New Left students, do have concrete and definable ends in view: larger Negro enrollments and black studies programs. They desire a new order, not the absence of order.

At the moment there is much that is indeterminate in the situation of black students.

Their direction in the near future will depend largely on the response of the entire university. If administrations and substantial numbers of students and faculty members support—either out of fear or condescension or uncritical goodwill—the violent tactics and separatist goals of some black students, then there may well be a reactionary resolution of the present crisis. Separatism will become institutionalized, academic freedom will be curtailed by black and white pressure groups, and political and racial criteria will be used to determine the content of curriculum and the quality of scholarship. In the context of the overall assault now being made upon professionalism and objective standards by black and white student protesters, it is not inconceivable that the university could be transformed into a political playpen.

But there can also be a creative resolution. The university can become a more integrated and democratic institution that will serve the needs of faculty and students, not corporations and the military; black studies can be developed into a major area of scholastic inquiry—as opposed to a psychic palliative—that will be integrated with programs in American studies; expenditures can be increased so that democratization will not threaten standards. Such a resolution would threaten the university's elitist role, not its scholastic one. But if this is to occur, the majority on campus, particularly among the faculty, must repudiate expedient solutions that undermine the legitimate academic function of the university. Which is also to say the blacks, out of self-interest if nothing else, must resolve their crisis of adjustment without seeking shelter behind a separate and second-rate educational program; the whites, guilty though they may feel toward the blacks, must resist the temptation of patronizing them.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT, like the university, is undergoing a profound adjustment in response to the racial crisis. Again, this adjustment can take a reactionary or progressive course. The former course is being charted today by those who propose separate black unions. Such proposals are supported by right-wing organizations, but also by some liberals and blacks who identify the labor movement as "the major en-

emy" of the Negro. They point to the competition for jobs between unionized white workers and nonunionized blacks—while all but ignoring the close to 2 million black workers who do belong to unions and profit from union achievements. And then, rather than support programs that might increase the number of jobs and thereby reduce the competition for them, they encourage a struggle over those that presently exist.

The competition between blacks and lower-middle-class whites is real—as is an alliance between blacks and elite whites. The former helped produce the Wallace movement and the latter gave rise to a coalition of groups supporting school decentralization in New York. Such political phenomena are designed far more to increase racial hostility than to alter the economic status quo—which may be one explanation for the position taken by elite whites. But they are also motivated by an attitude of contempt toward lower-middle-class whites and of whites' noblesse oblige toward blacks and of a certain amount of misplaced idealism.

It has been the wisdom of men like A. Philip Randolph—even at a time when it seems unfashionable in "advanced" circles—to continue to point toward the common interests of black and white workers. Largely because of their work, Negroes have continued to build a power base within the Democratic party and have generally resisted the formation of separate unions. And it is because of their work that the labor movement, in some instances, is responding progressively by forming alliances with civil rights forces. This has occurred not only in the strikes of the Memphis sanitation workers and the Charleston hospital workers, but also in the campaign of Thomas Bradley for mayor of Los Angeles. The United Negro Labor Community Council in that city has been primarily responsible for bringing the labor movement into a coalition with the black community in the effort to get Bradley elected. The goals of this Negro-labor coalition are integrationist because its political base is integrationist.

Moreover, the actions of the United Negro Labor Community Council (UNLCC) and similar groups in other cities have stimulated the unions to pay more attention to the Negro leadership potential within their ranks. Black

trade unionists are now playing an important role in determining endorsements made by the Committee on Political Education (COPE), and they are becoming more active and visible in leadership positions within individual unions. Even in the skilled trades, where discrimination is still a major problem, there have been significant gains. *9.4 percent of the newly enrolled apprentices came from minorities in 1968, as opposed to only 2.5 percent in 1960.* Progress has been slow here, but it is significant enough to reinforce the vast majority of black trade unionists in their opposition to separatism.

Those blacks who consider it in their interest to *promote* separatism are, as a rule, not workers but members of the middle class. Where separatism has been supported in the past by middle-class blacks, it has enabled them to assume positions of leadership (in churches and universities) that would be denied them in integrated situations, and it has also enabled them to monopolize the Negro market. Thus, a new black professional elite is demanding all-black schools so that they can monopolize the jobs in those schools, and black entrepreneurs are calling for a separate black economy which they can dominate. Andrew Brimmer, the only Negro member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, has written that "*With the progress of desegregation, the considerable protection which segregation provided for Negro businessmen has been eroded substantially.*" We can thus understand the call to "buy black"—even if it costs more—and the demand to reestablish an economically protective form of separatism. We can also understand the interest black entrepreneurs have taken in separate black unions, which would not be strong enough to demand the same wages as their white counterparts.

The demand for separatism among some blacks is not a true indication of Negro sentiment. Most polls have shown that 85 percent of Negroes still desire integration, a figure that has not diminished in recent years. (Much of the ideology for separatism has been provided by whites like Richard Cloward, W. H. Ferry, and Joseph Alsop.) Certainly in the South, where Negroes have made tremendous gains in winning the right to vote and where they are

now assuming positions of power in local communities and within the Democratic party, there is little enthusiasm for bringing back a militant segregationism.

IF MOST BLACKS are not separatist, they certainly are angry and frustrated. One key to the explosiveness in the ghetto is that blacks are passing through a dignity revolution—but without an economic revolution. This is particularly true of young Negroes whose new sense of pride and aspiration, because it is given no constructive economic outlet, turns into violent frustration. The Bureau of the Census recently pointed out that *unemployment among Negro teenagers was 30.4 percent in 1968, as compared to 22.7 percent in 1960*. Without an employment program for these youths, the predictions of the pessimists may well come true.

What is important is not that an economic revolution might solve the race problem in America—it is the well-off blacks, as we have seen, who tend to be the most pronounced racial chauvinists—but that its failure to take place will exacerbate the racial situation to the point of disaster. Liberals often fail to understand this point. They are highly sensitive to the dignity revolution and are rightly impressed by the new pride blacks are exhibiting. But they fail to perceive that this pride can turn into a destructive and self-destructive force if it is not met with major improvements in the economic conditions of blacks.

It may seem that I am attributing too much importance to the actions and attitudes of liberals, especially since many of them have “dropped out” of the civil rights struggle so that blacks could have the movement to themselves. But liberals have never really ceased to be influential in the affairs of blacks. The black militant protests against schools, universities, unions, and churches have been most successful in those instances where liberals have been neutralized. By supporting—or, at least, refusing to oppose—any tactics used by blacks, they have often given legitimacy to the very worst forms of confrontationism.

And indeed, it is impossible for any group to remove itself from the racial crisis today. In our society, separatism or passivity for any group is an impossibility. Competing social groups continually interact and influence each

other's development. When the blacks carried guns at Cornell while some liberals watched and New Leftists cheered, one result was that George Wallace gained new supporters. When the idea was conceived to turn over the schools of New York to local control so that each ethnic and racial group might wash its hands of every other one, a state of near-anarchy was created and a city was almost brought to its knees by racial hostilities.

It is a confusing time. Demands are made out of frustration and satisfied out of expediency. The worst is predicted by those who often act in such a way as to encourage the fulfillment of their own prophecies. It is most essential in areas undergoing rapid and unsettling changes to oppose retrograde steps, such as the separatist demands on campus. The further institutionalization of separatism during a period of confusion will make the task of dismantling it that much more difficult in the future. The main stress, for those who wish to avoid a racial apocalypse, must continue to be on political integration and economic equality.

Oliver Henry

A Negro Student On Campus Turmoil

During the past academic year Mr. Henry was a senior at Columbia University. His article first appeared in the March 11, 1969, issue of Connection, the magazine supplement of the Columbia Spectator, and is here reprinted with his permission—Ed.

UNREST AND DISCONTENT characterize Negro student communities on campuses throughout this nation. The unrest manifests itself both internally and externally; the discontent stems from the conditions in which many of these students have been forced to live. For today, the majority of Negro collegians come from ghettos, and it makes little difference whether the specific ghetto was Bedford-Stuyvesant, Watts, or the South Side of Chicago. These students know from first-hand experience the world of the ghetto which, to a large degree, represents the life of most Negro Americans: poor educational institu-

tions, poor health facilities, poor transportation services, poor everything. The shadow of the ghetto world follows many to the college campus. In their new situation—in fact, in their new life—some find a new freedom. Yet at the same time, most contemporary Negro students do not wish to forget their past while merging into the university scene. Indeed, many use their new freedom with its consequent permissiveness in furthering actions ostensibly directed toward so-called black liberation.

In many cases, these actions are directed against real grievances and, whether or not recognized, symbolize an indictment of the whole structure of American society, a structure which has until recently countenanced the conditions in which most Negro Americans live. Many students have grown tired of this society and of its institutions. And, for many, the college or university represents but another "white racist" institution whose real function is the "destruction of the black mind." And the campus with its tradition of tolerance, of free inquiry, of personal freedom, provides a setting in which many students can engage in activities, and formulate "plans for the liberation of black people." Thus many Negro students, only recently freed of the confines of the ghetto, with the opportunity of a lifetime before them, suddenly become "Black students." Their goal is no longer academic success or a broad-gauged college experience or even post-college economic advancement; for, as black students, they see these goals as but tranquilizers, as binds in which, if they allow themselves to become entangled, "whitey" can continue to control their lives and through them the lives of all black people.

The new black students reject academic success, liberal education, and economic advancement as significant goals of their college years. And these blacks join, or are converted to, a movement whose goal is "the liberation of black people by any means necessary." These are strong words, but they are usually pronounced by those without power to make them meaningful, for those with real power do not have to engage in bravado.

Having rejected "whitey's" allurements yet still within the university, black students become frustrated. For the real struggle aimed

at improving conditions for the masses of Negro Americans exists outside the university. But the attainment of those skills which, in the long run, might be beneficial in the continuing effort have been cast aside by black students as meaningless, without merit, unworthy of their time and energy. They see standards of merit and achievement as irrelevant both to themselves and to the lives of all black people. Therefore, instead of wasting time studying mathematics, chemistry, European History, or English, they devote themselves wholly to Fanon, Carmichael, Malcolm, and to meetings of the black students' organization where they plan for the revolution: "It will come tomorrow if we only believe, plan, discuss, and demand enough."

But black students soon realize that the real revolution exists not on the campus but in the larger society. Thus, in order to be relevant to their people, they must wage a form of revolution on campus. They do so in their "demands" for Afro-American Studies programs wholly controlled by blacks, black faculty and coaches, black student lounges, black dorms, "soul food," and quotas for black student admissions. Their revolution is against the university in which they are supposedly forced to adhere to "white standards." And this confrontation commences with incendiary rhetoric, the issuing of non-negotiable "demands," and the seizure of university buildings. Victory lies in the capitulation by those in power to their demands, for such represents a victory against white society, one which hopefully will lead to a better life for Negro Americans.

PERHAPS these black students are right; but some students, Negro students, today a minority, question the methods, the goals, and the style of their erstwhile brethren.

Negro students believe in academic success, in individual merit, achievement, and responsibility, for they realize that those more fortunate must prepare themselves for the continuing revolution that exists outside the ivied walls of academe. These students see the way toward improvement of the terrible conditions in which the masses of Negro Americans live through "learning just what white students are learning." Their revolutionary commitment

is not based solely on an emotional reaction to the Negroes' plight, but rather on an emotion tempered by intellect. The continuing struggle must and will be waged; but, before even the possibility of victory, weapons must be stockpiled. And Negro students see trained minds as the vital weapon, as the real resource that will aid in making life better for the majority of Negro Americans.

This view stems not from a movement, but from a sense of personal outrage and responsibility. And though many aid in countless ways the advancement of their less fortunate brethren, Negro students know where the real revolution lies. They see college as an opportunity in which they can gain the knowledge and skills necessary for meaningful participation in the ongoing struggle. And they are prepared to meet white students—indeed, white society—on its terms because that society will determine whether the revolution takes on a relatively peaceful tone or descends into an awful violence which can only mean doom for Negro Americans.

THUS Negro students work for success measured in terms of so-called white standards because these are the standards of a society that their people, as much as any others, helped to build. These students will not be forced out. Negro students desire the transformation of American society from one of limited opportunities for some and the sky for others to one in which all men will have the opportunity to become all that they can, regardless of pigmentation.

In this light, with this view of the revolutionary goal, Negro students question the current black happenings, for they see many of these as counterproductive to the achievement of an equal opportunity society . . . if in fact a society of equality of opportunity, one without delimitations and restrictions imposed by color, remains the goal to which black students are committed. Negro students desire the end of the color line; and thus they reject color as the criterion for judgment of any man. These students question the establishment of admissions quotas, dorms, and curriculum based on race. Negro students know that Negro Americans have been subjected to the "awful shadow of the veil" for too long. And they view many

of the "demands" made by black students as representing a new segregation, a revivification of the color line, a new veil to opportunity.

While black students demand separate Afro-American history courses in university curricula, Negro students work for the inclusion of the Negro in American history where he, as an American, belongs. They question the establishment of courses which would further segregate the Negro American from the mainstream of American life and thought. In the whole area of curriculum, Negro students want no "academic ghettos."

While black students seize buildings and demand separate living and eating facilities, Negro students urge that students, all students, be allowed to live and eat as they choose; and further that university officials refrain from making concessions to blacks which would result in the creation of an atmosphere in which Negro students might be forced because of social pressure into making "choices" which could only limit, only divert them from achieving those skills without which no revolution is possible: knowledge, ability, and character. In the fullest sense, these fundamentals can only be obtained through a college experience as broadly gauged and as free as possible. This necessarily means, where possible and where freely chosen, living, eating, competing, and working with white students; for these current students will tomorrow comprise the citizens and decision-makers of an American society in which Negroes will live. And the revolution, the real revolution, the one that takes long hard preparation, unshackled ability, tireless effort, and much time is not coming tomorrow. While black students have copped out of this revolution, Negro students know that for them it has only begun. While black students busily issue "demands," hold rallies, indulge in countless meetings, attract publicity and foundation and university funds, Negro students deeply committed to the real task find themselves in an unenviable position, for they must struggle for the real revolution against university administrators who, pandering to the whims of the moment, capitulate to the "demands" of blacks which delimit not only themselves, but all students. Negro students must fight for the real revolution against white students who, paralyzed by guilt com-

plexes, countenance anything, any idea espoused by the loudest, the most boorish black. Finally, they must oppose their brethren who, though emotionally committed, have not only lost sight of the real goal, but who have rejected either consciously or unconsciously the prerequisites to its achievement.

The unrest and tension which characterize Negro student communities throughout the nation are signs of "an ostracized race in ferment." Out of this ferment many directions will emerge and have emerged. While black students seem intent upon forcing all Negroes down the path toward a new segregation, toward a renewal of the "closed society," Negro students seek to maintain equality of opportunity in a free society as the goal of Negro Americans. To a large extent, which road predominates will depend upon which faction white America supports through action or inaction. To Negro college students, the future appears dim, for on all sides white administrators, students, and decision-makers seem intent upon conceding to black students' demands for separatism, for a renewal of racial exclusivism, for the maintenance of the color line. But, to the end, Negro students will and must oppose these new trends toward segregation, these new chains for Negro Americans.

George Eckstein

Black Youth and the NAACP

THIS PAST MAY the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP organized a series of discussions on the present phase of the civil rights struggle, which brought out in sharp focus the divergent philosophies in the Negro community. The two discussions I attended may serve as examples.

The first dealt with the roadblocks in the path of "Black Business Enterprise." Two substantial black businessmen, each self-made and heading a group of small and medium-sized enterprises, spoke for the American business myth. They felt there would be a good chance to develop capable Negro businessmen and managers, if only—by "compensatory action"

—sufficient high-risk capital were furnished by the white business community. They stressed that the black businessman, in order to succeed, would have to aim at the mainstream of American business rather than confine himself to the ghetto economy. Their position sounded curiously irrelevant at a time when room for the individual entrepreneur is getting ever more limited and the real action has long shifted to the large corporation.

Nor is the attempt at bypassing the capitalist economy through cooperatives—represented on the panel by a wonderful lady from rural Alabama—of more than marginal significance.

The really new philosophy was presented by Roy Innis with his plan for a Harlem Community Corporation, to be amply funded with the help of government agencies and banks. It would invest in a large variety of ghetto enterprises and contract with large corporations to set up "turnkey" operations in Harlem, turning them over to independent black management. (A start in this direction has already been made with, of all things, a Wall-street brokerage firm.) Innis's project is based on political influence—a bill for its creation is to be introduced by the two Republican Senators from New York—and aims at creating economic power in Harlem, concentrated in the ghetto for maximum effect in terms of employment, investment, and a board of directors that certainly would not exclude Roy Innis. Whether or not the plan will come into being, it certainly represents the thinking of a new generation that has grown up in the shadow of the government-corporate conglomerate structure, as against a belated sneaking-in through the back door of individual entrepreneurship. It also represents the thinking of a new generation that is looking for power as against an older generation satisfied with just a little more opportunity.

Even more revealing was a discussion by five black students and two young LDF lawyers on the topic of "Black Students Seek Identity: Integration—Separatism." The students, some of them from elite colleges, were unanimous in their fierce black nationalism and differed only in the degree of their hatred for white society. For the second time in my life I had this frightening experience: to realize that, simply

because of my race, nothing I might say could reach their minds (the first time was in Germany in the early thirties).

NOW THAT the college gates have finally opened rather wide for black students, these spokesmen do not wish to see this opening used for acquiring a passport into the corporate society. Instead, they want to use it as a wedge to establish Centers for Black Studies to further feed their nationalism. To some this is an end in itself; others, more sophisticated, see it as a means to an end: a chance to exercise power in the university, as one of the weakest institutions of the Establishment (Charles Duncan—Cheney State). They see their own role after college either as leaders of a separate and separatist black political entity (Leon Denmark—Columbia), or as “intellectual Molotov cocktails” inside the white corporate structure; a black brain trust “putting the U.S. corporations against the wall” (Charles Hamilton—Harvard). A tall order indeed, if not a somewhat pathetic delusion of grandeur. At the same time, they are well aware of the risk of repression; indeed, they are deeply convinced that white America is in any case out to commit genocide against its black minority. But “when the trucks come”—a recurring phrase—they want “to be found at General Motors or Union Carbide.” They feel themselves to be personal victims of centuries of oppression and are burning with a fierce will to power, so as to realize their manhood, to run their separate black national entity, or, failing that, to bring down white America. In their intense nationalism, they fail to recognize that even in terms of their own aims it should be desirable to split the white camp rather than draw it together by their own indiscriminate hatred of all whites.

Bayard Rustin came in for particular abuse and misquotation; but “when the trucks come,” being black, he and Roy Wilkins, it was said, would share the black fate.

Against this intense passion feeding (and at times distorting) a high intelligence, the NAACP has little to offer. The students express the frustrations of black youth in the cities of the North. The NAACP’s main strength still lies in the South and was exemplified in the forceful personality of Charles

Evers. His appeal for integration is, of course, meaningless to this passionate youth. Evers had to fight his way through the very depths of oppression in Mississippi, while these students enjoy a relatively privileged existence, defended in their rights by the very NAACP they despise, provided with scholarships from Ivy League colleges and a choice of well-paying jobs ahead of them.

Heywood Burns, Yale graduate and LDF attorney, came closest to an answer. He showed great awareness of the position of frustrated student youth who will have to come to terms with a new situation; a situation which demands that the blacks as a group, not only as individuals within white society, obtain a share of the real power—political, economic, cultural—in this country and thus make it finally truly an open society.

If the present fury is necessary to obtain this result, then it can be considered the bitter price that has to be paid for long neglect. If, however, this generation of black youth really tries to act out its separatist rhetoric, then the result could be disastrous for both blacks and whites. For it could well lead to an authoritarian regime, backlash concentrated and structured, which might make the glib talk of genocide a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Nicolaus C. Mills

Deadly Harvests In the Grape Fields

IN CALIFORNIA, where agriculture has an occupational disease rate 50 percent higher than any other industry, people have known for some time that farm workers are endangered by pesticides. Since 1954 the number of doctors’ reports involving pesticides and agricultural chemicals has doubled, and since 1958 there have been 800–1,100 of these reports annually. Even the Chief of the California Bureau of Occupational Health has acknowledged that “war gases and organic phosphate pesticides [TEPP, parathion, malathion] have a very close similarity.”

Recently a legal battle to gain access to the applicator reports filed by commercial pes-

ticide companies has been started by Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers Organizing Committee. It is now appealing the March 27 decision by Superior Court Judge George A. Brown denying it access to the applicator reports for Kern County.

UFWOC's concern with this problem began as a result of its Coachella Valley strike during June 1968. At that time the union became aware that many growers engaged in the practice of spraying economic poisons, as they are called, on the vineyards when crews were *still* working. On August 20th, Jerome Cohen, General Counsel for the union, made a demand directed to the Agricultural Commissioner of Kern County to see current applicator reports and pesticide permits. He was denied access to these, both of which are supposedly public records;* two days later, after his second meeting with the Commissioner, the pesticide companies obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the release of the reports. The only records Cohen was allowed to see were pesticide permits showing that, in addition to organic phosphates, growers had also obtained the right to use DDT (which UFWOC is now trying to get banned in California and which recently was banned by the State Agricultural Commission of Michigan as a health menace).

Between last August and January 29, the day on which the hearings on the restraining order began, the union and Cohen started a second series of attempts to gain information. In letters to the pesticide companies and the growers, UFWOC proposed that direct meetings take place on the question of pesticides. Cesar Chavez wrote to the Chairman of the Desert Grape Growers League:

There is one critical issue of such overriding importance that it demands immediate attention, even if other labor relations problems have to wait. I mean the harmful effects of spraying grapes with pesticides, or economic poisons, as they are called. We have recently become more aware of this problem through an increasing number of cases coming into our clinic. . . . We are willing to meet with your representatives on the sole issue of pesticides, even if you are not prepared to begin full-scale collective bargaining at present.

* Public records in California are kept in the *interest* of the public, but under certain circumstances they are not open to the public.

The growers and the pesticide companies did not take this offer seriously; they treated it as a new phase in a boycott, which, according to Department of Agriculture figures, left 78 million pounds of grapes in cold storage at the end of last year (approximately 2½ times the holdings of 1967).

At the trial itself the position of the companies did not change. They said that disclosure of the applicator reports would make known vital trade secrets and be against the public interest. They also argued that UFWOC's concern with pesticides was a result of "unsuccessful" efforts at organizing farm workers and that the information in the reports would be used "to keep alive controversy with the growers, to assist in selling unionization to workers, and to invoke public sympathy."

UFWOC, on the other hand, maintained that even if the reports contained trade secrets (they reveal the strength and mixture of pesticide dosages; the date, location, and method of application), such information could be kept in confidence, according to the California Evidence Code, *only* "if the allowance of the privilege will not attempt to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice." Their case rested on demonstrating that the companies and the state had failed to provide adequate protection for workers and that an injustice was being done if farm workers did not have advance knowledge of the pesticides to which they were exposed.

The affidavits of workers themselves show the extent to which pesticide poisoning has become a way of life in California. "The first day I was at work the insect spray that was on the vines got on my legs and I got a red and yellow rash all over my legs. I went to work the next day but it got worse so I had to quit." "The people in our crew smelled unusual odors, and then many of us got sick. We threw up and we were sick and had dizziness." "Last year I missed four days' work because it took that long for the swelling to go away. The year before that I also got sick from the insect spray the tractor sprayed while I was in the field."

Medical reports, moreover, were as grim as farm worker testimony. Fatalities ranged from a twenty-two-year-old farm laborer mixing a half pint of 42 percent parathion concentrate

with each 100 gallons of water he sprayed to a three-year-old girl putting her finger in a gallon of 40 percent TEPP mixture that her brother opened when he found it in a field. Of the epidemics, parathion alone was responsible for six sizable outbreaks (275 people in one peak year) among fruit pickers since 1949.

TWO FACTS stood out in this testimony: the inadequate safeguards for workers and the paucity of medical information available to doctors. The lengths to which this situation could go were revealed by Dr. Irma West, coordinator of the Injury Control Project for the California Department of Public Health, in her account of a sixteen-year-old farm laborer who died after applying a phosphate ester pesticide and sulfur to strawberries:

The highly toxic phosphate ester was applied by hand duster, a primitive and entirely unsafe method of application. The container label was not read by anyone until after the illness was discovered. No advance arrangements were made with a physician for prompt, adequate care for an emergency. The worker was not instructed about hazards and precautions for using the pesticide. He was not provided with protective clothing. When the boy was taken to a physician, no one could provide any information about the pesticide which the worker had applied. The supplier of the pesticide did not check the number of the permit given by the purchaser to assure that the permit was valid. The product was also misbranded, it contained 2 to 4 times the phosphate ester pesticide specified on the label.

Dr. West then stressed the need for *advance* knowledge of pesticide practice.

Some of the most damaging testimony came ironically from those favoring the nondisclosure of applicator reports. In an exchange with UFWOC attorney David Averbuck, C. Seldon Morley, Agricultural Commissioner for Kern County, described how he goes about his job:

Q Mr. Morley, have you notified the Department of Public Health of Kern County that they should keep in contact with you if they did hear of any injuries in Kern County due to economic poisons?

A Not so far, no, sir.

Q Had you contacted the State Department of Public Health?

A No, sir.

Q Have you contacted any doctors?

A No, sir.

Q Have you contacted anybody?

A No, sir.

In another encounter with Averbuck, Joseph Sellers, a general manager for Atwood Crop Dusters, gave an equally frightening account of his sense of professional responsibility. Sellers acknowledged that he possessed information vital to the safety of workers:

Q And yet you say you do not share this information with your competitors?

A That is right.

Q Are you telling us today that you would rather see your competitors do it without the expertise you have, and make mistakes, just to make a buck?

A Yes, sir. We would have less competitors that way.

Despite the testimony, Judge Brown's decision upholding the restraining order of the pesticide companies hardly came as a surprise. It demonstrated not only the ease with which the pesticide menace is overlooked when its primary victims are farm workers rather than consumers, but how closely the public interest in California is identified with corporate interest. After asserting nondisclosure of the applicator reports would fail to work any "substantial injustice" and that disclosure "would be very damaging to a major industry and the public in Kern County," Judge Brown argued:

The importance of the agricultural chemical industry to this valley and this state is enormous, not only in terms of the employment and income which it generates, but in terms of the astronomical increase in productivity and improvement in quality of food and fiber that has accompanied widespread use of agricultural chemicals.

His statement seemed a perfect illustration of an observation made earlier in the hearings by Robert van den Bosch, Professor of Entomology at Berkeley:

I think pest control, as it is now practiced in the State of California and in the United States of America, is essentially not an ecological matter. . . . It is largely a matter of merchandising, and this is a fundamental problem that we are confronted with today.

Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other reason for the dangers that led Cesar Chavez to warn growers,

We will not tolerate the systematic poisoning of our people. . . . We will be damned—and we should be—if we will permit human beings to sustain permanent damage to their health from economic poisons.

Martin Kilson

The New Black Intellectuals

THE NEGRO INTELLIGENTSIA in the United States has recently faced several critical points in its evolution. These crises have been both sociological—including a new social composition, shifting intellectual activities, a changing relationship to whites—and indirectly political, as the Negro lower classes express their violent estrangement through urban riots and demand black separatism or nationalist political leadership.

These two dimensions are intimately related; for it is the addition of persons from the lower classes that has changed the social composition of the Negro intelligentsia and led to the pressure for nationalism or separatism. As this composition changes, there are new claimants to Negro leadership, who transform traditional emphases within the black intellectual community. Formerly, activities were carried out through the NAACP, the Negro Medical Association, or other professional groups; at Negro colleges; and in closely knit groups of middle- to upper-class literati (e.g., the Harlem Renaissance movement of the 20s and 30s). Now, intellectual activity is found more and more on the street corner, among popular groups with charismatic leaders, or in community organizations—often funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. This shift is not complete; but it already indicates a major change in the character of the black intelligentsia.

A black intelligentsia first appeared in the United States during the late 19th century. From then until almost the present day, the middle and upper class of the Negro community formed the main social base of this group.¹ An illustration is the data we have

on 40 Negro writers who were members of the Harlem Renaissance movement: 55 percent came from professional homes and 45 percent from solid middle-class, white-collar families.² Persons of similar background dominated law, medicine, college teaching, and other professions. Because the social structure of the Negro intelligentsia conditioned its intellectual style and ideology, an establishmentarian intellectual style and political outlook prevailed. Because of the racism in American life, Negro professionals practiced largely within an all-Negro context: lawyers and doctors, for example, had their own law and medical associations, which serviced their members in dealing with white society. As a rule, these associations were viewed as stopgap or transitory agencies, for Negro doctors and lawyers hoped ultimately to integrate, both as professionals and members of the middle class, into white institutions.

Only a few significant tendencies toward deviant or antiestablishment behavior could be found among the Negro intelligentsia during the years between the world wars, and these were displayed almost exclusively by writers, artists, and a few college teachers. The lawyers, doctors, dentists, engineers, clergymen, and other professionals remained unaffected by these trends. Dependent upon and accepting the roles provided by the white establishment, they were less free to participate in oppositional movements. Writers and artists, on the other hand, were quite independent of the establishment for their livelihood. A few had independent means—often provided by fathers who were lawyers, doctors, engineers—others earned enough

¹ E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York, 1949).

² Robert A. Bone, *The Negro Novel in America* (New Haven, 1958), p. 56.

from published works and artistic performances. Some had lucrative patrons: wealthy whites, or white radical movements, for example, the Communist party.³ As a result, they could experiment with new, and self-determined, intellectual trends. From the 1920s through the 1940s the most important of such trends was the movement toward a race-conscious literature and art—the objectives of the Harlem Renaissance movement, also known as the New Negro Movement.⁴ Through the folkways of blacks the New Negro Movement sought to redefine the meaning of Negro life in particular and human existence in general. Intellectually, it owed much to Paul Lawrence Dunbar, whose novels and poetry drew heavily upon Negro folk material, in speech, lore, humor, and wit.⁵

Politically, the New Negro Movement was inarticulate, if not altogether indifferent, though a few writers participated in both the Communist and Socialist movements. Rather curiously, the New Negro Movement remained independent of another racialist movement, formed by Marcus Garvey during World War I, which was political. There were several reasons: the Garvey movement, officially called the Universal Negro Improvement Association, depended heavily on a charismatic leadership that was not disposed to let intellectuals play an independent or critical role. Garvey, who designated himself Provisional President of Africa, possessed a strong ego and nursed intellectual ambitions of his own. Though he had little formal training, Garvey wrote numerous pamphlets and articles on historical, cultural, and political issues relating to Negroes.⁶ To leaders of the New Negro Movement, Garvey seemed like something of an upstart, gifted but half-literate, who had chanced upon an

important cause. Alain Locke, the finest theoretical thinker in the New Negro Movement, remarked in 1926 that “Garveyism may be a transient, if spectacular, phenomenon, but the possible role of the American Negro in the future development of Africa is one of the most constructive and universally helpful missions that any modern people can lay claim to.”⁷

Conflicts in social outlook and style also kept the New Negro Movement at a distance from Garveyism. The Garvey movement was led by small businessmen. It was pretty much a petty-bourgeois phenomenon, and far less interested in the intellectual claims of black nationalism than in using black awareness in order to achieve concrete economic gains.

On the other hand, the intellectuals in the New Negro Movement, though mainly from middle-class families, were antibourgeois in outlook: some sympathized with the anticapitalist sentiments then widespread among American intellectuals, and others looked down upon economics and politics as too mundane. The latter group of black intellectuals saw it as their mission to help their fellow-blacks alter their self-image. As James Weldon Johnson put it in his poem “To America”:

How would you have us, as we are?

Or sinking 'neath the load we bear,

Our eyes fixed forward on a star,

Or gazing empty at despair?

When members of the New Negro Movement did occasionally assume a political posture they did so through white radical politics rather than Garveyism or its offshoots.⁸

By the end of World War II the first two major deviant racialist movements among Negroes had no effective links. It is this failure of the New Negro Movement to connect with the more popular and political nationalism of the Garvey movement that sharp-

³ See the autobiography of Langston Hughes, *The Big Sea* (New York, 1940).

⁴ Bone, *The Negro Novel in America*, pp. 53ff.

⁵ Paul L. Dunbar, *Collected Poems* (New York, 1930).

⁶ Garvey was fond of appearing in academic garb at public rallies. Cf. Edmund Cronon, *Black Moses* (Madison, 1955).

⁷ Alain Locke, *The New Negro* (New York, 1925), p. 15.

⁸ Cf. Harold W. Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (New York, 1967).

ly distinguishes the prewar Negro intellectuals from their present equivalents. Today a sizable segment of the Negro intelligentsia is at the center of, or at least responding to, a popular black nationalist movement that often releases xenophobic attitudes toward white society.

IN THE PAST decade there has been a powerful thrust toward a fusion of the two currents of black racialism inherited from the pre-World War II era. The basis of this tendency has been a revolutionary change, which was both sociological and ideological, in the Negro intelligentsia. The ranks of the Negro intelligentsia have been extended, almost willy nilly, to include a new set of persons, men and women who hitherto would hardly have been called "intellectuals." They may be described, for want of a better term, as "paraintellectuals": self-made intellectuals, lacking for the most part formal education in literature, the expressive arts, and the liberal and technical or scientific professions.

These "paraintellectuals," now a major force in the Negro intelligentsia, are largely upper-lower-class, though sometimes lower-middle-class in background. They possess at best secondary schooling, and more commonly are drop-outs from high school. But they are usually persons of high talent, and they display a high degree of motivation within the context of Negro lower-class culture. In general, they are adept at verbal and other skills, which enables them to become what may be called "cultural celebrities" within the Negro lower class.⁹

Their occupational careers before their debut as "paraintellectuals" are quite varied and carry high prestige within the Negro lower class. These occupations include "hustling" roles: pimp, numbers writer, narcotics pusher, etc. Other occupations of Negro "paraintellectuals" are rather more conven-

tional: petty shopkeeper, poolroom operator, storefront preacher, etc.¹⁰

The entry of these paraintellectuals into the ranks of the black intelligentsia is mainly the direct result of the urban riots of 1964 and, later, an expression of Negro outrage against racist restrictions in American society. Though a handful of paraintellectuals had surfaced before these events (e.g., Malcolm X, Louis X, and others who were transformed into paraintellectuals by way of the Black Muslim movement),¹¹ they were exceptions. Only after the first flush of urban riots in 1964 did a large stratum of persons distinguishable as paraintellectuals emerge. Every American city with a sizable Negro population (say 10 percent or more) has experienced the rise of such a stratum. In Boston, Guido St. Laurent emerged as founder and leader of NEGRO (New England Grass Roots Organization); in San Francisco there was Eldridge Cleaver, a leader of the Black Panther party. These two newcomers to the black intelligentsia had occupational careers like others of their group, and as a result of these careers had spent time in prison.¹²

The revolutionary implications of the entry into the Negro intelligentsia of men like Malcolm X., Louis X, and Eldridge Cleaver are clear enough. Until recently, if movement of lower-class blacks into the intelligentsia occurred at all, high school education was the minimum and college education the usual requirement. Thus the rise of what I have termed black paraintellectuals represents a hitherto unknown stratum not only within the black but also within the white intelligentsia.

¹⁰ For accounts of the occupational and cultural roles held by "paraintellectuals," see Arthur H. Fauset, *Black Gods in the Metropolis* (Philadelphia, 1944); St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York, 1945); I. Slim, *Pimp: The Story of My Life* (Los Angeles, 1967).

¹¹ See Malcolm X (and Alex Haley), *Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York, 1966).

¹² See Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York, 1968).

⁹ Cf. Charles Keil, *Urban Blues* (Chicago, 1966). See also Thomas Kochman, "'Rapping' in the Black Ghetto," *Trans-action*, February 1969.

TENSION AND CONFLICT are unavoidable in this kind of structural change. Unlike the established elements in the Negro intelligentsia, the paraintellectuals share a cultural experience similar to that of the black lower classes.¹³ They share too the lower classes' brutalizing experience with the coercive arm of white-controlled cities, especially the police power.¹⁴ These common experiences enabled the paraintellectuals to be spokesmen for the Negro masses as they emerged into a militant politicalization through riots. The paraintellectuals came onto the scene as legitimate and *natural* leaders. Moreover, they advance the politicalization of the black urban masses, after a fashion, by formulating descriptions of black-white relations, past and present, and policies for altering these relations that the Negro lower class finds meaningful. Few of the established elements among the black intelligentsia have, until very recently, had such success.

As a result, the paraintellectuals pose a major crisis for the established Negro intelligentsia. Several resolutions of the crisis are available to the established intelligentsia:

- (1) It could leave the emergent militant politics in the hands of the paraintellectuals, concentrating instead on broadening and consolidating traditional roles made available through the moderate politics of the civil rights movement.
- (2) It could compete with the paraintellectuals for leadership of the new nationalist militancy, adopting or fabricating a lower-class oriented black militancy of its own.
- (3) It could join forces with the paraintellectuals, more or less on the latter's terms.

These strategies, with one or another variation, have characterized the responses of the established Negro intelligentsia. In general, the upper strata of the black intelligentsia (e.g., lawyers, doctors, dentists, college teachers, large-scale entrepreneurs) tend to

avoid competing with the paraintellectuals in manipulating nationalist or antiwhite militancy and violent rhetoric. Instead, they persist in a commitment to nonracialist approaches to political and social change for Negroes.¹⁵

Yet the upper strata of the Negro intelligentsia also increasingly display interest in the nationalist militancy of the paraintellectuals, insofar as they hope such militancy will impress upon the white power structure the need to open greater opportunities to blacks.¹⁶ Indeed, some members of the established Negro intelligentsia (notably businessmen, city civil servants, and others whose careers may be readily advanced through politics) have gone so far as to adopt or simulate a nationalist militancy of their own. They hope thereby to bring their own needs and interests more forcefully to the attention of the white power structure.

Furthermore, when the white power structure concedes new roles and benefits to the politically active segments of the established Negro intelligentsia as a result of antiwhite militancy, these segments perceive an additional use for militancy: it enables them to appear legitimate in the eyes of the urban black lower class.

Such legitimacy is necessary in view of the paraintellectuals' new role as the *natural* leaders of the black city-dwellers. The paraintellectuals virtually control the terms according to which legitimacy in the urban black community is defined, and it is very difficult for other black leadership groups to ignore these criteria. It can therefore be expected that the politically active segments of the established Negro intelligentsia will continue for some time to utilize a variant of antiwhite militancy as one of their political weapons.

Other groups among the established Negro intelligentsia have also assumed a militant antiwhite posture, and one more genu-

¹³ Cf. Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner* (Chicago, 1967).

¹⁴ Cf. Claude Brown, *Manchild in the Promised Land* (New York, 1965).

¹⁵ Cf. Floyd McKissick, *Three-Fifths of a Man* (Toronto, 1969).

¹⁶ Nathan Wright, *Black Power and Urban Unrest* (New York, 1967).

ine than that of the paraintellectuals. This militancy is displayed most often by school teachers, writers, and artists, and it results partly from the intellectual persuasion of paraintellectuals like Malcolm X and Eldridge Cleaver.¹⁷ Some black writers and artists also have utilitarian ends in mind when they convert to militancy: new opportunities are more readily conceded by the white power structure in artistic and literary fields, particularly among liberal whites, when confronted by Negro militancy.

Another important characteristic of that portion of the Negro intelligentsia inclines toward the nationalist rhetoric of the paraintellectuals and is a sociological tie with the black lower classes. During the past decade we have had a sizable increase of college-trained black teachers, writers, and artists; they belong to the Negro intelligentsia, yet their roots in the black lower-class community remain strong. It was largely among such persons that men like Malcolm X first found their audience, for it was among them that a sense of outrage could be articulated with some freedom and coherence. They were drawn to the readiness of Malcolm X to say things that they might feel too but hesitate to express. And as urban riots became a regular feature of the political expression of the black lower classes, the teachers, writers, and artists were the first within the Negro intelligentsia to welcome this mode of attack on the white power structure.

Indeed, antiwhite violence in general is celebrated by growing numbers; it is seen as serving a dual function: validating Negro manhood and forcing concessions from white institutions. In several cities, especially New York, some teachers, writers, and artists have joined forces with the paraintellectuals in disseminating a veritable cult of violence.¹⁸ Negro teachers, moreover, will have an increas-

ingly important role in this development: for as ghetto school districts come under Negro control through administrative decentralization, a cult of violence might well be enshrined in the curriculum of many black ghetto schools.

RIGHT NOW we are too close to the processes of change and crisis in the Negro intelligentsia to know precisely what future trends will be. Patterns of militancy that appear immutable might well turn out to be merely ephemeral or tactical postures. Some paraintellectuals, the catalytic agents of black militance and violent rhetoric, have already modified their militancy in exchange for concessions from the white power structure. As they are coopted into the power structure by assuming influential and well-paying roles in the plethora of community organizations funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity or on governing boards of the Model Cities program, the propensity of some paraintellectuals toward militancy and violent rhetoric seems to diminish. This is especially true in cities where the paraintellectuals feel secure about cooptation into the power structure. Whether this sense of security prevails depends upon the intensity and form of competition both among paraintellectuals, and between them and the established Negro intelligentsia.¹⁹

Most questionable here is the assumption of many black nationalist students that the validation of Negro manhood and culture through black-controlled Afro-American studies programs on white campuses is more "relevant" than the acquisition of professional skills.²⁰ What, then, will be the long-run outcome of this development? At best the nationalist linkage of Negro self-identification and militance on white campuses will produce a generation of college-trained

¹⁷ Cf. two plays by LeRoi Jones, *Dutchman* and *The Slave* (New York, 1964).

¹⁸ LeRoi Jones's Black Arts Repertory Theatre School in New York is part of this development. See Larry Neal and LeRoi Jones, eds., *Black Fire* (New York, 1968).

¹⁹ For insights into this issue and its dynamics, see Charles Jordan Hamilton, "Changing Patterns of Negro Leadership in Boston," Honor's Thesis, Harvard University, 1969.

²⁰ See Ernest Dunbar, "The Black Studies Thing," *New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1969.

blacks who will be highly motivated to return to the urban black community to advance its fortune. At worst, this development will produce, for many college-educated blacks, a vicious psychological dependence upon antiwhite violent rhetoric. Moreover, their perception of the black community's basic needs (which are, mainly, more skills and resources in order to participate effectively in our society) will be pathetically distorted.²¹ And such faulty perception will in turn help perpetuate black nationalist political posturing and sporadic unrest as substitutes for serious politics.

The worst, however, need not occur. The new Negro intelligentsia will no doubt be militant in racial outlook and political style: but its use of militancy will probably be tempered by practical considerations. Like it or not, the militants' goal of black social and economic advancement—even along black separatist lines—can be realized only through such structures as political parties, pressure groups, trade unions, professional associations, and the like. As the new militants in the Negro intelligentsia adapt their aims to institutionalized structures and processes, the therapeutic and normless features of black militancy will be filtered out or neutralized; they will, in a word, be reduced to mere trappings of the political process, though symbolically important ones.

This development, however, will depend upon the emergence within the new Negro intelligentsia of political leaders skilled at redirecting into viable political channels the enormous energy now wasted by black nationalists in political posturing or role-playing. Fortunately, such politicians are already surfacing. The paraintellectuals, particularly those organized in the Black Panther party, represent one type of Negro leader potentially capable of facilitating the political institutionalization of black nationalism. Based in West Coast cities like Oakland and San Fran-

cisco and rapidly spreading to Midwestern and Eastern cities, the Black Panther party (BPP) is mostly a secular variant of the Black Muslim movement. Like the Black Muslims, the BPP seeks the transformation or rebirth of the Negro personality. But it shuns the religious forms of the Black Muslims, seeking legitimacy instead through assertive or violent political action. Violence, rhetorical or actual, had a special role in the early phase of the BPP because the idea of black renaissance was rooted in the paraintellectuals' need to link Negro self-identification with violence. Thus the BPP's early political acts invariably entailed confrontation with such features of the white power structure in urban ghettos as the police and the courts.²²

Currently, however, the BPP is entering a second phase of political development, including organization among Negro workers, community development activity, campus organization, and some electoral activity. But it is doubtful that the limited educational and technical skills possessed by the paraintellectual leaders of the BPP will allow it to evolve very far in this new direction without outside aid from more skilled groups. This is already recognized by some BPP leaders who have sought the assistance of middle-class white radicals and their organizations, such as the Progressive Labor party and the Peace and Freedom party. But inasmuch as the BPP is sensitive to the need to remain legitimate in the eyes of the growing segment of lower-class blacks who are hostile to whites, it must obtain a large part of the skills required by its new political development from Negroes themselves.

At this point enter the established Negro intelligentsia as the source of the second type of black politician able to facilitate the political institutionalization of black nationalism. A new crop of professionally educated black politicians is now emerging in urban ghettos—and the growth of this group seems

²¹ See Martin Kilson, "Black Power: Anatomy of a Paradox," *Harvard Journal of Negro Affairs*, II, 1 (1968).

²² Cf. Bobby Seale, "Selections from the Biography of Huey Newton," *Ramparts*, October 26, 1968.

certain as more Negroes enter and complete college. Lawyers currently predominate in the new group of Negro professional politicians; Hatcher in Gary, Stokes in Cleveland, Thomas Atkins in Boston, Conyers in Detroit, and Tom Bradley in Los Angeles are among the best. These men are fashioning a black militant style of their own, within the established framework of urban politics: and as they perfect the assimilation of a black ethnicity to the basic patterns of American politics, they may prove legitimate recipients of alliance with such paraintellectual elements as the Black Panther party.

Such an alliance could well be mutually

beneficial: the paraintellectuals will derive from it the professional skills and relationships they badly need; the professional politicians will acquire greater legitimacy in the eyes of the black lower class, as well as valuable political workers. It is an alliance that will not, of course, proceed without conflict, either between the parties to it or between them and the white power structure. (Hatcher's experience in Gary illustrates both forms of conflict.) But it is a feasible alliance, with political possibilities, not the least of which is lending political order to the Negro intelligentsia's endeavor to offer new leadership to the crisis-ridden black ghetto.

Stanley Pacion

Soul Still on Ice?

The Talent and Troubles of Eldridge Cleaver

THOUGH IT IS little more than a year since *Soul on Ice* was published, Eldridge Cleaver has been assimilated so rapidly by popularizers and professional reviewers that it is almost impossible to grasp the book in its original meaning. By emphasizing certain passages one can make him out a spokesman for fascism, Communism, or egalitarian democracy, a skilled psychoanalyst of black identity, a party propagandist, or a harsh critic of American civilization. Cleaver excites every possible emotion from love to hate. For the conservative he may be anathema, but he also represents more attractively black economy, decentralized schools, and local autonomy *vis-à-vis* the federal bureaucracy. For a wing of the New Left Cleaver is the armed revolutionary who will level the capitalist structure.

Cleaver himself must be held accountable for much of this misunderstanding. He writes an inspired and wild prose that tends to subvert rational judgment. His short declarative sentences forge a frenetic mood, an orgiastic trance. Soon one reads Cleaver not for argument or program, but for the affective experience. In the end, rhetoric blurs thought.

But while he engages strong feelings, Cleaver in no way succumbs to them. The great achievement of Cleaver's book, distinguishing it from much of black literature, is a relative freedom from self-intoxication. Rage, disillusionment, prejudice, fear, love, all passions are purposely marshalled; but none is vented freely. For all their apparent candor his words and materials seem highly calculated.

Soul on Ice gives an intimate account of the needs, feelings, and waking fantasies of a black man in jail. Nearly half the essays were composed during Cleaver's imprisonment, and the description of a black inmate's experience in the California state prison system is appalling, as it is meant to be. But unlike so many other exposés of prison life, Cleaver's account deals with psychological evils, not moral or physical ones. Of the homosexuality supposedly rampant among convicts he says little; nor does he offer the standard account of beatings, solitary confinement, and poor sanitary conditions. Cleaver shares in the occasional ambivalence that marked Malcolm X's view of the penitentiary, for like Malcolm X he admits that he enjoys solitude. Nevertheless, for Cleaver prison is a horror, not because it harms the body and corrupts standard morality, but because it plays havoc with the mind.

In Cleaver's view imprisonment forces men into paranoia (his word), a state in which no real personal relationship is possible and normal emotions emerge topsy-turvy. Though the convict is thought to have a high regard for anyone who spends time, money, and energy to set him free, his prison experience has rendered him incapable of such respect. "Convicts hate lawyers," Cleaver writes. "Convicts are convinced that lawyers must have a secret little black book which no one else is ever allowed to see, a book that schools lawyers in an esoteric morality in which the Highest Good is treachery and crossing one's dumb and trusting client the noblest of deeds." In prison every sentiment of civilization is reversed. Love, faith, and hope emerge as hate, distrust, and disillusion. This reversal of values is the prisoners' only defense against a world that has deprived them of wives and lovers, and of the hope of breaking the cycle of prison-parole-prison. They purposely scoff at hopes and ambitions to spare themselves future hurt. Cleaver describes this behavior in a poignant passage:

When I first came to Folsom, I was astonished to see the old grizzled cons playing marbles. The marble players of Folsom are legendary throughout the prison system. I first heard about them years ago. There is a sense of ultimate defeat about them. Some guy might boast about how he is going to get out next time and stay out, and someone will put him down by saying he'll be back playing marbles like a hasbeen, a neverwas, blasted back into childhood by a crushing defeat to his final dream. The marble players have the game down to an art, and they play all day long, fanatically absorbed in what they are doing.

Though *Soul on Ice* is not a traditional reform tract, it represents a merciless indictment of contemporary penology. But Cleaver's critique also works toward another end. It calls into question the central concept of the American system of justice: the notion that a prisoner is paying off a debt:

Rather than owing and paying a debt to society, Negro prisoners feel that they are being abused, that their imprisonment is simply another form of the oppression which they have known all their lives. Negro inmates feel that they are being robbed, that it is "society" that owes them, that should be paying them, a debt.

Throughout the prison essays, Cleaver borrows freely from Malcolm X; it is an influence he readily acknowledges. But the relationship between master and disciple goes beyond a common critique of American penology. For the black prisoner, as Cleaver explains, Malcolm X was a symbol of hope. A former convict, Malcolm X had secured for himself a prominent social place, and thereby raised the hope that the way might be open to others.

IN THE LATTER PART of his book Cleaver writes from a more ambitious social perspective. As Minister of Information for the Black Panther party, he champions the cause of black pride. He demands that "soul" break from its captivity in white America and forge

a separate black identity. In his last essay, "To All Black Women From All Black Men," he exhorts his people to speak their rebellion authoritatively, to walk proudly, to stop snivelling, to will their spirit and add strength to their flesh. He praises their beauty, calls them Africa's Cream, the Black Cream of the Earth, and Sable Spirit, the most precious of all skins. He wants guns and war, reminds them of Lumumba, Turner, L'Ouverture while also promising peace, a time when black and white will work together in equality. Constructed around a series of leads and responses which give it the effect of a litany, the essay is a masterpiece of cajolery and propaganda. Its resonant qualities belong more to the rally or arena than to common prose and suggest that it is meant to be read aloud, chanted at voice-top:

I greet you, my Queen, not in the obsequious whine of a cringing Slave to which you have become accustomed, neither do I greet you in the new voice, the unctuous supplications of the sleek Black Bourgeois, nor the bullying bellow of the rude Free Slave—but in my own voice do I greet you *anew*, my greeting is not *new*, but as old as the Sun, Moon, and Stars. And rather than mark a new beginning, my greeting signifies only my Return.

This essay signals a new phase in the black search for identity. Whereas older black writers like Wright, Ellison, and Baldwin felt their sense of reality shaped by the values of the white world, Cleaver declares his own voice, free and unfettered. He feels sure enough in his blackness to glory in it and extol its virtues to a wide public. But Cleaver himself, we are to gather, has moved beyond black celebration. Though he exhorts his people to trust in their own values and achievements, he feels himself beyond the need for such prompting. He has separated himself once and for all from the feelings that caused the black man to view his own woman as less desirable than the white woman, that curse

of Bigger Thomas and the younger Cleaver. No longer will he accept white standards that cast him as a "Menial" and force him to see his woman as an "Amazon." He wants to be black, not white; and in contrast to the "bullying bellow of the rude Free Slave" his voice is sure in its new position. To him this is an irrevocable liberation, and he celebrates it. For the first time—he seems to say—a black man openly declares his psychological emancipation from white society.

The crucial question, of course, is not whether Cleaver revels in his liberation, but whether he has actually achieved it. And the judgment is difficult to make. If Cleaver were indeed as secure in his blackness as he claims, what inner need would drive him to write his heated panegyrics to the humanity of black people? The driven rhetoric of his last essay suggests anxiety; it bears the stamp of trauma.

In the nature of things, one cannot be entirely certain about such matters, and there is every reason to be cautious. It might even be argued that Cleaver's rhetoric is part of a conscious design. For Cleaver has both a white and a black audience in mind. And while his language may hint that he himself has not yet overcome the stigma of blackness, it carries his message of black pride with remarkable force. Cleaver has not yet been given credit for what he has done, a point Malcolm X likes to make about the treatment of black people in general. Cleaver has forged a new propaganda for his people, a propaganda of pride, destiny, and at times racial superiority. Not only does it call upon the blacks to put trust in themselves; it has as its countergoal the destruction of the white ego-ideal and the inversion of the present racial hierarchy. Cleaver has manumitted himself from the doctrine of white racial superiority to the degree that he is capable of inventing a new myth for the glory of his people.

Like so many other American autobiog-

raphies, *Soul on Ice* is a success story. It tells how one black man managed to overcome white hegemony, and stay alive. Though Cleaver describes himself as "a full-time revolutionary in the struggle for black liberation in America," the book certainly contains no blueprint for revolution and one finds it hard, though not impossible, to picture Cleaver as an armed guerrilla. If anything, Cleaver's image takes on a conservative cast. Rather than armed insurrection, the book has as its chief lesson the almost corny admonition of the need for education. Intensely proud of his self-education, as was Malcolm X, Cleaver prints at least half a dozen literary discussions, plus numerous lists of the books he has read. Despite all his bitter stridency and the threat that he will level the earth to attain manhood, one leaves Cleaver's essays with the impression that he is counseling the use of books, not guns, for black America. The Black Panthers as a movement may talk endlessly about getting guns, sometimes engage in shoot-outs with the police, and even intimidate unsympathetic blacks, but the path to liberation suggested in *Soul on Ice* is fundamentally intellectual.

CLEAVER ALSO SPEAKS to the whites. He works upon a notion popular in contemporary America: the triumph of science in the West has effected a complete alienation of body from mind, flesh from intellect. The sheer amount of administrative chores demanded by increased technology leaves little time for contact with body functions. The modern administrator, to insure his mastery of science, must compound intellectual faculties through a denial of bodily needs.

This notion is, of course, an old one. But whereas Western culture has mostly regarded the repression of primary drives for the sake of civilization as good, or at least necessary, Cleaver, like other apocalyptic instinctualists, will have none of it. Together with his ex-

hortations that the black community educate itself and thereby risk taking on the troubles of the white American civilization, Cleaver argues that there is an inherent decadence in reason. And he is probably unaware of this contradiction. His hatred for the white man's civilization seems simply to overcome his pride in intellectual achievement. There may be still another reason for this contradiction. Since Cleaver's essays on the decadence of American civilization are of a later date than those prison essays in which he extols the virtues of reason, they may reflect an honest change of heart. But at no point does he try to reconcile his divergent views.

"Omnipotent Administrators," as Cleaver puts it, suffer from underdeveloped bodies, lack of will, sexual impotence and frigidity; while with the instincts or the physical he associates strength, brute power, force, virility, and physical beauty. Cleaver's implication is plain, though, unfortunately, it translates coarsely. For Cleaver intellectuals are little, ugly, weak, if not queer men, while the women of the "elite Mind class" are even more sorely affected:

Even though her man is effeminate, she is required to possess and project an image that is in sharp contrast to his, more sharply feminine than his, so that the effeminate image of her man can still, by virtue of the sharp contrast in degrees of femininity, be perceived as masculine. [Italics Cleaver's.]

Popular though they are in some university circles, Cleaver's cultural theoretics seem mostly nonsensical, and when pulled away from his exhortatory prose his ideas are hard to take seriously. But as a writer, he operates on an emotional level where concepts are weighed not for logic or truth, but for their propaganda impact. Cleaver's approach, which the more "progressive" segments of the white middle class are ready to buy and praise, rests on a new kind of racial superiority. The white Omnipotent Administrator, launched on a perpetual search for his alien-

ated body, now becomes a worshiper of masculine prowess; he both envies and resents body and strength. And because white America is incapable of saving itself, it has only one hope: its black men and women. Through them it can once again rejuvenate itself:

Still, they are the wealth of a nation, an abundant supply of unexhausted, undeesenced human raw material upon which the future of the society depends, and with which, through the implacable march of history to an ever broader base of democracy and equality, the society will renew and transform itself.

To underscore this thesis Cleaver puts forth some startling illustrations. He starts his essay "Convalescence" with a quotation from Norman Podhoretz's *Commentary* article, "My Negro Problem—And Ours."

... just as in childhood I envied Negroes for what seemed to me their superior masculinity, so I envy them today for what seems to me their superior physical grace and beauty. I have come to value physical grace very highly, and I am now capable of aching with all my being when I watch a Negro couple on the dance floor, or a Negro playing baseball or basketball. *They are on the kind of terms with their own bodies that I should like to be on with mine, and for that precious quality they seem blessed to me.* [Italics Cleaver's.]

So alienated is the white man from his body, that even to his most important appendage he ascribes puny images. Cleaver notes that while the white man calls his penis a "prick," a "peter," a "pecker," the black man calls his a "rod." Time and again the reader is told that white women find sexual satisfaction only with black men, and Cleaver maintains the doctrine of black sexual superiority even in those essays in which he is supposed to be describing the sexual problems of black men. In the end it is the white woman who symbolizes the sickness of white society, for she must bear the burden of her effeminate, weak, emasculate mate. The white

American woman, according to Cleaver, is the true "soul on ice." Mark the use of prison imagery:

Sitting at the foot of her bed like a mute Sphinx on the bank of the Nile, is the Ogre of Frigidity. She is terrified, because of the quality of her life, by the prospect of becoming a life-terminer in the prison of frigidity. Her basic fear is frigidity, that state in which her frantic search for Ultrafemininity collides with an icepack death of soul: where the fire in her body is extinguished by the ice in her mind. The psychic core of her sensuality, the male-seeking pole of her Female Principle, the trigger of the mechanism of her orgasm, moves beyond the reach or range of the effeminate clitoris of her man. Frigid, cold, ice. Arctic. Antarctic. At the end of her flight from her body is a sky-high wall of ice.

This is a strange passage from a man who was sentenced to prison for repeated acts of rape against white women. It reflects the full-swing in Cleaver's attitude toward them. Or perhaps it is really the same attitude reversed—stood on its head, so to say. In earlier essays he admits his passion for white pin-up girls, white whores and lovers, and even for a white woman who was responsible for a black man's death. He notes how frequent this attraction is among black men. But, as Cleaver points out, the relationship between black men and white women is not solely one of love; an opposite emotion comes into play.

Many whites flatter themselves with the idea that the Negro male's lust and desire for the white dream girl is purely an aesthetic attraction, but nothing could be further from the truth. His motivation is often of such a bloody, hateful, bitter, and malignant nature that whites would really be hard pressed to find it flattering. . . .

For Cleaver the Negro both loves and hates white women; and it is this love-hate relationship with white women, and all other white things (hair, noses, lips, skin) that hardens into the cement of his captivity. But by countering his warm appraisal of his own

people with a hostile view of white society, Cleaver accomplishes his other purpose of formulating a propaganda that subtly bares white defenses, plays on their insecurity, and softens resistance. Cleaver's intent is to lower white self-estimation, to make inferior those who had made the blacks inferior. The goal is racist, but in reverse of the historic American pattern, substituting a myth of white inferiority for the myth of black inferiority.

GIVEN THE PSYCHO-SEXUAL outlook of his later essays, it becomes easier to understand the general social outlook of Cleaver and his friends. If the "Omnipotent Administrator," that phantasm of social primitivism, signifies sexual decay and masculine weakness, then the virile blacks should—indeed must—resist as strongly as they can the socioeconomic achievement that would lead them to similar disaster.

Therefore: the almost two million Negroes who belong to trade unions and thereby share in the economic protection and better conditions these organizations bring to all their members; the small but growing number of Negroes who are finding jobs, sometimes rather good jobs, in the universities, entertainment, and even on some managerial levels; the Negroes who are going to college and can look forward to professional careers—all of these must, by the logic of Cleaver's argument, be deflected from the temptations society now offers them, lest they be "absorbed" and thereby suffer the loss of their manhood. For blacks too can presumably become "Omnipotent Administrators."

It is not always clear, however, whether Cleaver means to advocate that blacks remain poor or outside the social structure in order to preserve their sexual superiority. At times he seems to suggest that blacks can adopt the white man's way without suffering the same consequences, and that the blacks will save white society by rejuvenating it with "soul." But, on the whole, Cleaver's demand is for separatism; far from seeing white

America saving itself, he predicts its imminent collapse. It is an argument that appeals to romantic white intellectuals who are tired of civilization's demands but who do not, of course, themselves reject its comforts or accept the vow of poverty. It also suits all kinds of conservatives who, though passionately at odds with Cleaver's cultural theoretic, view it as a handy way to buttress the status quo.

Soul on Ice embodies one of the new ideologies that have emerged since the breakdown of the liberal, legalistic, and fundamentally Christian civil-rights movement of 1954. The book rejects either openly or implicitly integration, nonviolence, and the benefits of cooperation with the white community; it replaces them with a demand for separatism, militancy, and black self-determination. More important, it marks the first successful adaptation of Old South aristocratic ideology to the black movement in the North. In Cleaver's attack on science and technology one can almost hear an echo of John C. Calhoun's description of the factory system's evils. Both have the same basic defense reaction to Northern civilization. Both share a common fear of reason and a common praise of the instinctual. Both advance an insecure elitism in behalf of a sub-culture. In their absolutism and intolerance the two men are near equals. Though no one-to-one relation is possible, the traditions of the South are very much alive in this new phase of the black struggle in America. Hopefully, Cleaver's voice will not yield the same results as Calhoun's.

In a larger context *Soul on Ice* reflects the latest wave of modern anti-intellectualism. Cleaver's praise of the instinctive, the irrational, and the physical finds close parallels in the writings of D. H. Lawrence and Wilhelm Reich. His panegyric of the body and erotic ecstacy, his insistence on the degeneracy of the intellect, and his advocacy of blood consciousness have a strong Lawrencian flavor. Both Lawrence and Cleaver predict the end of the "old world" of reason

and science: apocalypse at the doorstep. But in identifying the catalytic agent that creates the revolution of instinct, Lawrence and Cleaver differ. For Lawrence the overthrow of the existing rational structure is determined, subject to a fated cultural life-cycle, which lies outside human volition. For Cleaver the revolution has an efficient cause—that of the black American masses. Wilhelm Reich had first viewed the proletariat, the white German proletariat, as a class able to escape bourgeois values by virtue of its basic physicality. Like Cleaver, he claimed the inherent superiority of instinctual predilection as a social property of the lower classes. But where Reich propagated his philosophy of instinctual superiority directly to the slum residents of Berlin before World War II, Cleaver aims his message to a primarily white middle-class audience. This change of tactics has its significance. By employing instinctivistic ideology to strike at the ego-defenses of white middle-class America, Cleaver has started a new chapter in the history of anti-intellectualism both in America and in Europe.

The great failing of Cleaver's book, for all its force and talents, is that it does not attempt in any way to broaden perspectives on the problem of black and white relations in America. Rather than breaking through the

reader's conditioned thought-patterns and responses, it plays on them. Its doctrines of racial and biological superiority, though novel because Cleaver reverses them, have a long history of acceptance in the West. The notion that blacks are endowed with extraordinary physical prowess in bed fits well with the stereotyped "big buck," "nigger savage" notions of the most benighted Southern whites. Cleaver's scorn for the impotent, weak, degenerate intellectual and his praise of black virility have an all-too familiar ring. That Negroes suffer dreadfully from disease, malnutrition, pathology, Cleaver neglects to mention.

For many of these notions of black physical superiority Cleaver is indebted to Norman Mailer who reflects, albeit more articulately, our standard cultural assumptions. There is, however, a major difference between Cleaver and Mailer. Where Mailer, no doubt honestly, believes his own dogmatics about the Negro's superiority, Cleaver's sincerity is more difficult to determine. Even as his exaltation of the instinctive appears to be heart-felt, his attack on the decadence of white civilization seems closely attuned to—and derived from—the current tone of the dominant American culture.

These days Cleaver is comfortably read. His authenticity is never questioned because it conforms so closely to current American assumptions. The only real challenge comes in Cleaver's passages on prison life, yet few reviewers have even noted their importance. Otherwise the book is mainly an index to the times, to the terrible emotive weight of contemporary ideology; its success reflects no more than the stalled morality of the nation. In this sense, it is a bad omen. For, instead of presenting a new vision of progress toward racial equality and harmony, it demonstrates that even while proclaiming themselves free of the intellectual and psychological domination of whites, black men—even black men as gifted as Cleaver—can still be trapped in the postures and fantasies of domination.

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Black Reparations—Two Views

1. Michael Harrington

WHEN JAMES FORMAN, the militant black leader, seized the altar of the Riverside Church in order to read a demand for \$500 million in reparations for American Negroes, it was clear enough that the First Amendment to the Constitution was being violated. But not so obvious was the fact that Forman's proposal, which seems so bold at first hearing, would not really change the lot of more than 20 million black Americans at all. And by focusing attention on an outlandish scheme, which would not work in the unlikely event that it were ever tried, there is a very real danger that political energy will be diverted from the real struggle.

The civil liberties point should be obvious to everyone. The Bill of Rights' guarantee of free assembly and speech obviously means that there is protection for a peaceful meeting—or church service. Preachers and congregations, speakers and audiences, cannot exercise their constitutional freedoms if they are forever glancing nervously over their shoulders to see if some new act of guerrilla theater is about to disrupt the assemblage.

What is not so plain, but still true, is that Forman's seeming militancy on economic questions only revives an old, and utterly unradical, utopia that distracts people from the real battle against poverty.

From time to time, people look at the outrageous, indefensible extremes of wealth and poverty in this society—or in the world—

and propose to deal with the problem by dividing up the wealth. The most famous American in recent history to come up with this notion was Huey Long, the Louisiana Kingfish. It is ironic that a Dixiecrat dictator must be identified as a precursor of this new demand of black militants.

The trouble with such proposals is that they do not provide much money to the people and leave the real sources of wealth untouched. If, as Robert Heilbroner computed the figures in his *Limits of American Capitalism*, one had divided the \$70 billion (not \$500 million) of corporate profits in the mid-sixties, it would have increased income by \$1000 per person, a gain of 20–25 per cent. If one simply distributed the dividends (and if the American economy were to continue on to the next year, a major share of those profits would have to go into new investment), the average gain would have been about \$250 a year. And that would not even make a dent in existing poverty.

IN FORMAN'S VERSION of the redistributive utopia, the pie is much smaller at \$500 million but the recipients are to be limited to the 23 million blacks in the country. If that sum were simply divvied up, it would mean around \$20 per year, which is not enough to keep an average smoker in cigarettes.

Even in a more expanded and sophisticated statement of the plan, which Forman developed in a *New York Times* interview, the same economic realities devil his idea. A

good portion of the money would be put to nonprofit uses such as supporting community organizations, a black university, and help for the Welfare Rights Organization. The amount that would remain for investment in potentially profitable enterprises, like television networks and publications, would not make it remotely possible even to begin to compete with the giant units of American capitalism. In 1967, General Motors alone had an annual product of \$20.2 billion.

In short, the "huge industrial combines" which Mr. Forman seeks will not be built on a budget that is roughly equal to the \$275 million the cigarette industry spends on television and radio advertising in a year.

Now there is little likelihood that Forman will get a half billion dollars to spend on his impossible vision. But it is quite possible that, even as he denounces the very real scandal of unequal income distribution in America, particularly between black and

white, he will be keeping his people from challenging this injustice. For his proposal could well divert precious political energies from the actual struggle.

In the immediate future that battle has two crucial aspects. There must be genuine full employment, which means eliminating underemployment, as well as joblessness. And one of the most important ways to accomplish this is through a massive, planned, and social investment on the part of the government to do away with the slums and to create new careers for the poor in health care, education, beautification, and the like. Such an approach would not parcel out the wealth of this society—which is so enormous and productive because it is concentrated—but would increasingly assert democratic and social control of it.

Unwittingly, Mr. Forman has demanded far too much to be politically feasible and too little to be economically practical.

2. *Arnold S. Kaufman*

IS IT REALLY NECESSARY to remind readers of *DISSENT* that in politics what people intend is often different from what they actually bring about? In trying to evaluate a political deed, one ought to consider likely, even if unintended, consequences. That James Forman may mistakenly believe that, without governmental action, he will be able to extract enough from churches and other nongovernmental agencies to repair the lives of black Americans does not reveal the full political significance of his effort to induce churches to pay reparations.

The fact is that Forman's audacious demand comes at a crucial moment in the evolution of American thought about problems of social justice. For reasons mostly of self-interest, various corporate agencies are beginning to satisfy claims that restitution be

made to the descendants of the only group of Americans that has ever been literally enslaved. To illustrate, several years ago a few local leaders of the civil rights movement in Ann Arbor, Michigan, asked key university officials to institute on-the-job secretarial training for black women. The request was rejected on grounds that training office help was the job of the local business college; that the university could not comply with demands made by every aggrieved pressure group that came down the pike. Today the program then rejected exists; so do a number of other compensatory programs. These gains were won, it is true, principally because political threats were effectively applied. But the political pressure was fueled by growing moral concern.

The real political significance of Jim For-

man's move is that it elevates controversy about what was in any event happening slowly and grudgingly into a great debate concerning matters of basic moral principle. By dramatizing a claim that transcends prevailing moral consensus, a new and powerful consideration is injected that reinforces growth of the constituency of conscience upon whom both Mike Harrington and I found much political hope.

And just in the nick of time. For it is inevitable that men of "moderation and responsibility" would claim—as did Eric Sevareid in one of his recent CBS commentaries—that there is no justice in visiting the sins of the fathers on the sons. That at least is how the compensatory claims strike most people whose moral point of view is rooted deeply in an ethic that has always tended to serve the sons of privilege. Now if, as a result of Forman's action, morally concerned citizens can be persuaded that Sevareid's argument as it applies to the sons of slaves is untenable, then the political will to support vast enlargement of compensatory *governmental* programs will be strengthened. That is, moral issues raised concretely in relation to the action of nongovernmental corporations will have a significant impact on legislative action. Indeed, the Freedom Budget, still-born during the Johnson administration, may be revived if a growing constituency of conscience can be brought to accept the case for compensatory justice.

Compensatory justice, as I intend it here, is not the same as the principle of restitution to which appeal was made when Jews demanded compensation of Germans. The Jews received payment from the same groups whose members were, in one way or another, personally implicated in responsibility for the sin of genocide. Forman's demand for compensation differs radically in this respect. The sons of privilege are being asked to compensate the sons of slaves whether or not the former are responsible for the disabilities of the latter. It is this aspect of the moral situation that caused Sevareid to claim that For-

man wants to visit the sins of fathers upon sons. But Sevareid misses a subtle, yet fundamental distinction. It is not claimed that the sons of slave-masters are sinners because their fathers sinned. Rather, the demand that the sons of slave-masters make restitution to the sons of slaves rests on the claim that the former enjoy great and undeserved benefits, the latter suffer grave and undeserved disabilities, as a result of accidents of social inheritance directly connected to the existence of slavery.

THE BASIC ARGUMENT is this: suppose benefits acquired unjustly by an identifiable group of fathers are transmitted by alterable institutions of social inheritance to their identifiable descendants; suppose similarly the disabilities of those originally enslaved are transmitted by social inheritance to their descendants. The sons of slave-masters continue to profit, the sons of slaves to suffer the disabilities of the original iniquity. Under these conditions the sons of slaves have rights of compensation against the sons of slave-masters. To the extent that others, by reason of the accident of skin-pigmentation, have been able to climb aboard the hereditary train of privilege, they derivatively acquire obligations of restitution comparable to those to which the sons of slave-masters are subject. This line of argument cuts so hard against inherited privilege that it should appeal to democratic socialists.

The principle of compensatory justice can be made politically relevant to existing conditions. The generality of America's affluent white population share in the benefits extracted from slaves. The generality of America's black population suffer the disabilities that resulted from slavery. The accident of skin pigmentation here can be made to work to the advantage of justice. Political demands designed to satisfy compensatory claims can as safely be translated into public policy as, say, political demands designed to satisfy the claims to justice of the poor. For, while most of the poor are "deserving," there are un-

doubtedly some who are, in Herbert Spencers' words, "good-for-nothings, who in one way or other live on the good-for-somethings." But most civilized Americans have long ago concluded that if a small number of wastrels happen to be benefited by policies designed to achieve justice for those entitled to welfare programs, then that is a cost that a society as affluent as ours should happily pay.

It might be added that the personal responsibility of those affected by compensatory programs is not wholly irrelevant to the case for compensatory justice. For those who enjoy benefits because of social inheritance and original injustice are not personally responsible for their gains—hence, they don't *deserve* their advantages. Those who suffer disabilities because of social inheritance, correspondingly do not *deserve* their unhappy state.

I have not given the whole case for a policy of restitution—only the part of the argument that most people are likely to regard as doubtful. Nor have I examined arguments that might be made to justify overriding the claim of compensatory justice in specific situations.* All I have tried to do is open debate on a far-reaching claim that lies at the heart of Forman's demand for restitution. Even if his success in getting churches to pay restitution falls far short of what the churches

should give, even if complete success would fall far short of what is socially needed and justified, the dramatic way in which the demand has been made is likely to have beneficial political consequences. For, by raising the issue in a fashion that catches public attention, discussion within the growing constituency of conscience has been energized, and the political thrust of demands for compensation is likely to have a greater impact on government. Already the religious community has been split; the Catholic archdiocese of New York rejecting, certain Protestant denominations accepting the validity of Forman's general claim. (Here is irony indeed, for the compensatory principle is close to certain ancient teachings of the Catholic Church, whereas the whole idea is alien to the Protestant moral tradition.)

Note also that I have not discussed how and to whom the funds due America's black men should be given. To answer the arguments given by insisting that Forman and those he represents are not the proper recipients of compensatory funds is beside the point. The questions of who and how are enormously important technicalities that can be dealt with once the basic claims to justice are acknowledged and a political will to satisfy them is organized. There is little reason to think that that good old American know-how will fail us once the objective is clearly defined and generally accepted.

* I do discuss some of the counterarguments, but all too briefly, in my book, *The Radical Liberal* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), pp. 100–103.

Harvard—Feints at Revolution

DISSENT is pleased to announce that beginning with this issue Robert Lekachman, the distinguished economist and social analyst, will write a column of comment on U.S. domestic affairs in every other issue.—Ed.

HARVARD is no more like other American universities than rich people are like the rest of us. This is partly because the place is truly richer than other universities. At Harvard the consequences of opulence are to be seen in the brilliant quality of its faculty, its ability to restore a flagging department to the first rank by calmly making offers to the best people at other institutions (who rejects a Harvard offer?), the high ratio of space to people, and the quasi-luxury in which the undergraduates live. The suites shared by two students at Harvard would be cut up among four to six Stony Brook students. For someone like myself, a visitor for a year whose academic associations in the past have been with Columbia and Stony Brook, what is still more striking than the sense of ease and spaciousness (there are windows in the Widener stacks!) is the tone of rational civility which adorns both student and faculty relationships. There is a gentleness of manner, a courtesy toward opposing opinion, a human respect and tolerance which, alas, I have not elsewhere encountered in anything like the same degree.

But if all of this is accurate, how could “it” have happened here? The “it” at issue is the same dreary sequence of SDS building occupation, police bust, “radicalization” of moderates, faculty unhappiness and guilt, and general turmoil.

I shall approach my own interpretation of the events through the issue of violence. Violent methods, assert President Pusey and his admirer James Reston, have no place on

university campuses. I agree. Armed blacks filing out of academic buildings (reputedly their leaders had arranged to sell pictures of the exit to *Life*), rowdies overturning catalogue cases and heaving furniture through plate glass windows, white bullies clubbing elderly professors (or even young ones), such events, should they become commonplace, will truly shut down the universities. It is platitudinous to repeat that universities which function only through consent and some sense of shared objective are defenseless in the face of violence if that violence is condoned by a very large proportion of the university’s own community. Equally disastrous is the sort of calculated disruption of classes in which King Collins and his supporters engaged for a time here in Cambridge.

Unfortunately these are the easy cases, not of course in the sense that there is agreement on how to handle them but in the sense that almost everybody in the academic community, save the perpetrators themselves, can be brought to condemn vandalism and violence against persons. Harvard is an example of the harder variety of cases which, fortunately, are also the more frequent. The two or three hundred students who occupied University Hall in the middle of Harvard Yard did so with no more violence against persons than was entailed by the gentle carrying out of a popular dean from the building after he refused to leave voluntarily. As the *New Yorker* described the event, a student trailed behind the dean, solicitously picking up the objects that fell out of his

pockets and restoring them to his possession.

At the time of occupation, the Harvard administration had a problem grimly familiar to other university officials but so novel here that no advance planning had apparently been performed despite the abundant warning SDS had given of its springtime intentions. University Hall is no ordinary building. It is stuffed with confidential correspondence and records. If, as was subsequently alleged, Harvard officials feared that the rebels would reproduce and circulate the juicier items (as in fact the local New Left paper, *The Old Mole*, did), and if this fear overrode all conflicting considerations, then the thing to have done was call the police just as soon as it became certain that the demonstrators would not leave their prize voluntarily and instantly. But this was not done, and the failure to do so casts considerable doubt on the University's rationalization of the choice that it did make.

The other possible courses of action were three. The administration could simply have outwaited the demonstrators. I agree with Tom Wicker's judgment in the May 1 *New York Times* that "They had the alternative . . . of waiting five more hours until a mass meeting of moderate students called for 10:00 A.M." My impression coincides with Wicker's that ". . . this meeting might well have condemned the students who seized the building," and that such condemnation might have persuaded the far-from-unified rebels to give up. There was a second nonpolice response possible. Within the building SDS had voted nonviolent resistance to removal. The administration might well have taken SDS at its word, sent in a force of the rather fatherly campus security police, and then lifted the demonstrators out bodily.

In the event, President Pusey and then-Dean Ford anticipated the sermon that President Nixon delivered, when he urged ". . . faculties, boards of trustees and school administrators to have the backbone to stand up against this kind of situation." So it was

that the cops came, after centuries of restraint, free at last to club the uppity college kids. They did it with their usual impartiality among leaders, followers, newspaper reporters, and curious bystanders. Anyone in Harvard Yard at five in the morning of a chilly April day was ipso facto guilty of something.

What is one to say? Practically, the police action produced the consequences quite cynically anticipated by SDS groups everywhere in the country. Police violence horrified moderate students and faculty and caused them quite to forget that SDS had started the whole affair by occupying University Hall. Such as they are, the police are the legal agents of law enforcement. The students, as later court proceedings found, were guilty of trespass and no doubt deserved their \$20 fines. President Pusey exercised the right he legally possessed to invoke legitimate authority against illegitimate action. He had simply turned the problem over, as he later observed, to the professional handling of the police. On the face of it Harvard's legal position was impeccable.

But its legal position is also totally irrelevant, for the simple reason that the violence against property which SDS committed seemed trivial to the campus community in comparison to the violence against persons which the University's legal response entailed. To object that SDS yearned for the police bust and treasured the brutality of the cops is simply to underline the bone-headedness of the university administration's meek compliance with SDS's assignment of the role of political villain.

This is not to be interpreted as the equivalent of a flat ban in all circumstances upon the use of police on university grounds; but it is an affirmation of the absolute necessity, in view of both police habits and campus opinion, of prior exhaustion of nonpolice solutions. SDS grasped very early in its spectacular career what many college administrators still appear not to have realized: *the critical importance of moderate faculty*

and student opinion. This the Harvard administration arrogantly disregarded. The results were a general student strike and a faculty resolution that stopped just short of open, public criticism of the Harvard administration. Neither group believed that their administrators had exhausted peaceful remedies. And I must say that I agree with the judgment.

Here at Harvard the situation seems stabilized and the outlook is quite promising. After all, by comparison with Cornell, Columbia, or Queens what happened was quite mild. I should go further in the direction of affirmative statement. I have seldom been so warmed by a university occasion as I was by the mass meeting organized by the Memorial Church group of moderates on the Monday following the police action. At the peak of attendance there must have been at least 10,000 people in Soldier's Field, on a glorious spring day. It was a great meeting, stylishly conducted by a young history instructor. All parties listened respectfully to each other's positions and resolutions. Popular professors like Stanley Hoffmann of the government department and Juan Marichal of Romance Languages were cheered even though they were urging their audience to return to their classes and terminate the strike. The crowd heard SDS quite attentively even though its spokesman declared that SDS would not be bound by the decisions of the assemblage. *Life* to the contrary notwithstanding, the students responded in good humor to the plaintive plea of a youngster who asked the chance to return to "his physics." Trembling in the air was a yearning for a better community, a sense of very attractive, intelligent, young people trying to do something to improve their immediate environment.

Why not? At Harvard faculty and students like both each other and their university enough so that it is hard to take seriously the existence of any real threat to the place.

Bully for Harvard, but what about lesser institutions not so favored by

fortune? I find it much harder to be cheerful about the general academic prospect than I do about Harvard. The surge of demands for Black Studies programs, deriving from the entirely comprehensible black aspiration toward the creation of a usable past, clashes with the intractable or apparently intractable fact that there are pitifully few scholars who by conventional criteria are qualified to conduct such programs. Whose fault is this? Whitey's, naturally. Blacks quite justly blame the white intellectual community which until about yesterday grossly neglected the black man in American history. The upshot of the emotion is the certainty that practically every college and university will have something called a Black Studies program. Almost everywhere the faculty to be recruited will be chosen as much by reason of empathy with their black students as by any other criterion. In most places the programs will not be intellectually reputable. One simply hopes that the frantic efforts now underway to train scholars of black history and literature will speedily produce a flow of Ph.D.'s adequate to meet the demand. The immediate, possibly even the proper, price to be paid by the white academic community for its past delinquencies and complacencies is the addition of some low-grade educational activities. An unsympathetic outsider might well respond, what is new about university acceptance of low quality, nonintellectual courses that carry the same credits and even-tuate in the same diplomas as does more respectable academic fare? All the same, it is a pity that black students will again be getting shoddy merchandise.

DISCONTENT among white students is something else. SDS, which has done poorly among black students, has displayed a canny talent for arousing the consciences of white students about a range of issues stretching from war and peace, through university democracy, ROTC, and Black Studies, to university real estate and investment policies. It helps not in the slightest to say that SDS

itself cares little if anything about such issues and quite cynically grasps at those which are handiest in order to "politicize" and "radicalize" fellow students and their teachers. Many moderates among students and faculty are uneasily aware that they have not devoted enough of their time and energy to the topics the SDS agenda has rudely thrust upon them.

Examples abound, but let me cite just one comparatively minor Harvard illustration. Before the University Hall occupation, the Harvard faculty, responding to earlier student pressure, finally got around to an alteration of the status of ROTC on the campus. For my part the presence of an ROTC unit on a campus does not seem outrageous. I see no special reason why students who elect to do so should not have available to them the opportunity to become officers. So long as we have an army there is something to be said for filling its officer corps with Ivy League rather than Texas A and M graduates. But the faculty debate did reveal to me a condition that was outrageous. This is the automatic membership on the Harvard faculty which is enjoyed by the commander of each ROTC unit. What is one to think of a body of scholars so indifferent to its own membership rules that it accepts into the club a man selected by the Pentagon on grounds quite irrelevant to the usual scholarly criteria? In fact, how could such a body do other than yield to the demands of black students for a powerful voice in the selection of the faculty of the new Black Studies program? They are likely to employ better standards than the Pentagon.

George Wald had it right in his *New York Times* piece when he criticized faculties for what he called a severe shortage of adult unrest. The crisis of legitimacy through which the universities are now passing is partly an issue of who is explicitly to govern. This is a matter of the redistribution of the formal powers now entrusted to trustees, administrators, and, more ambiguously, to faculties.

It is not that universities are autocracies, but that in crises formal powers become real powers. It is during the crises that academic communities realize with a sudden sense of shocked astonishment that the seven members of the Harvard Corporation (who are recruited in the same manner as the College of Cardinals) can really execute their delicately-worded threat to close down the University in the face of repeated disorder.

Government of universities by this combination of authoritarianism and inattention endures just so long as practically nobody cares very much. As long as students content themselves with study, romance, and frisbees, and teachers entertain themselves with research and consulting, the administration can tacitly be trusted to run the store. But once the store and its mode of operation become themselves objects of concern, the explicit lack of democracy in the formal charters of universities becomes an urgent and quite genuine topic of controversy. Nobody cheerfully surrenders power. All the same, there is a fair prospect that in the coming years something like a diffusion of responsibility among the major university constituencies will take place.

I wish that I could feel equally cheerful about another aspect of legitimacy, at least as defined by many students. It gives one pause to realize that the students who are most militant seem to come overwhelmingly from the humanities and the social sciences. At Harvard the law students paid little heed to the student strike and spent their time discussing their own grievances. The medical students concentrated on the consequences of medical school expansion to the community. For their part the business students greeted Mr. Pusey with the only cheers that he could have received during the weeks after the bust, at least from the Harvard community. One can hold assorted opinions about the social value of business, legal, or even medical training but what is undeniable is the "hardness" of each curriculum—the

difficult, specific techniques which must be mastered and the equally specific vocational and financial targets which successful command of the techniques equips students to hit. The same observation applies to students in the natural sciences and, to a degree, in economics—the most “scientific,” the “hardest” of the social sciences.

What concerns students is nothing novel in the criticism of American social science. It is the complacent tendency of the specialists to busy themselves endlessly with the tedious refinement of techniques that answer the sort of small questions asked by scholars who are content with the society in which they work and live. A generation ago Robert Lynd's *Knowledge for What?* castigated his colleagues on these grounds. More recently C. Wright Mills's *Sociological Imagination* addressed itself somewhat intemperately but extremely perceptively to the same issues. Students realize, even if their teachers frequently do not, that social scientists who

pride themselves on the “value-free” quality of their work actually choose problems, modes of investigation, and consequent research outcomes which support existing institutions and the distribution of political and economic power within them.

Save in a narrow vocational sense, the social sciences have failed their more concerned students. It is to their credit that the young radicals working within the professional societies in the social sciences are not content with shaking plums from the money tree of federal and private subsidy. I for one am uneasily conscious that in querying the legitimacy of much that passes for social science, they have a point.

I have had my say and I offer this pledge to anyone who has stayed with me to the end. In what I write for future issues I shall comment no further upon the academic scene. Already too many have written too much too soon. At least in *DISSENT*, I shall sin no more.

The Hippies as Contrameritocracy

HIPPIES SEEM TO FASCINATE the mass media somewhat less than they did a year or two ago. But they have not disappeared. Older Hippies, who refused to reconvert to straight society, have moved from Haight Ashbury to Big Sur or other places more removed from the tourist trade. "Communes" have sprung up in rural or urban settings, and Hippies are less noticeable now that some of their fashions have become part of youth culture. Some say that Hippies have become Yippies: they have renounced nonviolence and political indifference in favor of active provocation and resistance. Others say the Yippies are an invention of the mass media. The "mother-fucker" wing of SDS seems to consist of "Hipster"-type Hippies attracted by the pornography of violence.

But regardless of the vagaries of fashion that permit successive cohorts of youth to differentiate themselves from one another, the Hippie phenomenon seems here to stay, not merely as a variety of the perennial bohemian fringe well described some years ago by Ned Polsky in this magazine,¹ but as a social movement of some significance.

It is likely that Hippies, ostentatiously doing their thing even in Traverse City, Michigan, are an intrinsic part of the post-industrial world. My hypothesis is that there is developing in the United States (and probably in other industrialized countries of the West) a *contrameritocracy* which offers the failures or dropouts of the achievement society a haven that neutralizes the pains of failure. Until now this antiachievement society was located either at the very top or

bottom. At the upper-class level we had "café society," at the bottom disorganized working-class elements and hoboes. (The underworld, by contrast, has an achievement orientation.) By its nature, the upper class cannot endorse the achievement criteria of the middle class. It must shift the grounds of status from occupational achievement to family-rooted superiorities: ancientness of dynasty, graceful living, and a commitment to *noblesse oblige*. Style is more important than the consequences of action. The upper class also supports the more high-brow forms of art; for this appreciation seems to require special gifts not available to conventional middle-class patrons. In its struggle against the middle class it is often led to disparage the values of hard work, thrift, and personal restraint in favor of an ethic of prowess flowing from inherent traits of personality ("breeding"). The "Jet Set" is the militant expression of the antiachievement aspect of the upper-class ethos.

In the past few years, however, the Jet Set has become more and more a transmission belt into some sections of the middle class for fashions, mannerisms, and ideology originating mainly in the Hippie movement. This is because the Hippie movement has become the effective center of the contrameritocracy in the United States and probably also in England, though in Japan, Germany, Italy, and France, New Left patterns have been more important. The New Left copes with the threat of failure by asserting that opportunity for achievement does not really exist, since it is monopolized by a nation's power elite. The Hippie movement claims that the opportunities offered by the meritocracy must not be pursued if man is to save

¹ "The Village Beat Scene; Summer 1960," by Ned Polsky. *DISSENT* Summer 1961.

his soul. It has become the effective center of the contrameritocracy, because its values and behavior patterns permit a thorough and enthusiastic alienation, and because its critique, whatever its "scientific" value, offers a disturbing challenge to society.

It is my contention that the Hippie movement is made up of youths who are overcommitted to the basic middle-class values but are unwilling to realize those values in the occupational world. Since their attachment to middle-class values makes them unwilling to enter the world of juvenile delinquency, there remain for them the patterns of heroic value commitment and expressive behavior, through which they align their stand with that of the upper class—but without the latter's devotion to graceful living and essential conservatism. The Hippie movement is a religious sect through which the members reach what they feel to be the highest levels of value achievement, and thus they attempt to bring salvation to the corrupt society that rejects them. The use of the adjective "religious" is justified by the constant reference in the Hippie movement to nonrational, non-empirical forces, its concern with the ultimate ends and meanings of life, and its relative immunity to organizational failure. To describe the Hippie movement as "religious" is also warranted by the fact that members of the movement are willing to give its basic values primacy in guiding their personal development, regardless of loss or disapproval.

HIPPIES GIVE ABSOLUTE allegiance to two values: universal love and the unique value of the individual. Of the Christian religions, Eastern-Orthodox Catholicism is the most collectively oriented and Puritanism the most individualistic.

The Hippie movement, I would suggest, represents a further emphasis on this individualism. For the Puritan ethos the value of the individual in his uniqueness lies in his imitation of Christ, his struggle to act

continuously in such a way as to be consistent with the search for the City of Light; but this struggle is hampered, of course, by inner temptations representing the weight of the flesh. In the Puritan ethos there is one strain implying that actions of the elect have an inherent goodness; and then, in its liberal version this becomes the belief that all men are intrinsically good and that with effort, learning, and self-control anyone can succeed in "realizing himself." But whether fundamentalist or liberal, the Puritan ethos is suspicious of pleasure and holds that the direction of the good lies away from gratification of the flesh. The uniqueness of the individual resides in the unpredictable diversity of his struggles with the world and the flesh. An act, to be good, must be a personal effort rather than represent compliance with Church and State. While "nobody can tell you what to do" in any particular situation, the direction is nevertheless clear and common to all men: they must build the City of God on earth.

Though it has roots in the Puritan ethos, the Hippie conception of uniqueness is different. For the Hippie all men are good if only they give way to their nature, as against the pressures of the social structure. Hence, uniqueness will be found in the cultivation of sincerity and spontaneity. Since all individuals are equally valuable and worthy of love, the desires of each merit realization. Nor is there suspicion of pleasure as a guide to action, and of sensual pleasure in particular. But sensual pleasure is seen not so much in its hedonistic light (there is some of this, no doubt) but as a sign of what the individual needs, and a guarantee against domination by others. One must always do what one wants to do; anything else is subordination and loss of independence, *ergo* loss of individuality. Self-expression should know only one limit dictated by the love of others: the other's need for his own self expression.

The high valuation of love is in line with

all the major religions. In the Hippie movement this is not to remain an abstract dedication to others but must become a warm openness toward all human beings such as precludes competitiveness at any level. In the Western world, at least, men are supposed to love their families and be receptive to outsiders, but they are also supposed to be able to enter into limited relations that are dominated by objectively measured exchanges. Outside the family and friendship, direct expression of the value of love is limited to a willingness to cooperate on the neighborhood or job level, or to a general respect for the rules of the game even if cheating would bring immediate returns. But the Hippie commitment to love goes beyond all this: it implies a permanent willingness to share all of one's possessions with anyone who might require them. It also implies a refusal to judge anyone or to give a person a label like thief, convict, addict, because the code of love requires that the individual always be given another chance—and without expecting anything in return. In fact, love is seen by the Hippies as the normal expression of man unless he is hampered and perverted by social structure: the meritocratic rat race destroys love. The Hippie community, which assembles those who dedicate themselves to the value of love, takes on a special sanctity, for it demonstrates the possibility of creating groups where men can be together without conformity, discrimination, or jealousy. Within the group all resources are shared and a good deal of time is spent in the sheer enjoyment of each other's company.

The value of the individual and the value of love find their first combined specifications in the cult of sincerity, the cult of independence, and the imperative of "keeping your cool." The valuation of sincerity is definitely in line with the Puritan ethos, not just in the "I cannot tell a lie" sense but, more important, as part of the search for inner consistency—since every action must reflect

the election of the soul. Embracing this value with a vengeance, Hippies turn it against the adult world; they describe the relations between adults—with their mental reservations, their limited commitments, their unwillingness to raise issues irrelevant to an immediate problem—as "playing games."

Love is to be shared with all mankind, by contrast with the narrow capacities of the adults who are usually limited to family, friends, ethnic, and national similars. The Hippies want all relationships to be total or at least potentially total. No role differentiation for them: merely human beings, face-to-face, intent on love rather than on manipulating each other for selfish ends.

Another specification in line with the American ethos is the Hippies' high valuation of independence. A man and a woman should be financially and emotionally independent from any other man or woman. This does not preclude developing attachments to particular individuals, but those attachments must involve complete reciprocity and never act as binding obligations upon the other. In order to be valid, a relationship must be totally spontaneous and sincere (there is a tendency to see these two kinds of behavior as synonymous). In the optic of universal love, whether one has a special attachment to someone else is not crucial. What replaces love between man and woman is not hatred or indifference, but simply universal love. If anything, romantic love is under some suspicion, for it tends to withdraw people from the magic circle of universal love. One should not be "hung up" on anything or anybody, one should "keep his cool."

The imperative of "keeping your cool" is strangely in line with the Puritan norm of self-control, although it is certainly not the English version of self-control with its inhibition of aggression and sexual expression. More than a restraint upon self-expression, it is a warning that one should be able to disconnect any relationship that turns out

to be upsetting. One should never be so "hung up" on anything, or on any single relationship, that one is led to lose one's temper or feel inordinate grief; one should not allow anyone to possess another human being. Thus, the world can never threaten the Hippie effectively. Is not this antagonism to the "ties of the flesh" very similar to the attitude of the Puritan divines in the 17th century?

Another meaning of "cool" is awareness. The Hippie must never be "taken in" by society, but he must at all times keep his distance from the role relationships he may be compelled to enter. "To be cool" is to dominate through intelligence and analysis any potentially distasteful involvement in the world. In Puritanism potential conflicts between high valuation of the individual and high valuation of universal love are limited by the doctrine of original sin, which states that in and of himself the individual cannot reach perfection: he needs the aid of grace which permits him access to a perfection the model of which is outside the individual. Through denial of the self-directed impulse the individual demonstrates his state of grace, and the universal principles of morality (the Kantian categorical imperative) provide the rationale of self-restraint. Service combines inner direction and integration into the community, without foregoing the disruptive potentials of both the economic entrepreneur and the moral entrepreneur à la Thoreau.

Having abandoned the concept of original sin, the Hippies deny the relevance of any universal standard of morality. A person must do his own thing: only thus can he realize the good within him. Caught between what the sociologist must see as the conflicts inherent in a doctrine that stresses values impossible of simultaneous maximization (the cult of personal experience or independence and the cult of community, the cult of spontaneity and the high valuation on keeping cool), there is a tendency among Hippies

toward a split in values: some choose an individualistic and hedonistic pattern, which Norman Mailer described as the "hipster" life, and others a mystic pattern that strives to deny ego needs or fuses them into the needs of the group. The latter part of the Hippie movement has been attracted by Eastern philosophies, mainly Hindu or Taoist, for they structure a system of thought in which intuition, vision, telepathy, and modulated emotion are preferred ways to the truth. These philosophies hold out the promise that man may rinse the soul of Ego in the narrower and greedy sense of the term.

The resolution of these contradictions, and the cohabitation of both the hipster and the mystic in the same communities, will be easier if spontaneous and sincere action stays away from places where facilities are scarce and where the pleasure of one may lessen the opportunities of the other. It will also be easier if one avoids complex forms of cooperative action where the pay-off is long in coming and where those who possess the highest technical skills must make sure they have the cooperation of the less skillful. Luckily, the most valued activity for the Hippie is the expression, and hopefully the creative expression, of inner moods through various art forms, or simply and more frequently, through the spontaneity of the "scene." And here the Hippies part from the Puritan ethos with its emphasis on active mastery of the environment. We have instead a primacy of expressive activities, which is reflected in the Hippies' devotion to culture, especially to culture of an avant-garde type. In painting their tastes go from the most advanced abstractionists to op and pop art. In writing there are a series of seers such as Kerouac (less liked now that he has become too establishment-oriented), Alan Ginsberg, Ferlinghetti, Herman Hesse, Corso, Burroughs, Ken Kesey, Selby, Tolkien, Kahlil Gibran. All poetry either far-out in style or sexual in content will be appreciated or

given the benefit of the doubt. Poetry is preferred to novels because it is less rational in construction, more spontaneous, and apparently does not take as long to write. Many Hippies, when asked what they do, will answer "I write"; they usually mean poetry.

A function of this cult of culture is to upgrade the self-imputed status of the Hippie. Not only is he superior to all members of society who do not share his interest, but he is also superior to those who do not give to this interest the same dedication.

Yet the cult of culture requires less effort than might be thought. In many ways Hippies have a relation to high-brow culture similar to that of upper-class people. They know the writers and the artists, or know someone who claims to know them. There is a set vocabulary to assimilate and use at proper moments. There are taste leaders who give the proper cues as to what should be admired. Above all, Hippies see themselves as creators in their own right, even if the only object of their creation is their own mood when under the influence of drugs.

ANY GROUP whose ideas deviate significantly from the surrounding community has the problem of maintaining solidarity among members whose reason for belonging lies precisely in their social maladjustment. The cohesion and continuity of the group will be furthered if it develops a high ethnocentrism and reduces its relationships to the outside world as much as possible to martyrdom and proselytism.

The high ethnocentrism in the Hippie community leads to two consequences. The first is its justification of an exploitative relation to the outside world. Sponging on welfare and petty thievery in record shops, bookstores, university libraries, and supermarkets is accepted because, supposedly, there is a state of war between the square (or "straight") world and the Hippies, a war that is the sole responsibility of the former.

Friendly patrons can be used without any commitment on the Hippie's part, since fundamentally they are still the enemy and, after all, they are repaid by the pleasure derived from giving. It encourages a feeling of mutual dependence, the fraternity of the trenches. Merely by belonging to the group, the Hippie gets a feeling of being one of the chosen few. Tolerance is justified because the failings of the chosen are minor in comparison with the importance of being among the chosen.

Two ideological tenets reinforce this ethnocentrism. One is "catastrophism," the belief that the world is soon to be obliterated because squares in their ignorance, folly, and meanness are bound to unleash atomic war, thereby making nonsense of middle-class planning and postponement of gratification. The second belief is "miserabilism" or "pastoralism," which states that the more outside the system an individual is, the less likely is his native goodness to be corrupted. And since the Hippie identifies with the Noble Savage, he can worship his own group without having to bear the burden of the sin of pride. Examples of the Noble Savage are the Negro, the itinerant worker, and, more recently, the Indian.

The tense relationship between the outside world and the Hippie community is maintained by "blowing people's minds," the use of drugs, and work avoidance. "Blowing people's minds" is the obverse of "keeping your cool": its purpose is to shock, disconcert, and thus help disintegrate the "unhealthy" psychological structures of outsiders.

Always permissible against squares, this is supposed to force people to face the futility of their present course of action and make them accept the new wisdom incarnated in the act that "blew their mind." The capacity to blow people's minds has been the only approved way to express aggression,²

² The past tense seems indicated here because there seems to have been a shift away from non-violence, e.g. the recent Chicago (August 1968) slogan "Kill the Pigs" (the police). It is difficult

because in its essence it is supposed to be an act of love. Retelling of occasions where "blowing someone's mind" was done successfully against squares is one of the ways prestige is built. And "blowing people's minds" has the advantage of shying clear of police reprisal: it may shock, it may be an act of exquisite cruelty, but it is unlikely to be a legal misdemeanor.

Squares have their minds blown when Hippies offer the spectacle of their decorative spontaneity, in their clothing, hair styles, profanity, public love-making or undressing, gifts of flowers to policemen, sleeping in the streets, in the frenzy and bawdiness of their music, integrated love-making, and self-righteous begging. The "love-in" becomes a sort of Hippie revival meeting. Blowing people's minds is the way to proselytize the world; but it is not an attempt to influence through dialectic, for the choice of the true way must remain one's own. To influence someone is to restrict his freedom.

Releasing the primacy of expressive activities need not result in the kind of achievement valued by squares: the drug cult is proof that one can gain pleasure without having to pay the price of work and self-denial, and that the road to happiness is not through competition. When one has some marijuana one shares it with others, and when they have some they reciprocate.

It is the secret weed around which rituals of solidarity and mutual love are organized, for Hippies believe that taking drugs together can lead people to mystical kinds of experiences that may link them forever, even if they should never again see each other. Drugs prove that the inner state (pleasure, revela-

tion) is the important goal, rather than trying to modify the outside world.

A frequent belief among Hippies is that we do not normally use more than 10 percent of our brain power, and that drugs, especially of the LSD variety, permit the expansion of one's consciousness by going beyond the structures of thought derived from role playing and "status games." Thus drug takers are privy to a wisdom that is beyond the grasp of any square, however learned he may be.³

Drugs play a major role in cementing the solidarity of the Hippie community. For new members the use of drugs becomes a rite of passage, a way of teaching proper techniques of appreciation. It also serves as a sign of mutual recognition among Hippies and a way to maintain the hostility of the square community.

Avoidance of work is equally crucial to the integration of the Hippie community. As the opposite of spontaneity, work is a constraint upon one's fulfillment because it subverts the individual in his uniqueness. Hippies reject the alienation of work because it always requires some and often much self-denial.

Hippies also reject the commitment to exchange that is implicit in work. While the classical Puritan ethos sees in work the idea of service, for the Hippie the impersonality of the market to which work is oriented either directly or implicitly condemns work as a force separating individuals from one another.

The worst form of work is, of course, that which is most common in the modern world, work in the bureaucratic context, which is said to heighten impersonality and subordination and to remove people from nature. The Hippie might try his hand at some craft which puts him into intimate rela-

to determine, however, whether this was a slogan pushed mainly by the SDS, Maoists, and Trotskyites, and to what extent it was taken up by the new Yippies, the old-style Hippies, and the "straight" McCarthy youth. Furthermore, the slogan seems often part of the pornography of violence rather than an effective commitment. The police, unfortunately, do not always seem aware of the difference.

³ It is conceivable that drugs may not be necessary anymore, say some of the older Hippies. They were a shortcut, a way of discovering where "it was at," but the true sage should be able to gain peace and wisdom without them.

tion with wood, stone, plants—but not with IBM cards and paper clips. To paint, carve, write, or play music is not to work but, on the contrary, to do what one wants, regardless of whether others like the product or not.

Beatniks of the type described by Polsky in 1961 went to great extremes to avoid work, but Hippies will occasionally work at some semiskilled jobs. Men may do house painting and decorating, janitoring, cab driving, bartending, and mail delivery. Girls will do waitressing,⁴ Kelly girling, thesis typing, modeling, or clerking.

THE HIPPIE MOVEMENT serves to mitigate the impact of deviance from the total society. Although the group is economically parasitic upon the society, it discourages among its members gross stealing and swindling. It is uncool to steal from persons, though all right to steal from supermarkets that overcharge the poor.

While there are many deviant behavior patterns Hippies will tolerate, they definitely do not encourage "hard drug" addiction. Even "pot heads" (people who smoke marijuana so as to be "high" through most of the day) and "speed freaks" (amphetamine addicts) will find a subtle pressure to limit their drug intake to group occasions. Although Hippies have no Kantian principles of sexual morality, they consider rather "uncool" seduction, satyriasis, pedophilia, rape. There is even some muted social pressure against homosexuality as a dominant sexual adjustment. Indeed, all the evidence points to a relatively low rate of sexual activity, considering the lack of moral censure and the ready opportunities; the levels are certainly well below those entertained by "square" fantasies. There are known cases of beautiful girls having lived many months in Hippie communities and remaining vir-

gins. And Hippie girls will not prostitute themselves (turn themselves into an object), even though this is often an easy source of funds and need not assume the sordid trappings of "hustling."

At least until 1967 it was considered quite uncool to provoke the wrath of the police. The taboo against aggression insures that whatever provocation takes place will be verbal, indirect, and not likely to start the night sticks swinging. Except for the possession of drugs, the Hippie will seldom engage in obvious violations of the law. He is more likely to specialize in nondelinquency which thrills the doer, shocks the onlooker if he's around, but rarely triggers the apparatus of justice. Dealing in marijuana and LSD is usually the worst felony committed, and the result is a very low arrest and conviction rate. Hence the delinquencies the Hippie community allows and/or fosters are unlikely to make a return to middle-class society difficult.

The educative impact of the Hippie community has two aspects: first, just by being a member, the Hippie experiences a relief from the self-deprecation that often has characterized these individuals before they joined the movement.

The refusal of career commitments becomes a conformity to the antiwork ideology. Failure becomes a mark of purity: paranoia, the assumed reality of police harassment, passivity kindness. Depersonalization and twilight states can be explained by the use of drugs. Impotence and nymphomania can be seen as expressions of sexual freedom. Homosexual trends can be talked out and even occasionally acted out in festive group occasions without shame and panic.⁵

The tolerance and lack of aggressiveness of the Hippies serve as tranquilizers on many personalities suspicious or anxiety-ridden in their interpersonal relations. The

⁴ In bohemian bars and coffee shops, this may even have some prestige because it transforms the waitress into a priestess of the Rhythm and Blues cult.

⁵ This is often the latent function or at least the unexpected consequence of the "orgy."

"saints" of the movement often do have a self-confident and benign quality that facilitates their rapport with an "uptight" neophyte. The importance of the group as a shelter, a source of nurturance, and a solvent of guilt facilitates a strong transference for a personality that has gained new self-esteem.

The Hippie collective offers the neophyte the possibility of increasing his rate of interaction with others—and at his own speed. "Keeping your cool" promotes a degree of self-control in personalities where this capacity has often been lacking. A legitimated self learns dissent without fearing exclusion. And then, like the child who discovers his parents are not perfect, the Hippie discovers the discrepancy between the values of the group and the limits of its organization.⁶ For eventually he comes to realize that there are freaks and scoundrels as well as saints among the chosen, and that the difference from the square world is perhaps not so great as he first thought. A lasting heterosexual commitment; the subsequent realization that if one wants a good job, it is necessary to complete one's education and/or accept certain bureaucratic disciplines; a growing realization that one is not so young anymore and that the millennium is not for tomorrow—all these can then lead the Hippie to "sell out" and rejoin the meritocracy.

Thus in the social reconversion of the Hippie his group experience will have been useful, and its cultivation of high-brow culture will have helped him maintain a familiarity with the academic atmosphere that is handy when he reenlists in college. Sponsors on the fringe of the movement can often help him obtain a job in the mass communication industries, from managing record shops to writing advertising copy.

⁶ One of the major problems of the Hippie movement, as of all religious sects, is that success means wider membership, division of labor, hierarchy, all of which make much more difficult the undifferentiated and immediately-felt fraternity of the "tribe." There is a tendency for communities to explode and fragment when they reach a certain size.

Evidence on the postgraduate lives of Hippies is not easy to assemble. In 1967 a list was made of 67 Hippies who used to come to the Ibiza-Formentera islands every summer or lived there all year around but had not shown up that summer. They had been described by informants as hard-core Hippies, whose period of activity in the movement ranged from one to four years. These Hippies were mostly American and British. Out of 25 women, one was dead, nine had married within the group, and another was living with a French sculptor. All but one of the husbands held relatively steady middle-class jobs. Of the 15 girls not known to be married, only six were involved in the type of employment that might permit the continuation of Hippie Life: three were photographers' models, two were night-club dancers, and one was a translator in Ibiza. Of the 42 men, one was dead, and only six could be said to be still pursuing the Hippie life. This does not mean that the teachers, the manager-owners of the macrobiotic restaurant, the published novelist, the American who had become an interior decorator in Germany, the nightclub manager in New York, have become entirely "straight." Some of these "reconverted" 35 have joined "swinging bohemia" and others "proper bohemia." What is crucial here is the assumption of a full-time job, i.e., coming to terms with the dominant society in ways other than sponging or part-time low-skill employment. Nor will the return to the community necessarily mean a simple conformity. There is more likely to be a marginal adjustment, and a potential relapse.

OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS there has been a considerable increase in college enrollment in the Western world and especially in the U.S., drawn mainly from the lower-middle or working class. Once enrolled in college, these students benefit from a status that is already higher than that of their parents. Yet a good number will not be able to maintain themselves in college and will have to settle for

occupations involving a return to the status of their parents. Even a student from a middle-middle-class home who has entered a prestige Ivy League university will be exposed to this possibility. And since lower-middle- and even middle-middle-class families do not have the means to cushion the downward mobility of their children, achievement anxiety is likely to be most common among students from these two groups.

Only rarely will a student who has been able to enter college or graduate school fail because of lack of I.Q. He is much more likely to fail because of an incapacity to efficiently mobilize for the completion of tasks. College and graduate education require a capacity to work without direct supervision and to bear professional authority without fawning or rebellion, and perhaps most of all an ego strong enough to withstand the judgment of competent specialists. Given the crucial nature of the university degrees as passports to middle-middle- and upper-middle-class positions, and the broad equality of opportunity that exists in the university, the adolescent faces the possibility of a failure that could seem the failure of his whole personality. The better the university, the more talented and understanding the teaching staff and the psychological services, the more difficult it is to find excuses for one's failures. There is no place to hide.

Most students who drop out manage to reduce their level of aspiration without excessive bitterness. But those students who come from families with a strong desire for upward mobility, and whose status is threatened by discrepancies in income, occupation, style of life, and ethnic origin, are likely to experience a more difficult problem of identity. They are not as likely to find in their parents the models they need to balance their aspirations and their effective potential. The pressures of the meritocracy find a weaker ego structure, a greater fear of judgment, a greater anxiety as to what the future may contain. If the students come from non-religious, unitarian, "liberal," or radical

homes, the response is likely to take the form of a New Left or Hippie commitment. And indeed, it is among the latter that we should find the bulk of the militants of the contrameritocracy.

Since those who choose the Hippie mode of adjustment as a *dominant* behavior pattern will represent no more than 1 percent of the student body, it is necessary to inquire why so small a movement has had such an impact upon the youth society and why it has become the *dominant* mode of bohemia.

Some of the impact upon youth can be explained by factors common to other movements: the chance to be taken seriously, to live dangerously (it takes "heart" to live the Hippie way), and the denial of competitive achievement.

The themes of love and total acceptance of the whole personality give legitimacy to the prolongation of a teen-age kind of gang that is immune to the centrifugal forces of heterosexual commitments and differential school and occupational achievements. Thus, while the Hippies attempt a "primarization of life" as their response to the increasing pressures of the meritocracy, they shift the grounds of achievement from areas where it is scarce and competitive to areas of the inner self where everybody can win.

Security and nurturance are offered without the member having to pay the price of conformity. Here is an opportunity for American youth to experience a peer group with which he is likely to have had little or no contact: a peer group where solidarity is untrammelled by any achievement criteria like sports, sexual prowess, fad leadership, etc.

Other "exclusives" of the Hippie movement are the heavy public exposure through the popularity of the Rock band and of young bards like the Beatles, Bob Dylan, Donovan, Joan Baez, Jimi Hendrix. Their music and songs are a self-righteous exaltation of love and animal spirits against the dull requirements of social structure. The

Hippie cult of spontaneity and independence strikes a responsive chord among adolescents struggling to establish their identity amid the pressures of school and family.

While Rock bands and bards sing the joy of having one's "mojo" working, the attitude of the Hippies toward sex succeeds in removing some, if not much, of the confusion and anxiety attending sexuality among adolescents. And just as Puritanism began the movement toward a single sex standard (men abstaining as well as women), so the Hippies continue it (women enjoying sex as freely as men). The result is the same: a step toward effective equality between men and women. But the content of premarital sex—for this is the type of sex they are really concerned about—has been transformed. Sex has been demythified or desacralized. Hippies distinguish between "fucking" which is sheer sensual enjoyment,⁷ without any commitment, and "making love," where there is some commitment even if it does not result in a lasting relationship. Hippie girls seem usually to prefer "making love," yet they can also indulge in the more detached type of sexual intercourse without feeling shame. Sex must be free, i.e. a woman must fully want it rather than merely bear it, consent to it, be seduced, or forced into it. To that extent even "fucking" is spiritualized, an act of the total self. Contrary to public fantasies, the end result of Hippie social pressure (not altogether intended) is not some loose promiscuity but more or less stable relationships, which are entered into on the basis of psychological compatibility without any fog of sexual deprivation and obsession.

For many boys the end of the "seduction imperative" must indeed be a relief, but the main beneficiaries of the Hippie sexual patterns are the women. The Hippies at once upgrade the classical "female" values of love, nurturance, expressiveness, while also offer-

ing girls more opportunities for rejecting the traditional female role.

Hippie life seems to resolve some of the strains that women experience in a period of changing sex roles: at once encouraged to be active and self-reliant in studies, job hunting, and choice of lover(s)—yet expected to be passive, attractive, and loyal to men even at the cost of some personal satisfaction. The Hippie woman *seems* to secure sexual satisfaction without shame, and to be free without loneliness. She can express "masculine trends" without fear of male rejection. Since it is easier for girls to find jobs in the square world—employers being easier on the females of pariah groups—many a Hippie girl winds up as the breadwinner of the couple. Having set out to be an amazon she discovers she has become another Jewish mother.

Hence the Hippie movement is a preferred mode of deviance for girls, and their ratio in the Hippie community (two or three boys for every girl) is much higher than in other patterns of deviance such as alcoholism, hard-drug addiction, suicide, professional crime, or juvenile delinquency.

The most telling appeal of the Hippie movement is that it can relieve the pain of failure in the occupational world. Through drug experiences, for example, it has created a new respect among its members for the nonrational and nonempirical aspects of human experience that challenge the value of occupational achievement and emphasize how much man deludes himself in thinking he can control his "social" destiny. Astrology, numerology, the whole folklore of good and bad "vibrations" are further instances of nonrational and nonempirical phenomena to which Hippies give credence. An air-tight system of beliefs thereby transforms the losers, the dispossessed, the subordinates, and the judged into a blessed group. Although in bureaucratic, capitalistic, war mongering Babylon they seem to be chained, they are superior to their captors and no prison can hold their souls. The first are

⁷ The evidence collected so far does not seem to point to special success in attaining high levels of sexual enjoyment.

really the last and the last the first, because they will not sell their birthright for the pottage of success. The Hippie belief system does not, like the radical political movements, have to suffer the consequences of the failures of ideology in Soviet Russia, China, or Cuba. It does not even have to achieve any concrete political goal, because on its own terms organizational success or failure means nothing.

One of the weaknesses of the American New Left is its youth orientation: every year brings its devotees closer to the fatal age of thirty. But the Hippies are on firmer ground for they deny the relevance of age, just as they deny the relevance of sex and status categories. And by declaring age irrelevant, they not only declare irrelevant the disabilities the square world attaches to age; they also offer their members eternal youth. Youth is transformed into a motivational category: the elect have it forever.

With all their potential appeal the Hippies have influenced so far only a small fraction of the Youth Society. Most lower-middle- and middle-middle-class youths have satisfactory family relations and have made sex-role identifications which permit integration to occupational, marital, and community roles, and have ambitions that are within reach of their intellect and will power. Nevertheless, meritocratic pressures keep bearing down harder on the Youth Society and may make it vulnerable to the Hippie appeal if alternate structures do not appear.

HIPPIE STYLES have radiated upward to older bohemia as it receives the mature failures and the temporary failures. The latter come to visit more than to stay. Their anger against the world that has passed them by, or friends who went on to better things, dissipates progressively as they learn the meaninglessness of what the squares call success. A whole world of freedom and new pleasures seems within easy reach. Although older bohemians tend to be sarcastic about Hippies (as the latter tend to be toward teenie-boppers, i.e.

Hippies of high school age), they still feel obliged to defend them against the squares. Defending the Hippies is like the Hippies defending the Negroes, a way of validating one's group without seeming to.

The crucial appeal of the Hippies for older bohemia is that they offer the chance of renewed youth, a still open future. Hippies will relate to people whose age varies from 14 to 80, and bohemia will relate to the older Hippies (20 to 25).

Bohemia is, of course, an institution that antedates the Hippie movement by more than a century. Some of the Hippie themes, as Bennett Berger has pointed out, are as old as bohemia. What the Hippies have brought to bohemia is a mass base for the development of the underground press, a new militancy, an increase in self-righteousness, a relief from the ghetto feeling. The stress on high culture and the occasional interchange with the Jet Set permit condescension toward the middle-class meritocracy. Even if average in the occupational world, the bohemian is always culturally superior to the readers of the Time-Life art section.

THROUGH MASS MEDIA CHANNELS and the numerous shops that have sprung up in suburbia and around campuses, the Hippie movement has been providing a series of statements and attitudes, a style the young striver, at least in the professional, mass media, and intellectual trades (i.e. frequently high-ambition and high-uncertainty trades) can use as an *insurance policy against failure*. The heightening of meritocratic pressures leads to an increased need for a center that can reduce the tensions induced by frustrations while nevertheless keeping the individual from quitting. The Judeo-Christian churches used to provide this center for strivers and failures of all classes. Essentially, they were able to proclaim the salvation of those who had the proper motivation regardless of their success or lack of it in this

vale of tears and thereby to reduce human failure to insignificance in the eyes of God.

It is largely in this sense that the Hippie movement—with mystique that places its basic dogmas outside the realm of rational discourse—can be termed a religious movement. It offers a way to *supreme success*, i.e. sincere, spontaneous, loving self-expression, doing what you want to do, if only you give up the games of bureaucratic existence.

Like all churches, the Hippie movement has a small core of devotees and theologians, its phonies and its saints, and a large mass of vacation, weekend, and Sunday members who return on Monday to the uncharitable competitive world of the job or graduate school. The Hippie commitment expresses itself through a nonactivist support for pacifism, the underdog, the rebellious youth; a style of life that dismisses as many of the conspicuous aspects of status as is possible; a pattern of speech that allows for the maximum amount of self-revelation and the maximum amount of support for others (we are all sinners and love children together); a preference for direct confrontation rather than manipulation; a permissive attitude toward sex of which their somewhat overweight wives do not seem to take notice or advantage; an attitude toward work that at once runs it down yet tries to make of it as much as possible a personal experience; a willingness to change career lines once one feels that there is little to be learned or created; a liking for the novel, the disconcerting, the far-out; a preference for marijuana and LSD as tranquilizers or as recreation, and for interactive adventure rather than getting things done; a tendency to transform the friendship network into a sort of Jewish family; in short an aesthetic and sentimental attitude toward life.

It is at least conceivable that the Hippie movement represents a groping toward a necessary adjustment of our social structure to the growing rationalization and “disen-

chantment” of life on the one hand and, on the other, to the decline in the *quality* of community experience that one can secure outside one’s immediate family. So far, all the evidence points to the fact that the meritocracy, far from making life easier for the highly educated, increases the burdens upon those who have to assume high-uncertainty decisions.

Hippieism (or another movement less burdened by the contradictions between its ethics and the structural cost of living) may do for professional life and the increasing range of professionalized occupations what increased capital wealth, scientific technology, and the prestige of entrepreneurship did for bankruptcy: diminish its sting, make it a normal cost of business innovation to be assumed not just by the entrepreneur and his family, but also by the total society. The result was an increased rate of economic change and great increases in productivity. Thus Hippieism may decrease the cost of social change and create a sort of permanent revolution of manners and mores, more effective than political revolution.

Hippieism continues the Puritan tradition by putting the “burden of proof” upon the collectivity for the social forms that constrain the individual. It attempts to increase the capacity of people to relate more quickly at a level where they can give each other a support that is commensurate to the strains placed upon them by the meritocracy. Hence it may turn out to be necessary to the continued existence of the meritocracy. Just as Christianity, a religion proclaiming the supremacy of the meek and the downtrodden, became the religion of some of the best officers and civil servants of the Empire, so Hippieism, instead of drawing only on the failures and semifailures of the system, may become a creed of its more effective servants. It serves as a response in the incessant search of mankind for forms of order which require less violence, less pain, and less contempt.

Abortion and Social Change

FREE ASSOCIATIONS to the word "abortion" would probably yield a fantastic array of emotional responses: pain, relief, murder, crime, fear, freedom, genocide, guilt, sin. Which of these associations people have no doubt reflects their age, marital status, religion, or nationality. To a forty-four-year-old Japanese or Hungarian woman, the primary response might be "freedom" and "relief"; to an unmarried American college girl, "fear" and "pain"; to a Catholic priest, "murder" and "sin"; to some black militants, "genocide."

To begin this way is to underline the complexity of individual emotion and social cleavage in regard to abortion. It may be years before Americans use the more neutral expression, "pregnancy termination," as the British did in naming their abortion law last year. Some of the sting may be neutralized by placing abortion in a wider historical context, for abortion is only one of many devices man has used to control fertility. Only a few centuries ago many European cathedrals had revolving doors with a basket attached into which a woman could deposit her unwanted infant. By now, such abandonment has been largely transformed into a more humane system of infant adoption. Infanticide too has declined as a means of controlling fertility. Compared to either infanticide or child abandonment, abortion of a fetus during the first trimester of pregnan-

cy is clearly a far milder form of fertility control.

In the world today, abortion is used either as an *alternative* to other, primarily contraceptive methods of fertility control, or as a *backstop* method when other contraceptives fail. Abortion continues to be a major method in Catholic countries where the distribution of birth control devices has been prevented or kept to a minimum, and in underdeveloped countries which have as yet had no widespread exposure to modern contraceptives. In France, the annual number of abortions equals that of live births. In Latin America, there is an average of one abortion for every two live births, although in some countries, such as Uruguay, the ratio is estimated to be as high as three abortions for every live birth. For many years to come, a high incidence of abortion will continue to be the major brake on the dangerous population growth now taking place in Latin America and Asia, far overriding the effect of family planning programs, which distribute pills and loops. If there was ever any doubt that abortion remains the best strategy to effect changes in the birth rate, it must surely have been answered by the dramatic doubling of the Rumanian birth rate in the course of one year, from 1966 to 1967, following the legislative restrictions on abortion instituted in December 1966.¹

By comparison, abortion is far less dominant in the fertility-control picture of the United States. The medical statistician Christopher Tietze estimates that between

This is a revised version of a paper given before the American Orthopsychiatric Association in Chicago, Illinois, March 21, 1968. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the National Institutes of Health, sponsors of my work under a Research Career Scientist Award (USPHS-MH23768).

¹ Malcolm Potts, "Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe," *The Eugenics Review*, 59(4), December 1967, 232-250.

one-fifth and one-fourth of all pregnancies in the United States are terminated by induced abortion.² In actual numbers, the estimates have been from 8,000 to 10,000 legal hospital abortions annually and from 250,000 to well over a million illegal abortions.

There is no way of telling how many abortions in the United States are resorted to as the only method of fertility control, and how many as a backstop when contraceptives fail. It is reasonable to assume, however, that those women who want to control their fertility but lack money, knowledge, or a partner agreeable to contraceptive use, constitute a large category which relies primarily on abortion for fertility control. Undoubtedly, a large proportion of the poor women who enter municipal hospitals every day with post-abortion complications use the only cheap but most dangerous method, self-induced abortion. Social or religious groups relying on inefficient contraceptive procedures, such as the rhythm method, are also likely to be overrepresented among those who resort to illegal abortion. In fact, even if all women of child-bearing age in the U.S. used the pill, a 1 percent failure rate would yield as many as 250,000 unwanted pregnancies annually.

At any point in time, there are several million women in this country who have personally resorted to abortion to avoid an unwanted pregnancy; yet public attitudes continue to show sharp distinctions between contraception, approved by an overwhelming majority, and abortion, viewed largely in negative terms. The widespread acceptance of contraception is in part a tribute to the appeal of the birth control movement itself. The guiding ideology of this movement has been "family planning," which projects a positive, socially desirable image of married couples spacing their children in a rational

manner. In this context, the emphasis is kept on the welfare of the child, the mother, and family stability. In part, this is public-relations sugar to coat the pill of "birth control," which projects a less traditional image and suggests that some births are not wanted and that contraceptives are used to enhance the sexual pleasure of men and women apart from maternal health and family stability.

Unfortunately, euphemistic language can affect social reality. Until very recent years, family planners have studiously avoided helping unmarried women, and they have totally ignored the problem of unwanted pregnancies. Abortion has been kept clearly separate from the family planning movement, and family planners have contributed relatively little to the public discussion about the incidence of abortion, the danger of illegal abortion for women's health, the role that abortion has historically played in restricting population growth rates, or the need to critically examine whether abortion has any place in a criminal code. There is, however, no longer any clear-cut distinction, even on technical grounds, between conception prevention and pregnancy termination. The intra-uterine loop is far more accurately described as an abortive device than a contraceptive one. The loop does not *prevent* conception as condoms, diaphragms, and pills do; it either prevents the implantation of a fertile ovum in the wall of the uterus, or produces a spontaneous abortion within a few weeks after uterine implantation (medical authorities are not sure which of these two processes are actually at work). Yet the family planning movement defines the loop as a contraceptive device and has been actively engaged in distributing it in underdeveloped countries. The loop now is quietly used in American medicine, as physicians begin to worry about the side effects of the pill. The refusal to consider abortion as part of fertility control is a serious limitation on the effort to assist countries belatedly con-

² Christopher Tietze, "Foetal Deaths, Spontaneous and Induced, in the Urban White Population of the United States," *Population Studies*, 11(2), 1957, 170-176.

fronting their population problems.³ Recent studies make clear that loop insertions and sterilization procedures are having "some" effect on Asian birth rates; but Kingsley Davis has argued strongly that underdeveloped countries will not avert major economic and political crises from overpopulation unless demographic practitioners mount a far more rigorous campaign of birth restriction, including widespread facilities for simple, inexpensive abortions.⁴ Like American physicians on the domestic scene, public health officials often merely react with shock to the proposal that family planning clinics should be total fertility clinics, serving both married and unmarried women and providing abortion facilities for clients whose prescribed contraceptives fail them.

Reform Movements

DURING THE PAST five years there has been mounting interest and political activity concerning abortion. Abortion reform and study associations have mushroomed in several dozen communities across the nation, and a first international meeting, under American sponsorship, was attended by representatives of more than a dozen countries this past fall. Reform bills were introduced in 30 state legislatures during 1967, with Colorado, North Carolina, California, and Maryland the first states to pass slightly liberalized bills. Vigorous attempts at legal reform in New York State failed in 1967 and slowly started again in 1968. In February 1969, Lawrence Lader, Lonny Myers, and Garrett Hardin spearheaded the first nationally coordinated asso-

ciation calling for total repeal of penal-code coverage of abortion.

The bills passed in the last few years, and those under consideration in state legislatures, have been modeled after the American Law Institute's 1959 recommendations for revision of state penal codes. What liberalization has meant, therefore, was an enlargement of the grounds for exemption from liability to criminal prosecution: these range from danger to the "life" of the mother, the most prevalent state clause, to grave risk to the physical and mental health of the mother, chance of deformity in the child, or pregnancy as a result of rape.

What is particularly important to note is that the liberalized code exempts from prosecution predominantly women *who want to be pregnant*. The law keeps the whole issue firmly in the context of maternal and child health: it is not a woman's rejection of maternity, but the unfortunate condition of her heart or liver or other organ, or an unfortunate exposure to German measles, that justifies granting a legal abortion. Clearly, protecting the health of a woman or avoiding a high risk of a deformed fetus are health reasons hard to object to. Almost as many people want healthy mothers and babies as favor motherhood itself. Except for emotional traditionalists or Catholics who adhere to strict doctrinal positions on abortion, there is widespread support for legal change that would permit abortion on health grounds. But such reform does nothing to solve the basic problem, and it postpones coming to grips with the majority of cases—women who do not want a child they accidentally conceived.

The Problem of Unwanted Pregnancies

HERE WE REACH the heart of the abortion problem: what should an individual woman do who finds she is pregnant against her wish, and what should professional and public policy be toward such a woman? Americans find this a disconcerting question: there is

³ Leighton VanNort points out that demographers in Western countries have so accepted the dominant values of their society that they have failed to deal in any thorough-going way with either abortion or infanticide as alternatives to approved methods of birth control, and he suggests demography must operate with a wider variety of assumptions: "On Values in Population Policy," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 38, 1960, 387-395.

⁴ Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?" *Science*, 158(3802), 1968, 730-739.

resistance to the image of a woman not wanting a child because it violates what we would prefer to keep intact, a sentimental reverence for a nurturant, loving mother.

Yet the confrontation of exactly such circumstances in family life is a daily occurrence for social workers, psychiatrists, and physicians. Despite their intimate knowledge of such problems, these specialists have not informed us concerning the probability of emotional damage to children born to mothers who unwillingly accept an unwanted pregnancy—although the same professionals espouse the view that the best “headstart” a child can have is to be born into a loving environment as a wanted child. A one-in-three probability of fetal deformity when the mother was exposed to German measles has been considered sufficient ground for recommending an abortion. Would psychiatrists claim a different probability of emotional difficulty in an unwanted child? If not, the mental health fields should be among the first to support a legal change that would reduce the incidence of unwanted pregnancies brought to term.

The Problem of Wanted Pregnancies

BUT AN EVEN MORE difficult problem must be faced. Demographers have investigated how many children young couples want to have, and how large a family they consider “ideal.” The results pinpoint the major dilemma facing a rapidly expanding human population: people want too many children. Permitting women to abort unwanted pregnancies is one very small step toward reducing population-growth rates. The much more difficult but more effective solution must be a *reduction in the rate of wanted pregnancies*. As Kingsley Davis has recently pointed out,⁵ in the very countries that family planners cite as showplaces of success (Korea and Taiwan), the programs are aimed at women who do not want any more children because they already have four or more, and

girls not yet married or married women early in their child-bearing years are largely ignored. Judith Blake has analyzed fluctuations in family-size desires and compared them with actual fertility rates, showing that family-size desires have remained both relatively constant and high over long periods of time, thereby suggesting a gap between desired and attained family size that she calls “latent child hunger” and concluding that *nowhere in the world did modernization alone have an abiding and drastically downward effect on family-size desires*.⁶

Both Judith Blake and Kingsley Davis have urged the view that no significant stabilization of the population growth rate in either underdeveloped or industrialized nations can be expected so long as attention is narrowly focused on family planning programs. Reliance on the position that everyone should have the number of children they desire—the key idea in family planning ideology—is inadequate for the simple reason that people want too many children. In the United States in 1966 an average of 3.4 children was considered ideal by white women aged 21 and over. In my own research, college graduates had a desired family size mean of 3.2; 38 percent wanted four or more children. What must be changed to reduce these desires is the basic motivation for having children, and such an approach must necessarily involve changes in the structure of the family, in the position of women, in sexual mores, in opportunities for legitimate alternative satisfactions apart from family roles. Only in this way can there be a future reduction of family size.

What women do with their lives is a central issue in fertility control and population

⁶ Judith Blake, “Demographic Science and the Redirection of Population Policy,” *Journal of Chronic Diseases*, 18, 1965, 1181–1200; “Parental Control, Delayed Marriage and Population Policy,” *Population Reprint Series No. 238*, University of California Press (Berkeley), 1967; see also “Reproductive Ideals and Educational Attainment Among White Americans, 1943–1960,” *Population Studies*, 21(2), 1967, 159–174.

⁵ *Ibid.*

growth. Maternity cannot continue to be an exclusive goal of women, for this encourages the view that the more children the better, as well as the view that no marriage is complete without a child. Praise and social approval for women with large numbers of children are no longer appropriate to a crowded urban society. This applies to economically affluent women as well as poor women, to American women as well as Latin American women, to white women as well as black women. By 1969 this has become a delicate and pressing issue in American politics, for there is mounting pressure on Congress to pass legislation providing vastly expanded subsidies for family planning. This is being urged under the guise of a mandate for helping the poor who need more birth control education and devices, but it is increasingly feared by many of us that it is really a poorly-concealed mandate from the well-to-do who wish to see fewer and smaller families on welfare and a halt to any increase in the proportion of blacks in the American population. Class-directed efforts in the contraceptive field unnecessarily politicize the population problem; this is also self-defeating since the solution must be sought in encouraging the comfortably-situated majority of the American population to reduce the number of children they want, not merely the small minority represented by the very poor. Put this way, legal change to permit women to abort unwanted pregnancies would seem the easiest way to cope with the population problem, for it involves the removal of barriers women do not want, rather than the more difficult task of changing deep-lying motivations.

Politics of Abortion Law Reform

LET ME TURN FINALLY to the tactical question of how our punitive abortion laws can be changed. A preliminary question is why there has been so much activity aimed at even moderate revision of abortion laws during the 1960s. There is no reason to be-

lieve the incidence of illegal abortion has changed drastically during the past thirty years. If anything, as more effective contraceptives have been developed, there has probably been a reduction in the annual incidence. Of course, this may be more than compensated for by the large increase in the number of young people reaching the sexually active years, as the baby boom of the post-war period reaches adulthood.

An important development has probably been the trend toward more open discussion of all questions pertaining to human sexuality. Venereal disease was more openly discussed during World War II than ever before in American history. The postwar publication of the Kinsey reports sparked widespread discussion of sex and contraception. Since the birth control pill was marketed a decade ago, there has been continual debate about its effect upon our sex lives and reproductive behavior. Of special importance was the wide dissemination of the finding that despite what the church said, the majority of American Catholics were using mechanical and chemical contraceptives. This had very special political consequences, because *it neutralized the whole issue of birth control in our political life*, paving the way for the gradual introduction of sex education in public schools, and for an increasing role of the federal government in appropriating large sums for birth control education both at home and abroad. Significantly, abortion did not loom as a widely discussed problem until what Judith Blake describes as the "reproductive renaissance" of the 1946-1960 era came to an end. By the 1960s fourth or fifth pregnancies that had been welcomed by so many American couples in the preceding two decades, were no longer desired.

The step from open discussion of contraception to open discussion of abortion was hastened by the rash of thalidomide cases a few years ago, strengthened and reinforced by the German measles epidemic at about the same time, with increasing numbers of

people learning what medicine had known for twenty years, that such exposure constituted a serious risk of deformity in the fetus. No progress was made in implementing proposals for revision of the abortion clause in penal codes between 1959, when the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed its revised model penal code, and 1964; but concern for maternal and child health stimulated by the thalidomide and German measles cases provided the impetus for a concerted attempt at legal reform since 1964. Unfortunately the ALI model code, drafted during the conservative 1950s, was the one available in the more liberal mood of the mid-1960s.

Many abortion law reformers have hoped that the ALI mental and physical health exemption would be broad enough to permit a wide range of interpretation. While surveys of physicians indicate overwhelming support for the ALI exemptions, they show a good deal less support for medically approved abortions for women who for personal or economic reasons do not want a child.⁷ Therefore, there is little reason to expect that the majority of women who now resort to illegal abortions would be helped by physicians to obtain abortions in medically safe surroundings. Young unmarried women and emotionally disturbed or physically ill women may find the route to a hospital abortion somewhat easier, but healthy married women with an accidental third or fourth pregnancy are likely to be turned away. Preliminary data from Colorado and California support this expectation. A clue to the only slight increases of legal abortion rate in these states can be seen in the way applicants are screened by hospital abortion committees. Such committees place a group buffer between patient and physician that may reduce the anxiety level of physicians by shifting responsibility for an abortion denial from himself to an impersonal committee; but this is at the expense of increased anxiety

for the patient and the loss of precious time if she is determined not to carry the pregnancy to term.

I think a good case could be made that the hospital abortion committee procedure is very like the "needs tests" in the welfare field, and that it adds the same insensitivity to the indignities visited upon individual applicants. Under the terms of the New York bill defeated in 1967, a woman with an unwanted pregnancy would have to apply for an abortion, pass the functional equivalent of a welfare "needs" test by permitting herself to be examined not by one but by several physicians while having her psyche probed for signs of distress, then wait out the slow machinery of the hospital bureaucracy for a decision that will affect in deeply personal ways what her responsibilities will be for the next fifteen or twenty years. The psychology here is like that facing the welfare applicant. A woman is forced to show her weaknesses, her inability to cope under stress, in order to secure the help of the profession; if she shows her strength, the profession will probably refuse her their services.

This committee procedure has the added risk that it increases the probability of surgical complications or mortality when a woman obtains an illegal abortion after a hospital denial—since the abortion will then be performed at a later stage of pregnancy. The mortality rate in pregnancy termination cases in Sweden, where the committee procedure is followed, is for this reason higher than it is in East European countries where the committee procedure is not followed. It was in part due to this consideration that British reformers, in writing their Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill, specified that a decision can be taken by any two registered general practitioners. After a preliminary attempt by the medical establishment's Medical Defense Union and Medical Protection Society to require that one of the doctors be a specialist, they settled down and prepared a pamphlet advising their members that general practitioners should be considered spe-

⁷ Robert Hall, "New York Abortion Law Survey," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 1965.

cialists in cases of social abortion because they are more capable of assessing a patient's situation than medical specialists who lack personal knowledge of the patient.⁸

In American discussion of abortion during the past five years, the problem has been kept almost exclusively in a medical, legal, and theological framework, and this has determined the thrust of most attempts at analysis and solution. If abortion is examined in the context of fertility control and in view of the place of pregnancy in the life of women, it is no longer so clear who is the appropriate expert. Much of the medical and legal literature then becomes rather limited in relevance. A new cluster of issues becomes more relevant: sex and the relations between the sexes, the determinants of reproduction motivation, the role of maternity in the life-goals of women, the question of a woman's right to control so private an area of her life.

Women themselves have played a minor role in public and professional discussions of abortion precisely because the problem is dealt with in the narrow legal-medical framework. At the Washington conference in 1967, women figured more as actresses in the dramatic skits presented than they did as speakers and discussants. Of all the professions in American society, law, medicine, and theology are precisely the ones in which women constitute a small minority well under 10 percent. Those few women lawyers, doctors, and psychiatrists who have been active in abortion reform have by and large taken positions that go far beyond the conservative ALI recommendations. They are more apt than their male colleagues to place abortion in the context of personal rights.

Other women, deeply concerned with this issue, do not yet feel free to speak up publicly. The fields in which women have been represented in significant proportions and have attained high status are nursing, social work, and education, very often as local,

state, or federal employees. Subtle as well as overt pressure censors the tongues of many women in these fields. One high-ranking woman in the federal government wrote to me asking for a reprint of an abortion article on her personal stationery, explaining that while very interested in the problem, she could not express such interest on official stationery.

This incident suggests that abortion is now at the stage of public awareness that contraception was a few decades ago. The government did not enter the family planning field until it became very clear that Catholics were themselves using contraceptives in very large numbers—which meant that the Church position did not represent the views of Catholic voters. What needs far more extensive circulation than it has yet received is the result of surveys showing only very slight religious group differences on the issues of abortion law reform.

In a 1965 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, which I analyzed,⁹ Catholics were only slightly less in favor of reform than Protestants, and most important, they made the same qualifications on situational grounds that members of other religions did. They showed none of the doctrinal rejection of Church spokesmen. As with birth control, there is a vast discrepancy between the beliefs and practices of the Catholic population and the doctrine of the Church.

This 1965 survey was taken just at the point when public discussion was on the rise. Another survey was conducted by the Association for the Study of Abortion in 1967.¹⁰ A comparison of these two surveys gives a crude measure of attitude change during these two years. In 1967 the results showed an overall endorsement of reform among 75 percent of the sample. Yet, more important is

⁹ Alice S. Rossi, "Abortion Laws and their Victims," *Trans-action*, September-October 1968.

¹⁰ Results of this survey are not available in published form. Mimeographed summaries have been released by the Association.

⁸ Jane McKerron, "Abortion: Can Doctors Cope?" *New Statesman*, February 9, 1968, p. 166.

to note that 72 percent of Catholic adults,¹¹ 83 percent of Protestants, and 98 percent of Jewish adults favored reform. Using the 1965 survey as a baseline, there was a 20 percent increase over the two-year period in support of abortion law reform, from a 55 to a 75 percent level of approval in these two samples.¹²

Why, then, since Catholic voters in the state were clearly on the side of reformers, did the New York bill fail to pass? For one, legislators are less in contact with the average public than with articulate spokesmen of organizations and institutions. In this case, they were subject to conflicting testimony of legal and medical experts and a uniformly opposed position by Catholic church spokesmen. Legislators can easily develop a distorted image of far greater cleavage along religious lines than in fact exists. They must be reassured that their constituency approves such reform, regardless of the views expressed by self-appointed spokesmen.

There are several other lines of analysis and action that could gather political support among citizens and legislators for total repeal of penal code clauses pertaining to abortion. For one, current abortion laws simply do not fulfill their intended purpose of lowering the incidence of abortion. Experience in the Soviet Union (which has had an erratic history of shifting abortion from legally permissible to an illegal status and back again to legal) shows that the incidence of abortion remains constant. When abortion was

defined as illegal in the Soviet Union, women simply obtained illegal ones, so that concern for their health and safety soon led to the repeal of the Soviet law. All the law really affects in the Soviet Union, and all it affects in the United States, is whether women have medically safe abortions.

Second, there is a growing sentiment among legal scholars that any law which is not enforced, and is in fact unenforceable, should be repealed.¹³ This was the American experience with prohibition laws, and the same point applies to abortion statutes. The millions of American women who have had illegal abortions are not immoral women, nor do they feel disrespect for human life. Most such women have other children they care for, often more adequately because they aborted an unwanted pregnancy. That abortion rates are higher in Catholic than in non-Catholic countries should itself be sufficient evidence that having an abortion is not an index of immorality or lack of respect for life. If those who break the law are not immoral, and the law does nothing to restrict the incidence of behavior it was designed to restrict, the only effect of its retention on the statute books is to encourage disrespect for the law generally.

Third, total repeal is more consistent with the values of traditionalists who abhor any abortion than is a moderate liberalization of the law along ALI lines. There is a growing minority of Catholic spokesmen who consider total repeal preferable to moderate liberalization on the grounds that the latter sanctions at least some proportion of hospital abortions. They argue that they cannot in conscience support the ALI recommendation because the law continues to judge some abortions as morally permissible.

Finally, total repeal can be based on constitutional grounds that combine the protec-

¹¹ The New York State survey also indicated that even among Catholics who characterized themselves as "very religious," 63 percent favored the ALI reform.

¹² It should be noted that the two surveys are not strictly comparable. The 1965 survey was based on a national probability sample, whereas the 1967 survey was confined to residents of New York State. The 1965 survey asked separate questions for each of six situations, whereas the 1967 survey asked one question covering all three exemptions recommended by ALI—maternal health, fetal deformity, and rape. To make these as closely comparable as possible, the least endorsed of the three situations covered in both surveys is used as the base figure for 1965.

¹³ This view that the law should not govern morality is elegantly argued by the British legal scholar Granville Williams in *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.

tion of individual civil rights and an effective political strategy. It has been the strength of American political life to cut across non-divisible group cleavages such as religion, ethnicity, and race, and to seek alignments along economic lines within party structures. Thus it has been the appeal to economic interests that welded Democratic party support among groups that would otherwise have been arch antagonists: white, fundamentalist Southerners and urban working-class Catholics and Jews. It has been the American experience that ideological issues which cannot be translated into economic terms are best resolved by recourse to the Supreme Court, the body that is outside the established party alignment. In both great constitutional issues of recent times—civil rights and apportionment of voting districts—Supreme Court decisions took the place of political action within the party system.¹⁴

There is legal precedent for contesting the constitutionality of abortion laws in a closely related problem. Legal restrictions regarding access to medical advice on contraception and prescription of contraceptive devices were removed *not* by state legislation, but by contesting the constitutionality of the law.

¹⁴ Peter Drucker, "On the Economic Basis of American Politics," *The Public Interest*, Winter 1968.

Justice Douglas argued in the *Griswald vs. Connecticut* case that the statute violated constitutional amendments that created "zones of privacy" which the government is constitutionally prohibited from entering. Roy Lucas recently reviewed constitutional limitations on enforcement and administration of abortion statutes, and suggests there is ample legal ground for contesting the statutes as violations of constitutional rights.¹⁵

Since part of the difficulty in reforming abortion laws through state legislatures has been that the issue does not follow party lines but cuts within parties along religious lines, a movement to seek abortion law repeal through the courts is consistent with the political strategy Peter Drucker has shown to be most successful in our political history. A court-contested case would therefore avoid the religious and racial cleavage that has marked the abortion issue, as well as enlarge and strengthen the rights of women to control their lives in light of their own intelligence, values, and conscience.

¹⁵ Roy Lucas, "Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes," *The North Carolina Law Review*, 46(4), June 1968, 730-778. Roy Lucas also suggests this argument applies with equal force to state restrictions on the distribution and use of chemical abortifacients, when medical advances have produced a reliable one.

A P O R T E S

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Sociología y sociólogos comprometidos	Aldo E. SOLARI
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El fracaso de la democracia en Cuba	Mauricio SOLAUN
Las fases de la revolución cubana	Nelson AMARO V.
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The Cold War & the Third World

THE COLD WAR is demonstrating greater longevity as an idea than as a political fact. Despite radical changes in the landscape of international politics, it remains a seductively comfortable concept that dominates both learned and popular discourse. The belief persists that the struggle goes on, though in a muted form and with little threat of a nuclear showdown, to control the political destiny of the world. Persons of otherwise diverse opinions and ideological leanings share the convention of seeing all international events through the optic of an East-West confrontation universal in its proportions. Yet if anything definite has been settled by the contest it is that neither side can win the war for "the hearts and minds" of mankind (the only war that the balance of terror permits). For all the competition for the allegiance of the developing world, the political future of the new nations is largely beyond the control and the struggle of the Great Powers and marginal to their interests. In support of this contention, I offer four propositions intended to summarize a "revisionist" view of the contemporary Cold War.

1. Neither major Communist power can control the location, timing, or ultimate success of a revolutionary nationalist movement (i.e., war of national liberation). Guerrilla insurrections, espousing some variety of Communist ideology, are not characteristically plotted from without and instigated by foreign elements. Wherever such movements have achieved a modicum of success they have been undertaken by groups indigenous to the country of operation. In Vietnam, the Philippines, Cuba, and in China a Commu-

nist-inspired leadership has sought to cultivate newly evoked nationalist sentiments and to link them to popular social discontents to create a revolutionary movement on a mass base. In each of these cases the leadership has been local, the organization largely independent of external forces, and the fighting forces have been nearly self-reliant in terms of arms and munitions (in Vietnam large-scale Soviet and Chinese material aid was required only after the introduction of American troops had altered the character of the war). It is the foremost principle of revolutionary guerrilla warfare that the popular forces must mobilize mass support, tapping it for manpower and supplies. They must also distinguish themselves carefully from the alien forces, real or doctrinally presumed, who together with "reactionary" local elements are stigmatized as enemies of national self-realization. Chances for success of an insurrection undertaken along these lines is in inverse proportion to the existing regime's ability to satisfy nationalist aspirations, meet social and economic grievances, and assert its administrative control over the country.

Certainly, the organizational acumen of the carefully conceived and rigorously trained political apparatus usually, but not always, enjoyed by the local Communists give them somewhat of an advantage. Where they exist at all, they are almost always capable of instigating a revolt of some scale—however small that might be. And to this extent the formation of cadres in Communist countries does constitute an external factor impinging on the situation. But whether the rebel group evolves into a full-fledged revolutionary movement will be determined by the

crucial variables of nationalist legitimacy and governmental efficacy internal to the system. The very fact that a local regime is in imminent danger of collapse under the pressure of a Communist-led insurrectionist movement (as was Saigon in early 1965) might then be taken as *prima facie* evidence that symbolic appeal and political capability have passed to the challenger—dooming not only the regime, but also any U.S.-led salvage operation.

The disparity between this interpretation and the Washington perspective on wars of national liberation, which insists on seeing them as plotted and directed by foreign Communist powers, leads to equally divergent views as to the international significance of the civil struggles they evoke. High-ranking American officials have declared on many occasions that the war in Vietnam is a test of wills between the Communists (China and her auxiliaries) who attempt to impose their system on a reluctant people and the American resolve to support existing governments in their resistance to such takeover attempts. It follows that if the U.S. fails there, the Communists will be encouraged to employ the same techniques elsewhere in the area. The apparent fallacy in this thinking has been pointed out by several critics of U.S. policy. If, contrary to the historical evidence and to what we know about the dynamics of revolutionary movements in the postcolonial world, such movements can be launched and controlled by external forces, it is difficult to understand why guerrilla insurrections have not been instigated throughout Asia. It would certainly be to the Communists' advantage to present the U.S. with three or four Vietnams simultaneously. Why wait for the outcome of the one struggle when action can be taken that could have a decided impact on its resolution? In fact, the official American interpretation of the Chinese-led revolutionary challenge has not been worked out to a logical conclusion. Having been accorded the world role of fomenter of revolu-

tion by Washington, China has yet to respond by recognizing her own potential for disruption.

2. *Given the nationalist dynamic at the heart of these movements it is doubtful that the success of Communist-inspired insurrections would constitute an absolute increase in the power of the existing Communist nations or shift the scales drastically against the West.* Here again we should be careful not to confuse ideological affinities with substantial political and military power. Lin Piao formulated a doctrine that equates the success of a "national liberation" movement with an advance of Chinese interests and a step toward the isolation and ultimate destruction of "Western imperialism"; this, however, does not mean that we should accept his assessment uncritically. On the contrary, I would argue that by committing themselves to a strategy that to a very considerable extent identifies their world status with the victory of other nationalist forces following their example—a strategy that subordinates direct armed aggression to political-ideological warfare—the Chinese have hit upon a world policy with manifest contradictions. Upon achieving power, indigenous Communist movements that tapped nationalist sentiments on the way to victory are likely to be sensitive of their independence. Whatever assistance they might have received from China, it is improbable that they should allow their foreign or domestic policies to be dictated by her. Nationalism, the source of the movement's strength, can be expected to condition the behavior of the party now in control of the state apparatus. Ideology, past associations, and the perception of common enemies dictate that they should forge ties of friendship with other Communist states, that they should seek economic aid from them, and that they should align their foreign policies up to a point. But to accept a wholly subservient position *vis à vis* the established powers would grate nationalist sensibilities; and it

might well run counter to *Realpolitik* and the necessity of avoiding the implacable hostility of the United States and of maintaining trade relations with the West.

Even the truncate countries of North Korea and North Vietnam (to leave aside the example of Cuba), strongly dependent on their Chinese big brothers, have striven, on the whole successfully, to avoid satellite status. When and if a Communist-inspired revolutionary movement comes to power in one of the larger countries of the Third World, there is every reason to expect that it soon will be as independent of either of the two Communist rivals as the Cold War situation and its own capacity for industrialization allow. Under the circumstances, China might find that she helped spawn several independent Communist states which felt a real interest in limiting Chinese power. In this sense, Lin Piao's manifesto offers a policy with "built-in obsolescence"—one whose very success would create new obstacles to Chinese national aggrandizement.

3. *Few of the major countries in the Third World are liable to internal Communist revolution.* And in Southeast Asia, where the United States is by its own calculations defending the ramparts against a Communist sweep, there is not one nation where a Communist government could have an unsettling effect on the relations among the major powers.

Japan, the world's fourth industrial power, is well advanced beyond the developmental stage of growth and possesses a social structure unsuited to insurrectionist activity. Its urbanized Communists are a politically marginal force. Pakistan has been governed, from the point of view of economic development successfully so, by a benevolent authoritarianism of the military variety and it has few home-grown Communists to concern itself about. In India, the political health of the country is more uncertain and the Communists have established strong bases of support in a number of states. They have

been singularly unsuccessful, however, in taking advantage of failures in the industrialization program and the weaknesses of the Congress party to forge a coherent national movement. India's Communist party mirrors the country's deep regional, linguistic, and even caste antagonisms, and it is suffering from many of the same infirmities that threaten the democratic republic. Thus nearly all those familiar with Indian affairs believe that political fragmentation, a military coup, or some form of Hindu authoritarianism are far greater threats to the regime than the Communists.

Indonesia is the fourth non-Communist Asian state of consequence. After the bloody civil conflict of 1965–66 the once powerful Communist party was organizationally obliterated and barely survived physical liquidation. The U.S. government, not unexpectedly, has claimed credit for their defeat, arguing that the American military presence in Vietnam gave heart to the army, the students, and the anti-Communist forces. But the Administration has not turned up any solid evidence to support this contention.

According to available facts, the long-awaited showdown in Indonesia came about because of the peculiar circumstances within the country; the deterioration in Sukarno's health that set off a series of mutually threatening moves by the army and the Communists. The logic of revolutionary politics in the Third World would lead one to the same conclusion. History does not provide us with a single example, short of military invasion, of a major political upheaval in a modern nation produced by foreign forces. In a new nation the size of Indonesia, the political forces are of such dimensions and the nationalist passions so deep that its politics are not liable to manipulation from without. The actions of a politically mobilized population, working through well-structured organizations like the army and the CPI, are not readily controlled by external events like the war in Vietnam. The two sides fought as everyone expected them to fight;

a series of as yet unclear coincidental developments provoked the crisis; the army won—thereby denying the Communists the opportunity to assert their brand of Indonesian nationalism.

Since all the major non-Communist Asian states seem secure against a “national liberation movement,” the policy debate narrows to a more immediate concern for the fate of the non-Communist nations of the Southeast Asian mainland. We argued earlier that the success of Communist movements there will be determined primarily by domestic conditions, that the Chinese capacity to organize revolution is generally overestimated, and that the establishment of Communist governments in the Third World will not necessarily constitute a grievous setback to the West.

The danger is further mitigated by what appear to be the very limited opportunities for significant Communist advances in Asia. At stake are only the four or five thinly populated countries of mainland Southeast Asia; these countries possess few critical resources and are of strategic importance only in relation to each other. I am not suggesting that the West, i.e. the United States, write them off; neither do I assume that insurrectionist movements, outside of Vietnam, are inevitably going to succeed. Indeed, there is little evidence that they are of formidable proportions elsewhere in the area. But the “loss” of these countries, if that should come to pass, would be something less than a disaster.

4. The competitive effort of the great powers (the two superpowers and the long-range contender for that designation, China) to gain influence and assert a degree of control over the foreign policies of well-established governments in the Third World is narrowly circumscribed by the search for independent national status on the part of these states. Under existing conditions there appears little opportunity for empire-building or for the

use of these nations as instruments of someone else’s foreign policy. Generally speaking, the United States is the status quo power in these areas and consequently feels its interests threatened by Soviet or Chinese encroachments. The sense of vulnerability is understandable yet unrealistic. Short of forging the formal military alliances which seem unattainable under the circumstances, it is difficult to envisage what sort of successes the Communist powers might achieve that could meaningfully affect Western security. Has Soviet intimacy with Guinea, Algeria, or Syria really challenged the U.S. or her European allies in any tangible way? Sympathies have been redirected to a degree. Certain—but by no means all—economic relationships have been rearranged, an occasional U.N. vote has been garnered, and in one case limited naval accommodations were accorded the Russians. But little if anything of crucial economic or military importance has been altered. The significance of these developments seems to be greatest in the uncertain realm of prestige where the great powers maneuver to achieve narrow victories that increasingly have taken on the character of points won in a game of one-upmanship.

To specify further what is at stake in this competition, we should consider the Communist capability to undermine Western interests. I question whether the Soviet Union (China does not as yet enjoy the power to play this global role) seriously entertains the possibility of isolating the U.S. militarily, strangling her economically by gaining control over critical resources in the developing countries, and of thereby winning a worldwide political victory. At some level of the Soviet government a debate might well be going on as to the practical desirability of continued adherence to this totalitarian conception of world competition. Whatever the tentative conclusions reached in that exercise, there is reason to believe that in the face of hard realities the U.S.S.R. will be more

dovish than hawkish in the immediate objectives it pursues. The higher priority being given to domestic concerns, the stress on the importance of maintaining peaceful co-existence—all these will lead to an assessment of Soviet foreign policy objectives that diverge from the stated goal of achieving hegemony. (The U.S.S.R.'s intentions, however, in protecting its security interests and retaining the influence of its present position, cannot be doubted, as events in Czechoslovakia make clear.) Indeed, as Professor Kautsky wisely pointed out, "The more the Soviet government changes its policies from those which were once associated with the goal of world Communism, the less it can afford to stop insisting that it continues to stand for this goal." Oratorical flourishes that reiterate the goal of world Communism should not be confused with substantive commitment.

Nevertheless, the evidence of détente and the appearance of world conditions that limit the opportunities for major shifts in the balance of power have not prevented the great powers from giving an East-West coloration to international disputes that have little to do with the Cold War. The Middle East crisis of 1967 is a case in point. It is instructive on the great powers' tendency to fabricate crises between themselves in situations that are in fact beyond their control. The Arab-Israeli conflict is exactly the type of dispute that is *not* comprehensible in Cold War terms. The ethnic and religious antagonisms that are at the heart of it pre-date the Cold War, as does the political contest for the control of former British Palestine. What has become a nationality conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors would exist at the same pitch of emotional intensity whether or not the great powers intruded upon (or let themselves be drawn into) it. The real Cold War issue in the area has been the contest to win Arab allegiance. Israel and the conflict her presence has engendered are factors tangential

to the East-West competition. But since it is the overriding concern of the Arabs, the great powers cannot have avoided considering it. Unhampered by any feelings of moral commitment to Israel, the Soviets have had the freer hand and quite cynically were willing to sacrifice Israel in June 1967 to achieve a certain degree of political influence in the area. The military reverses suffered by the Arabs demonstrated just how limited is the capacity of the great powers to determine the outcome of events involving third parties.

At the same time, the June war presented us with a classic example of how easily an East-West drama is created out of others' political material. The picture presented of the two superpowers posturing in the wings gave the impression that a major confrontation was at hand. On the surface, it has all the appearances of an authentic Cold War crisis; the red phones of the hot line were dutifully employed, sharp exchanges took place in the Security Council, Kosygin hopped off to New York, and an unplanned Summit meeting was held.

I suspect that the situation was a good deal less serious than we were led to believe. In fact, as an East-West stand-off, the Middle East crisis was a nonstarter. Nothing vital to the security of either side was at stake, no basic interests were engaged, no military alliances were being torn asunder, no "diabolical" new technique for worldwide aggression was being tested. True, the U.S. had a commitment to maintain the national integrity of Israel and would have honored it; true, the U.S.S.R. had given a vague pledge of support to Egypt; and if the Arabs had gotten the upper hand, necessitating American involvement, the situation could have become dangerous. But under the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine either side risking direct hostilities. Is it at all plausible to have expected the Soviets to intervene, in the name of an unpublished equivocal pledge, in order to save Sinai for a regime

which keeps its local Communists imprisoned, when they have refrained from belligerent action against the U.S. in Vietnam despite the fact that a fraternal Communist state has been severely bombarded for three years and her own ships are periodically hit in Haiphong Harbor? I think not. Through a series of miscalculations the U.S.S.R. had allowed itself to get sucked into a situation in which the dangers were out of all proportion to the possible gains.

In this situation the chances of a conflagration were probably exaggerated. There is cause for concern, however, in the outdated thinking on both sides. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have failed to appreciate fully just how secure they are and how limited is the vulnerability of their opponent to indirect assaults. They are secure not merely in the sense that a stabilized deterrence has created military standoff. They are also secure in that the persistent contest for the allegiance or support of third parties is unlikely in the foreseeable future to shift significantly the weights of international power. A considerable political wisdom was incorporated in the cumulative decision to

conduct the Cold War according to the rules of peaceful competition. A further achievement would follow a reappraisal of this conflict by recognizing that the stakes are not control of the "other third," but rather the limited, and rarely permanent, increments of prestige and influence that are minor compared to the stable resources available to the great powers.

What I have been arguing in this essay is not the case for an American neoisolationism. As both the world's leading economic and military power the U.S. has a legitimate commitment to use its resources in the interests of a stable international order. The advice being urged is that the United States rest more confidently in its own security and "avoid the elaborate vocabulary of make-believe" by whose terms it fights daily a worldwide struggle against assaults of assorted Communist enemies. It then would be possible to make more sagacious discriminations between real and hypothetical foes, between vital and nonessential interests, between the world in its concrete complexity and the simplified world of ideological pretense.

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Impressions from Jerusalem

NEVITABLY, the first question every American visitor asks Israelis is: "What about the occupied territories?" The answers, in that highly political and vocal country, cut across party lines.

A young *raftan* (dairy worker) in a kibbutz in the Galil explains over his breakfast: "The most important thing is peace with the Arabs. We must give back the territories." His friend, sharing the meal, disagrees: "We need peace, yes. But what about security? We must keep Golan and East Jerusalem. We can't go back to farming under Syrian guns." The two young kibbutz workers belong to Mapam, a Marxist-Zionist organization noted for its emphasis on both the kibbutz as vanguard of Israeli society and Arab-Jewish rapprochement. In this crisis such prominent Mapam intellectuals as the novelist Moshe Shamir have joined the "Land of Israel movement," calling for the annexation of the occupied territories. But the party as such continues to reject annexation.

Tourists returning from Israel report with awe on the remarkable self-assurance or, if you wish, cockiness of the average Israeli's attitude toward "the situation." Outwardly, at least, Israelis seem to regard their constant harassment by Arab terrorists as a trifling inconvenience; they seem united in their supreme confidence that any confrontation will be decided in Israel's favor.

But this impression of Israeli public opinion is only partly correct. A much more accurate gauge of Israeli feelings is the serious political discussion now taking place in the press and the many solutions offered by various leading political figures. It is of course possible, as some commentators maintain, that the political leaders are all out of touch

with the sentiments of the average citizen and that the country's whole party structure has become anachronistic. But in Israel new opinions soon make themselves felt, and the notion, so popular among certain journalists, that the party leaders have lost contact with the people, isn't likely to stand up under close examination. Within all the parties there are, of course, minorities that reject their leaders' various stands on the territorial question; but with time and debate, alignments on this question are gradually being formed and integrated into the party setup. One can already distinguish quite clearly the political lineup.

The most important recent political event in Israel is the formation of the Israeli Labor party (*Mifleget Avodah*). The ILP is expected to make electoral history by becoming the first single party to achieve a parliamentary majority. Meir Yaari, the Mapam's theoretical leader, is happy about this prospect because "Israel will now be able to resist the blackmail of the religious parties." Until recently, the religious parties held the balance of power in the coalitions that are necessary in order to form a government. Now the secular parties may be able to govern on their own. Nevertheless, Mapam has refused to lose its identity by merging with the ILP; it has agreed to a joint electoral list with the new party, forming a single parliamentary bloc, but will remain an independent party.

IN THE PAST few years, seven of the nine important Israeli parties have merged, federated, or split. Such divisions are not similar to the alignments of the American radical movement; they follow the tradition of Euro-

pean politics. Some Israeli observers feel that the seemingly endless regroupings are necessary to the painful process of casting off old European ideologies and adapting to the new situation. (The ideology to be cast off is usually the other fellow's.)

The major portion of the ILP is the former Mapai, which still has the final say in policy decisions—subject, of course, to horse-trading with the other groups, Achdut Avodah and Rafi. Despite the Mapai's predominance, the most popular contenders for the succession to the prime ministry—Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon—come from minor partners in the new ILP.

The pivotal personality in Israeli politics is Moshe Dayan, a man with a positive genius for attracting gossip and speculation. But, as Ben-Gurion learned to his chagrin, personality is not the decisive factor in Israeli politics. What matters most is control of the party machine, of the Histadrut (the labor federation) and the industrial and agricultural enterprises. Therefore Dayan, who recognized this fact, led the small Rafi group into the newly united ILP, despite Ben-Gurion's opposition.

A few years ago Rafi's political prospects as an independent party seemed rather promising. Rafi combined, at the top, the revered figure of Ben-Gurion with such "Young Turks" as Dayan and Shimon Perez; it made a strong pitch to the youth. It promised to lead the country from a class-conscious to a "national" outlook. It urged an "activist" reply to provocations from the Arab states, and confidently hoped to become a serious contender for leadership. But results were so disappointing (a mere 10 Knesset seats) that the road back to Mapai looked inviting. Now all that remains of Rafi is Ben-Gurion himself, in splendid isolation in his Knesset seat, though within the ILP Rafi members still constitute a distinct tendency.

I asked a middle-aged Rafi member, a government economist in Tel-Aviv, about his attitude toward the pertinent issues. His response to my first question: "Socialism?

That's an old-fashioned issue; we don't think in those terms any more." The territories? "They are ours. To give them up would be a sign of weakness." When I asked about Dayan's numerous and contradictory plans for the territories (ranging from annexation to a federated state, and stopping in between at an independent Arab state on the West Bank), he became a shade less belligerent: "Will giving them up bring us peace? If Israel would be assured of peace, I would accept any plan."

On this issue, Dayan holds the trump cards. To a good part of the public he remains the "conquering hero," and if *he* were to favor a compromise solution the Israeli government would have little difficulty in getting wide public support. Right now Dayan favors "integrating" the conquered territories into the Israeli economy. The rationale is that peace will be long in coming and meanwhile Israel should show the world (and the Arabs) that it can coexist with the Arabs. Opponents claim that this is only a shame-faced way of proposing annexation.

As a "conquering hero" Dayan is unique. He establishes personal contact with Arabs as often as he can. Some Israelis say that this is his hobby. He once visited a village the day after the army had dynamited houses on the suspicion that they were used by terrorists. On this visit he was accompanied by less security guards than an American President would require in any city in the U.S. And most reports indicate that he is cordially welcomed by the Arab villagers. What it means is anyone's guess. This is in sharp contrast to Ben-Gurion, who never visited an Arab village during his long tenure in office.

In the mood of national unity generated just before the Six Day War, all political parties were invited to join the cabinet. Beigin, leader of the far-right, nationalist Herut, proposed Ben-Gurion as defense minister, but popular opinion focused on the architect of the 1956 victory, Moshe Dayan. Why the demand for Dayan?

It was generally assumed that Prime Minister Eshkol was in favor of a diplomatic response to Nasser's aggressive acts of removing the U.N. troops, sending huge forces to the border, and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba. The facts, as they became known, contradict this picture. Eshkol favored a military response to the threat of Arab invasion much earlier than did Dayan and his followers. We know now that even after the blockade of the Tiran Straits, Ben-Gurion, Dayan's mentor, was against recourse to arms. He criticized Eshkol for calling up the reserves and thus making it more difficult for Nasser to execute a partial retreat. Shimon Perez ran from one political leader to another warning against military action and stressing the importance of recalling Ben-Gurion to office, because only he could get de Gaulle to change his mind and thereby end Israel's isolation.

DAYAN, it turned out, was then against the army's advance to the Suez Canal, feeling that international pressure would be irresistible. Up to June 9 Dayan also opposed mounting the Syrian plateau, since he felt this would bring Soviet intervention. It was Dayan's view that the Israeli forces should content themselves with a devastating strike against the Egyptian forces in Sinai and with taking Sharm-a-Sheikh.

Dayan's role in the 1967 military actions have been greatly exaggerated. The Israeli Army's plans were formulated and prepared—like the contingency plans of all other armies—long before Dayan's admission to the cabinet, and implementation of the plans did not have to await his appointment to the post of Defense Minister.

The image that now emerges is, politically speaking, extremely powerful: a dashing and vivid military hero, yet a military hero who fraternizes easily with the Arabs and has in fact urged a course of military restraint. Almost everyone in Israel can find something to please him in Dayan.

His major contender for leadership of the

ILP is Yigal Allon, member of an Achdut Avodah kibbutz and a former chief of staff. Allon follows the Achdut Avodah's "activist" policy of retaliation against Arab terrorism and, unlike Dayan, serves as a spokesman for the kibbutz movement in matters of internal policy.

Allon is being groomed by many in Mapai for becoming the next prime minister. This raises an important question: Why should an entrenched social democratic machine support a declared "leftist," who is not part of the old Mapai, for leadership?

The answer is that both Rafi and Achdut Avodah are, in a sense, the children of Mapai. While there are differences, all three groups are sufficiently in agreement on the major premises—a combination of socialism and Zionism. They only differ about the mix of the two elements. Some of the old-guard Mapainiks hope that the two groups, Achdut Avodah and Rafi—those slightly to the left of Mapai and those slightly to the right—will balance each other, with the result that the Mapai "machine" will retain power in the best of all possible worlds. They will control a larger party and still give the appearance of having transferred power to the younger militants. The older generation of Mapainiks, composed of powerful personalities greatly experienced in the ways of Israeli politics, cannot be counted out.

Allon and the former Achdut Avodah favor complete equality for those Arabs who have been living in Israel since 1948, but they have not yet developed a firm position on the territories. The "Allon Plan," which calls for returning the West Bank while keeping a strip along the Jordan for garrison purposes, has not been endorsed by his group. Tobenkin, the leading theoretician of Achdut Avodah, has raised the slogan, "We are returning home," and is in favor of annexing the West Bank.

The similar military backgrounds of Allon and Dayan may explain their substantially similar policies regarding the new territories and their responses to Arab terrorism. Yet

it is only Dayan who today can exercise charismatic powers both in Israel and abroad; in his swashbuckling but not merely chauvinist style he embodies the ethos of the new Israel.

Pinchas Sapir, an old-guard Mapainik, has come out against the integration of the West Bank economy with that of Israel. His underlying view seems to be that Israel should rid itself of the territories as soon as they can be used for gaining a permanent peace. One of his strongest arguments is that the new Arab citizens acquired by Israel through annexations could change the national character of the country, that Israel would then no longer be a Jewish state, but would either become a binational state or some day face the possibility of being a country in which an Arab majority is ruled by a Jewish minority.

Only one prominent voice has been raised in favor of returning the territories now. Pinchas Lavon, a former Secretary-General of Histadrut and the "original cause" of the estrangement between Ben-Gurion and his colleagues, recently came out of semiretirement to urge the return of the territories without waiting for negotiations. So far his is a lone voice, but it may be symptomatic of a sentiment among the old guard that a price must be paid for peace.

BESIDES the territories and peace, there is another important issue within the ILP: the nature of Israel's economy. All groups accept the idea of a mixed economy. Mapai generally wants to keep things as they are now, with approximately 65 percent of the gross national product deriving from the private sector, and some 35 percent produced by the labor and public sectors. Allon hopes to reverse the ratio, while Dayan, who tends to see the state (rather than the *chalutz*) as the modern "pioneer," calls for state investment in industries that are not attractive to private capital and for state operation of industries of "national importance." This is an elastic phrase, never properly defined. "Normal" (read profitable) in-

dustries he proposes to turn back to private ownership.

Inevitably, the consolidation of the labor parties has led to reactions among the other parties. The two large nonsocialist groups, the Liberal party (controlled by the General Zionist conservatives) and the Herut Party (the former Irgun, and generally reactionary) entered into an electoral alliance—the Gahal—in the last election. This resulted in further splits. The progressives in the Liberal party, who refused to unite with the antidemocratic, antilabor, anti-Arab Herut, became the Independent Liberals. Next to Mapam, this party is most outspoken against the policy of raids and reprisals, and was vehemently critical of the raid on the Beirut airport.

The Six Day War gave Herut leader Beigin a new political lease on life. Just prior to the war, he had, for the first time, joined the ranks of the "respectables," when he became a minister in the unity cabinet. In 1947 Ben-Gurion had used Haganah troops against the Irgun and vowed to "never [align] with the Communists and never with Herut." In 1967 he embraced Beigin publicly. Whether this new respectability will translate into votes for the relatively united Right, in the Gahal, we still do not know.

In economic matters, Gahal favors a complete shift to private capitalism. Israel is less a welfare state than a welfare society, and many welfare functions are performed by nonstate institutions like Histadrut. Gahal is therefore eager for the state to take over welfare functions now performed by the labor movement, in order to weaken Histadrut. It also promises to tax the *kibbutzim* and to reduce their share of development funds.

In foreign policy Beigin's motto of "Not One Inch!" has been accepted by Gahal. This is not the same "one inch" that was the subject of Eshkol's statement of June 5, 1967, "We don't want one inch of the territory now in the hands of the Arabs." Beigin's inch refers to the occupied territories, and

the inch in question is not to be returned to the Arabs under any circumstances.

Though the second largest parliamentary group in Israel, Gahal has no chance of coming to power in the near future. Right now it has only 23 of 120 seats in the Knesset.

Israel is the only country in the Middle East to boast a legal Communist party. In a surfeit of wealth, it even has two Communist parties. The original party is Maki, led by Moshe Sneh, with a predominantly Jewish membership. Maki supported Israel in the Six Day War and has produced some of the best polemics in condemnation of Russian support of the Arabs. Maki has also denounced the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. As a reward, Israeli Communist journalists have been refused visas to Russia to attend the Youth Festival and other occasions.

The other Communist party, called the New Communist List (Rakach) is predominantly Arab in membership but has a mixed

leadership in Meir Wilner (Jewish) and Tewfik Toubi (Arab). This group has inherited the Arab protest vote that once went to Maki. For a while it seemed that the "New Communists" were developing a Maoist line, but they have been recognized by Moscow and have supported its actions in Czechoslovakia.

There are few issues in Israel not directly involved in partisan politics, and one of these is Biafra. Support for Biafra is overwhelming. The Israelis think of the Ibos as the "Jews of West Africa" against whom the Nigerians are practicing Nazi policies. The bombing of civilians in Biafra by Egyptian pilots has not helped endear the Lagos government to the Israelis. As a whole, the Biafra tragedy has had one somewhat unexpected effect in Israel: it has made the Israelis more willing to admit that in their struggle for national survival, the Jews throughout the world still play a crucial role. As one Israeli put it, "Without the Jews of the world, we would be another Biafra."

Erazim V. Kohák

Ideology and Terror

THE UNPERFECT SOCIETY: BEYOND THE NEW CLASS, by Milovan Djilas. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 267 pp. \$5.00.

COMMUNISM, Djilas tells us, is not a religion. It is a movement concerned with ideology and power. Religion is something more basic, the perennial, stubborn faith in "an insubstantial and ageless justice" that keeps man from becoming a determinate link in a nature-continuum and enables him not only to know reality but to judge it—and find it wanting.

It is a useful distinction. But by the same token, early Christianity, the militant protestantism of the Reformation, or Jesuit Catholicism were not religions either. They too were movements concerned with ideology and power, though in their case the connection with religion is clearly visible. All start with that perennial vision of a cosmic right and wrong and then transpose it from eternity to time. The Kingdom of God ceases to be the ageless ideal by which we measure the ways of men, and becomes something quite definite to be built in history. Religious leaders were invariably convinced they were living at the end of an eon, that the old world would soon pass away and a new world take its place. All that seemed required was to destroy the old and give all power to the elect.

The ideal, however, is not only concretized but also transformed. Though its content may still be humanitarian, its impact is not, for the aim is no longer simply the love of God, but the love of God according to, say, the Council of Trent, administered by the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Heretics must burn, not because they oppose the ideal, but because they oppose the movement's monopoly of power. But it does not matter, for the present becomes but a transition to the future, and the ideal can be sacrificed in the present to the ideology guaranteed to realize the ideal, not now, but surely soon.

In our time, Feuerbach dethroned god from his heaven and put Man in his place, but in the process he reaffirmed the principle of religious movements—though, as he recognized, in a "political" form. The trademark of all Hegelianism is precisely that it transforms the perennial ideal into a concrete, attainable future state. This is why Hegelianism, right and left alike, was able to inspire intense emotions and powerful movements—the reward it offered was no less than the millennium. But this is also why it failed to advance the ideals which its movements embodied. The millennium in time is an illusion. After 50 years of ideological crusades and countercrusades, the cost is staggeringly high, but the achievement meager. Ideological revolutions have not given their subjects bread, freedom, and dignity, but only holy causes to which to sacrifice them.

Yet since the ideal the movements embodied and failed to advance remains perennially valid, their adherents have not been willing to disown them. Instead, they have sought some contorted "dialectical" way of claiming esoteric success in spite of evident failure. The result is the ideological never-never land in which toleration is repression, freedom is bourgeois, and Byzantine despotisms—including semi-feudal military oligarchies in the Near East—are "objectively socialist," historically "higher" social forms.

This way madness lies, the psychotic politics of the Emperor who has to behead more and more of his subjects who fail to see his new clothes—or who fail to see that *Parteistaatssozialismus* enforced by secret police is really the ideal society. There is a simple alternative: the Emperor can proclaim he is naked, and ban all clothes altogether. This is *Realpolitik*, which abandons ideals together with ideologies.

But that way lies death. Man remains human only as long as he can dream dreams and see visions. The task before us is to free the ideal from the ideology, to restore it as the perennial norm, but not the monopoly of any one elite.

THIS IS ESSENTIALLY Djilas's thesis in *The Unperfect Society*. Djilas knows that men must dream dreams, but he also realizes that any one perfect society will inevitably be subject to the same strains and failings as the society it replaces. If, however, it claims to be perfect, it will become tyrannous: imperfection in a perfect society becomes not only a problem but a sin, to be expiated at the stake. This is why Djilas speaks of the future as an *unperfect* society, a society which recognizes that perfection is neither a goal nor a fact, and strives instead for bread, freedom, and dignity—in his terms, “freer personalities, greater rights for social groups, and more equitable distribution of goods.”

The great prophetic role of Karl Marx is precisely that he expressed the perennial dream of brotherhood and equality in a way that spoke to his time. But Marx was not only a prophet. He concretized his vision by tying it in with a particular historical movement and a particular political program. He may have done so willy-nilly—Djilas points out that even the first systematization of the Marxist vision, Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, was occasioned not by internal needs of the vision but by external needs of the movement. But whatever the reason, in the process the ideal became an ideology and claimed not only the perennial validity of a philosophy but the authority of a science.

This authoritarian claim brought Marxism increasingly into conflict with actual sciences. But since Marxism never was a science and derived its strength not from scientific accuracy but from the impact of its vision, in the clash between Marxist ideology and science, science had to yield. Lenin “refuted” Einstein with platitudes from Engels, Stalin with firing squads. And, we might add, not only science but all reality fared the same way. When the facts of economics, of agriculture, or of internal dynamics of society contradicted the ideology, reality had to yield. Not only was mention of the discrepancy forbidden, but even the ideal of bread, freedom, and dignity had

to be banned from the present. All that remained was the dogma that the ideal can become real eventually as long as ideology and its official guardians retain unlimited sway over the present.

Did the ideology embody the ideal? We have always assumed that it did. To this day, we take the superiority of “socialist forms of ownership” and other ideological trimmings for granted. Yet what can we offer to substantiate the claim beside quotations from Marx? There has been technological progress in “socialist” countries, but, as Djilas points out, it has been slower and less effective, both in immediate production and in providing an infrastructure for future production than in the West. Ideological economy has reached a dead end. Yet we cannot claim that it has safeguarded freedom and justice. Quite the contrary, freedom and justice were consistently sacrificed, to a degree we still find hard to imagine or admit, for the sake of building a “socialist” economy. Then what evidence can we offer for the vaunted historical “superiority” of “socialist” ideology?

Djilas is obviously still convinced of the truth of Marx's insight—and so am I. But the truth of a vision does not guarantee the truth of the ideology in which it is embodied, and in the case of Marxism, it did not even survive it. Marx made a crucial discovery, that economy affects society. But Marxist ideology canonized this truth as the whole and only truth. Since technology develops, Marxist ideologues postulated a “law” of progress for society, and sought to predict not only that society and economy will develop, but to determine the specific forms in which it must do so, as well as the men who must govern it. Socialist ownership and party supremacy as a dogma became the tangible expression of the Marxist vision.

Yet the society based on the dogma, an ideological economy ruled by an ideological elite and governed by ideological considerations alone, is precisely what failed. *Parteistaatssozialismus* became a mirror image of classical capitalism, but since it claimed to embody “science,” it has resisted change far more stringently. Capitalism, in its bungling, unscientific way, remained sufficiently flexible to develop to the point at which it no longer exists

in its classical form. Ironically, "scientific socialism" proved rather less adaptable.

Objectively, the crisis of communism today is not simply the crisis of one ideology, but a crisis of ideology as such. Any ideology that sanctifies itself with the aura of the ideal and suppresses dissent in the name of perfection becomes increasingly rigid, tyrannical, and can be sustained only at increasing cost in freedom, bread, and justice. Yet as Djilas points out, the crisis of communism is basically a "subjective" crisis. Its monopoly is tottering not because its ideology is "impure" or its practice harsh, but because it can no longer be justified as necessary for the satisfaction of concrete human needs. The ideal has outlived the ideology. After generations of sacrificing for a millennium, men today want bread, freedom, justice, and the ideological surrogates, party supremacy and ideological monopoly, have become irrelevant.

Or, more exactly, the promise of a perfect society which justified the party monopoly on truth and power has become irrelevant. This is why Djilas speaks of an unperfect society beyond the new class, not of a revised ideology, after the manner of orthodox revisionists East and West. Proposals for a perfect society are beside the point. There is no return to perfection. Because society is infinitely complex and multifaceted, it will always require a leadership, a "system," if you will. But for the same reason, the "system" will always be imperfect, and cannot claim a monopoly on truth and power. Proposals to cure its ills by destroying the whole social structure leave tyranny as the only alternative, while what is needed is a responsive, corrigible system.

Djilas obviously feels strong kinship to the ideals of the New Left, and finds it difficult to criticize it. Yet he is too honest not to realize that its authoritarianism and violence are the only tangible, realizable aspects of its ideology. The great difference between the revolutionaries of the SDS and the students of Prague is that the New Left in the West still lives under the illusion that ideology, if it is only the "right" one administered by the "right" people, can realize the ideal, the perfect society, in history. Djilas knows it cannot. What is needed is not the right ideology or the right elite, but a democratic framework, the freedom in which ideals

can be used to judge practice and to correct ideology. What is needed is reality, weaning men from ideological illusions and measuring the present in terms of the perennial ideals of bread, freedom, and justice.

I am told that Djilas's hosts at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs found him a bit awkward. I can understand why—Djilas, the Montenegrin peasant with his coarse, heavy hands among the immaculate soft hands of American liberals and uncouth soft hands of the *Kathederrevolutionäre*; Djilas, fresh out of a Communist jail, speaking of bread, freedom and dignity while his hosts exchanged interminable dialectical abstractions about "repressive toleration" and a "higher stage of liberation." Yes, reality is awkward. Ideology is much more sophisticated, and much more flattering to ideologues and bureaucrats alike.

But while the identification of the ideal and the ideology may be flattering, it is also deadly. The emptiness and cruelty of ideologies is increasingly evident and insupportable. Czechoslovak workers sought to respond by affirming the socialist ideal while stripping ideology and bureaucracy of its arbitrary power monopoly. The Russians sent tanks to make the point that the ideal and the ideology are inseparable. If they succeed in convincing the Czechs, they may prolong the life of ideology and bureaucracy by a few years, but when they fall—as they will—the ideal might well fall with them.

Mutatis mutandis, the same is true of Tito's reaction to Djilas's attempt to affirm the ideal and reject the ideology and the bureaucracy. And, finally, the same is true of the United States. The American "radical" Left has hesitated to follow the Rustins and Harringtons in separating the ideal from the ideology. In the name of the ideal, it has supported ideologues in the assault on freedom, whitewashed Stalin's purges in the thirties, Soviet imperialism in the forties, dogmatism in the fifties, and waved Viet Cong flags and little red books in the sixties. The point of "nonnegotiable demands," after all, is that progress is possible only if it is progress on *our* terms, under *our* control, that the socialist ideal of bread, freedom, and justice is inseparable from revolutionary ideology and revolutionary elite.

Yet the inescapable moral of Djilas's book

is that this is a dangerous strategy. In the unlikely event that the ideologues will prevail in the United States, the ideals and the idealists will be their first victims—as in East Europe and marginally in enclaves like San Francisco State. The ideal will be as distant as ever, but the possibilities of realizing it will be far more remote. In the much more likely event that Americans outside the privileged university enclaves respond in kind to confrontationist violence, the victims will be not only ideologies but also ideals. It will make little difference that the guns at Cornell were an echo of guns in Alabama. *Only in the never-never land of Hegelian ideologies does a dialectical conflict of guns produce a synthesis of freedom.* In the real world of every man at his work, freedom can replace guns only if we dissociate the ideal from the ideology, even from the ideology that claims it as its justification for violence and intolerance.

Milovan Djilas writes badly. His book is rambling and disorganized, his sections are mis-titled and his chapters misdivided. He does not even provide a bibliography or an index. *The Unperfect Society* would never do as a doctoral dissertation—it is as coarse and rough, as multifaceted and unperfect as reality itself. But it is a book that ought to be read, read urgently, and read hard.

Murray Hausknecht

Father Strikes Back

THE CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS: THE CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS, by Lewis S. Feuer. New York: Basic Books. 543 pp. \$12.50.

THE ROOT METAPHOR controlling Lewis Feuer's vision of the student world is the primal band of brothers falling on the father with bared teeth and drawn knives. "Generational conflict" is the war between students, driven by primitive emotions, and a generation of hated and feared castrating fathers. Since that conflict is one of the "deepest universals of human nature," the psychological conditions for generational conflict are always present in all so-

cieties—students are perennial time bombs in the ivy. But they explode only when a generation of fathers has been "de-authorized . . . a sense that the older generation has discredited itself and lost its moral standing."

Student movements show recurrent patterns of behavior throughout history. "A complex of urges—altruism, idealism, revolt, self-sacrifice, and self-destruction—searches the social order for strategic avenues of expression." The movement becomes politicized, and typically attempts to attach itself to "carrier" political movements of a peasantry or working class. When the students "go to the people" they are rejected, largely because they do not appreciate the real needs and aspirations of the peasants and workers. The rejection encourages already present tendencies toward elitism, violence, and antidemocratic ideologies. The tendency toward violence has an ambiguous quality, since it is linked with a "suicidalism" characteristic of students in full generational revolt. Feuer uncovers these ideological and behavioral patterns in past and present student movements of the Western and Eastern worlds. Not unexpectedly, he finds them also present in Berkeley—where he was one of the beleaguered fathers. Each case examined reaches a conclusion similar to that of the judgment on the Bosnian students: "Gavrilo Princip, who dreamed of killing policemen, finally achieved his place as a father-destroyer, a hero in history, even though it also meant the destruction of himself and the maiming of European civilization."

Berkeley, of course, is the *raison d'être* of the book; it elaborates a thesis Feuer propounded in his communiqués from the front during the Free Speech movement. Indeed, the book has a quality reminiscent of the memoirs of a retired general making forays into history to justify old decisions and back-handed swipes at former comrades. But, as an enterprise of intellectual analysis it is no more successful than the earlier dispatches.

That political and social movements draw upon energies rooted in psychological troubles is a commonplace; few will deny that, in societies like our own, unresolved Oedipal difficulties may be linked to political ideologies and behavior. It is also true, given the influence of psychoanalysis in American middle-

class culture, that students will indiscriminately mix political and psychological perspectives. Mark Rudd holds Columbia responsible for a long list of political and social ills including "our identity crisis." Feuer's metaphor captures this undisputed psychological dimension of student behavior because, to quote Max Black, a metaphor evokes "a system of associated commonplaces" serving "to organize our views of man."

But at this point the hard tasks begin. To undertake the exploration of the psychological dimension of thought and action in terms of the metaphor entails a responsibility for going beyond what, since Freud, are mere truisms. The first task is to relate the psychological to other perspectives on the problem. Are students simply to be defined as children rebelling against fathers, or are they also, for example, a grouping of young people occupying a special position and life circumstance in a particular kind of society? If one assumes that both descriptions are true (although the first implies a dubious *a priori* assumption about "universals in human nature"), then what is the effect of the second on the generational relationship of fathers and sons? To what extent may the ideologies and behavior of students be ascribed simply to fear and hatred of castrating fathers, rather than to the specific circumstances of their social position? Questions of this order are resolutely ignored by Feuer.

Other questions of an empirical and methodological nature are not dealt with any more adequately. How intense is the generational conflict between middle-class fathers and sons in contemporary America? Is it severe enough to account for the student movement? Feuer liberally quotes the words of students and calls attention to their generational metaphors. Aside from the usual difficulties of such a procedure, he ignores the further difficulty that, as the delayed entrance into adult roles affects more of the young for longer periods of time, age as a category of thought becomes more important. The mere fact that the students may define the situation as a conflict of young versus old does not *in itself* support any particular explanation. There is also a lack of rigor in Feuer's use of the concept of "de-authoritization." Its definition never allows for a test of the proposition that whenever there is genera-

tional conflict, the older generation has been "de-authoritized."

Because he does not raise questions that are relevant to his analysis, Feuer produces an explanation of student movements that reduces them to an eternal replaying of the primal murder. It is an insensitive and mechanical use of Freudian concepts that ignores developments in psychoanalytic thought since *Totem and Taboo*, and bludgeons history into a foreordained shape. The better contemporary work shows an awareness of complexities to which Feuer's simplistic perspective remains blind. And thereby the very real contribution Freudian theory can make is lost. Feuer here resembles some student ideologues who prefer theories that enable them to avoid grappling with the complexities of the social world. Such predilections, whether held by sons or fathers, indicate a laxity of mind.

Unfortunately, laxity permits some gains. Early critics of Feuer noted that his views were designed to discredit the Berkeley students. His intentions are not pertinent since, regardless of intent, the discrediting function must follow from his initial theoretical assumptions. His mechanical Freudianism is just another variation, complete with scholarly apparatus, of the tiresome gambit of the parlor psychoanalyst, "Yes, but what is your *real* reason . . . ?" In addition to casting doubt on the rationality of one's antagonist, the question is an assurance that there is no need to pay any attention to the reality he is experiencing. Here Feuer is symptomatic of an important aspect of the conflict of generations—an unwillingness to take the students' experience of reality seriously until it is too late. His analysis, then, has a conservative political import.

But even conservatives would do well to be wary of Feuer. The true conservative is concerned with preserving standards of civility; with maintaining what Ortega y Gasset alluded to as that clearing in the jungle called civilization. That some student militants are among those violating standards of civility is one of the more unfortunate facts of our present situation, and this ought to be of concern to liberals and radicals too. Matters are not helped when the students' severest critics show a disregard for the same standards. The students who went to Mississippi in 1964, says Feuer, identi-

fied with the Negroes, but the identification "fused itself with an extinction of both one's selfhood and selfishness through a death-seeking for the movement's sake. The students became death-seekers." Here, narrowness of intellectual vision produces an appalling coarseness of sensibility. Similarly, one would expect that someone who sees McCarthyism as "the projected creation in large part of the bad conscience and cowardice of the radicals—Communists, former Communists, and fellow travellers" would not himself show, in his comments on former colleagues and Paul Goodman, an absence of generosity approaching a meanness of spirit like that of the "radicals." There is a violence of word as well as deed. It might be a responsibility of intellectuals to moderate tendencies to violence in at least the one sphere where they do have some influence.

Michael Maccoby

Viva Zapata

ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, by John Womack, Jr. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 467 pp. \$10.00.

JOHN WOMACK'S EXCELLENT STUDY of Zapata and his fight to protect the rights of Mexican *campesinos* in Morelos deserves the praise it has received from reviewers. Integrating a mountain of documents, Womack writes with clarity and a sensitive understanding of Mexican villagers. I found the book fascinating and exciting. It broadened my understanding of events I have read about before, and of people in Morelos whom I have studied closely during the past eight years. (The small state of Morelos is directly to the south of the Federal District. The capital, Cuernavaca, is about 40 miles from Mexico City.)

Zapata and the Mexican Revolution is also an important source of information about the roots of peasant revolution. To begin with, Womack authoritatively dissolves the mythological view of Zapata's revolution. According to this myth, the hacienda peons, after years

of semi-feudal slavery, rose up behind Zapata and overthrew their masters, demanding land and liberty. In terms of myth, the haciendas were static, backward plantations owned by absentee landlords who lived in Paris on their rents and lacked interest in developing their land. Thus, the revolution not only attacked dehumanizing structures, but also economically reactionary institutions. This position, taken by the revolutionaries after 1920, justified breaking up the haciendas and giving the land to the peasants.

The reality is not so simple. The haciendas did in fact treat the peasant workers as serfs. The peon's life was mortgaged to the estate; he inherited the debts of his fathers. Although he was not bought or sold like the black slaves in the U.S., he had no rights and could be punished at will by his master. Ground down by work and beatings, he became submissive. The peon was the most unlikely individual to start a revolution. He had no hope of a better life, and he was too dependent to fend for himself.

However, from an economic point of view, the hacienda was not the stagnant structure of the myth. To the contrary, the haciendas had found, in 1880, new technologies, which increased their capacity to refine sugar and spurred them to grab new land to exploit. It was not the uprising that sparked the fires of revolution in Morelos, but the fact that in the 30 years preceding the Revolution many free peasants were losing their land to the haciendas and were thus being forced into the role of the landless peon. From 1870 to 1910 sugar production in the state increased steadily from 8,748,131 kilograms to 48,531,600 kilograms. During this period the haciendas, aided by a government that abused the law concerning idle lands, dispossessed families that in some cases had held their land for centuries.

The free *campesino* or peasant is very different from the peon. He is fiercely independent, suspicious (especially of city types who cheat him), and stubborn. He values his rights, and he respects the rights of others. He is dignified and reserved (*formal*). And he considers a threat to his property a threat to his life. The Russians and Poles discovered that many peasants prefer death to collectivization. The Mexican hacienda owners found even earlier that the

free villagers, the small land-owning peasants, were prepared to defend their property rights with their lives.

The primary goal of the Zapatistas, stated in the *Plan de Ayala* of 1911, was return of land that had been usurped. Thus, Zapata's goals were at first conservative. The Revolution pitted traditional, small land owners against a developing, capitalistic system. Human rights confronted the "progressive" demands of profit and technology, which could be rationalized in terms of national development.

As Womack shows, only when the national government of Victoriano Huerta radicalized the Morelos revolution by treating all peasants as Zapatistas and enemies of the state did Zapata open his armies to peons, and change his revolutionary goals to demand the abolition of the haciendas and land for all. Once the haciendas lay in ruins and the old life was gone, the peons' repressed hatred of their former masters added fuel to the explosion, which Zapata could not always control. But it is clear that Zapata started out defending established legal rights, and that it was the government's cruel and indiscriminate violence which radicalized the population and increased the bloodshed.

Womack writes that General Juvencio Robles

put into practice a favorite policy, "resettlement." Modeled on Spanish proceedings in the recent Cuban War of Independence, and on similar British action in the Boer War and American action in the Philippines, "resettlement" was a deliberate definition of an indefinite war. By 1910 it had become the standard method in the Mexican army for suppressing popular guerrillas. It required first forcing ranches and into concentrational camps on the the rural pacificos out of their villages and outskirts of larger towns, where federal supervision was easier. Then flying columns could move freely into the countryside and treat whomever they met as "hostiles". . . . The peculiar feature of Robles's use of this method was that he burned places he wanted the population to evacuate.

(An old villager in Morelos told me that the government troops treated anyone wearing the white manta peasant dress as "hostile.")

THE REVOLUTION in Morelos and the reaction to it prefigured the peasant uprisings that have become increasingly frequent since 1910, and which our government still does not fully understand. Womack presents the history, but he leaves a great deal to the reader's commentary and interpretation. The following question is crucial: how could the conflict between the hacienda and the free villagers have been resolved so that neither economic development nor individual rights would have been lost? As things turned out, the destruction of the haciendas set back the process of economic development. The hacienda peon who received land often lacked the training and character needed to work and administer it. In many parts of Mexico the peon has lost control of his land to new entrepreneurs who take over the role of the old *hacendados*. On the other hand, the small landowner, conservative and wedded to traditional technology, is unable to increase agricultural production for a growing population.

A way of averting this result would have required a new form of cooperative industrial agriculture, in which small landowners maintain property rights but cooperate in buying, selling, and working the land with advanced technology. Such a form of cooperative agriculture, in contrast to the commune where individuals lose property rights, has proved workable in Yugoslavia, in some parts of Mexico, and in Israel. It is not easy to institute such an organization; the peasants are suspicious of co-operatives, and the landowners would resist losing control of the total operation. Even if individuals are willing, such projects require education for the peasants, and strict honesty on the part of the administrators. Probably, it would not have been possible in the Mexico of 1910. But today we have experienced in many parts of the world the destructiveness that results when the demands of new industrial-capitalistic organizations clash with traditional rights to land and liberty. Free individuals will fight for their rights. Yet, the new technologies are needed to feed hungry people.

TO CONTRIBUTORS

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BOOKS

Richard Robbins

The Failure of Lyndon Johnson

THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON, by Eric Goldman. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 531 pp., \$8.95.

AN INTELLECTUAL'S LOT is not a happy one—at least if the setting is the White House, the President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the man of ideas Eric Goldman, on leave from Princeton to serve as Special Consultant to the President or, more broadly, "White House intellectual-in-residence." As an account—the word "tragedy" is altogether misplaced but more about that later—of a turbulent period for LBJ and a frustrating experience for EFG, this book is only intermittently interesting. Although it adds virtually nothing of importance to the record, and its effect is to persuade this reader that court scribes should wait at least five years before writing up the events they have witnessed, there is something of value to be gleaned from the book. The "something" has to do with the imprint of a powerful personality on the political process, as well as with the role of an "idea man" who is charged with serving that powerful personality, but never really told to what end nor in what ways nor for how long.

A considerable segment of this memoir is devoted to a detailed, mostly boring description of the President's impressive record on liberal domestic legislation. On the periphery of the periphery of power Goldman has little to contribute here; long passages read as if the *New York Times* had been cut to page size and pressed between hard covers. Then, there are endless miniatures of the men and women in the President's entourage, capped by a full-scale, sympathetic profile of Mrs. Johnson. All the sketches are agreeably written but the result is no more useful: *Time* pressed between hard covers. "Lyndon Johnson went into another intense brain-picking effort, especially with lawyer-politico friend James H. Rowe, Jr., Montana-born and Harvard-educated, an alumnus of the New Deal, able, urbane,

rocking back and forth in his chair, in his comfortable, middle years. . . ." Etc., etc.

Johnson himself moves restlessly across the scene, and Goldman does succeed in conveying the sense of a human being—generous and mean-spirited, boastful and "lashed by insecurity," a Populist and a Texas conservative. For the most part, however, the life and times of Abe Fortas or Jack Valenti provide the same kind of pedestrian reading as his description of the tactics employed to get votes on Medicare.

Aware of all this, Goldman has threaded into his narrative a recurrent theme, a thesis if you like: Fate handed to President Johnson a unique opportunity not only to complete the unfinished work of the New Deal-Fair Deal-New Frontier but to preside over an emergent "consensus," a reconciliation of the people out there in Texas and the South with the new, politically strategic middle-class and professional people of the Northeast. Because of what he was and had become, President Johnson could bring together Middletown and "Metroamerica," thus enabling American liberalism to move ahead beyond civil rights bills and ad hoc antipoverty legislation to new, more comprehensive programs required to cope with the crisis of the cities and the demand of black people for jobs and justice. What a word, "Metroamerica"! But let that pass, Goldman defines his own modest role as "to help bring this enormously capable leader into rapport with Metroamerica."

The rest we all know. At the height of success at home, Lyndon Johnson applies the same formula abroad. The world can't be more unruly than the Congress. Asians are mostly good ("the people"), their leaders mostly bad ("the aggressors"), and if you draw the line on the aggressors why, then, you help the people. Slowly, the Great Society sinks into the quagmire of Vietnam. The President withdraws, foregoing renomination and possible defeat. We are left with "the tragic figure of an extraordinarily gifted President who was the wrong man from the wrong place at the wrong time under the wrong circumstances."

Such is Eric Goldman's version of the tragic play, the proud man who "got things done" now undone himself, yet large in defeat as in victory. The thesis is wrong because it em-

phasizes style and mood instead of substance. You are compelled to think that Lyndon Johnson goes down not because of what he did but because of what he was, or rather, because of what his critics, the "Metroamericans," felt he was—Southerner, Texan, wheel-dealer, parochial old-fashioned liberal of rough humor and rougher tactics. I cannot agree; the thesis is wrong.

Put aside the knockabout caricature of LBJ in *MacBird*; shrug off the obscenities directed at LBJ by some of the young people on the New Left which, in any case, are more than matched by LBJ's delicate descriptions of both his thoughtful and his thoughtless critics—sons of bitches, bastards, knee-jerk liberals, and so on. Professor Goldman is very hard on "rude" critics of the President like Dwight Macdonald and Edmund Wilson who did not respect the office and its occupant. He is right; one should oppose the President without impugning his person. I would try to do it so. But it is interesting that in all these 531 pages there is not a single instance of anybody calling Mr. Johnson on the foul language with which he expressed his scorn for scholar, hippie, intellectual, congressman, or anybody else who got in his way. All that Goldman can do is to note, lamely, that Lyndon Johnson's "know-nothingism" was somehow less offensive than the intellectuals' "know-it-allism." Put aside all this business of an asserted snobism on the part of the New York intellectuals, the *New York Review of Books* and the Kennedy-Harvard establishment, and what is left? The plain fact that millions of Americans who couldn't care less about four-letter words and the New Left, who worried not at all about LBJ's rough edges or Lady Bird Johnson's charm, *nevertheless voted overwhelmingly for President Johnson in 1964 and overwhelmingly rejected him in the 1968 primaries*. They were concerned not with Johnson's person but with peace in Vietnam and change in the city ghettos. When Hubert Humphrey—not really a "Metroamerican" either—turned to these issues late in his campaign, they almost elected him President. Goldman's effort to portray the President as the tragic victim of a conflict between the cosmopolitans and the locals seems a bit fanciful.

IF THERE IS LESS than meets the eye in all the rhetoric about Metroamericans and other Americans, there is even less to the assertion that in LBJ's rise and fall we have a deep personal tragedy. Johnson served his country for many years, in Congress and as Chief Executive. He acted according to his lights. There were achievements and frustrations. In the end he had to step down. This does not mean he was Lear; it simply means he didn't have the votes anymore. Perhaps he will be vindicated on Vietnam by history—I doubt it. Perhaps a greater emphasis will come to be placed on his domestic achievements—I am sure of it. But nowhere is there "the downfall of a great man" nor "a sorrowful or disastrous conclusion that excites pity or terror." Lyndon Johnson wasn't big enough as man or mind to warrant such language.

A final note. *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson*, if scarcely a book for all seasons, does provide a useful account of who said and did what during the Johnson Administration. But it leaves unasked the question of whether the post of White House "intellectual-in-residence" is worth filling, given the way in which the Presidency functions and power is stored in Washington. We have had only three recent cases to form a basis for judgment—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., under Kennedy, Eric Goldman and John Roche under Johnson. In the first and third instances it worked out reasonably well because, to turn to the sociologists' distinction, the status and the role, the formal position, and the way it is in fact played by the person designated, were reasonably aligned. President Kennedy made it clear; Schlesinger would have no hand in policy, but he was a good writer who would write, a man knowledgeable about politics who would do some political liaison work. The mandate for Roche was different but also clear; he was an intellectual, he was tough (like the President), and he was needed because he spoke forcefully for the President's policy in Vietnam in the face of an army of professors and other critics. In the in-between situation neither the status nor the role were ever clarified.

Goldman was never sure why he had been chosen. Once arrived, he had to shape his own

(Continued on page 368)

LETTERS

College Teachers' Union

Editor:

May I make a few corrective comments on our UFCT member Murray Hausknecht's analysis of the City University collective bargaining election?

1. The union's position on promotions is that of a dual track of advancement up to the rank of Associate Professor. In the face of arbitrary percentage quotas for each rank dictated by budgetary considerations which bear no relation to merit, the UFCT proposal is that once an individual is granted tenure after a rigorous selection and evaluation process, he would be able to advance by annual increments to maximum in rank and shift to the next rank until he is an Associate Professor. Outstanding merit as judged by departmental peers would provide more rapid advancement by promotion from rank to rank. The promotion to rank of full Professor would be based solely on outstanding merit considerations.

This would prevent the practice of keeping deserving individuals at the rank of Assistant Professor for the rest of their professional lives because of budgetary considerations. A person may be a productive scholar and an excellent teacher and still be denied a promotion.

This proposal was not an idea that met favor only with our community college membership. It was supported by our entire Executive Board which is representative of both four-year colleges and community colleges.

2. Murray Hausknecht has confused the promotional issue with a controversy over having both senior and community college staff paid according to the senior college salary schedule. This controversy was resolved by the union's position of having the senior college schedule as the *basic* CUNY schedule with a \$2,000 differential above this schedule for the Ph.D. available for *all* faculty members.

3. The UFT strike was a factor in our loss at the senior colleges, but it was a bit more complex than the article indicated. The conservative supporters of the "company union," the Legislative Conference, were opposed to the strike because it was a strike. Others were opposed to the UFT strike because of their belief that "due process" was not involved and that the aspirations of the

black and Puerto Rican "community" were being stymied by the UFT.

4. I disagree with the characterization of the UFCT as employing the tone, rhetoric, or posture of the union-organizing days of the thirties. During the campaign, we stressed the issues including the strengthening of the powers of faculty senates and councils which are currently advisory and largely impotent. We eschewed a "closed or union" shop. The campaign was positive until the final run-off when we did seek some sharper differentiation from the Legislative Conference.

5. Other explanations for our weaker showing in the senior colleges include: the professoriate, entirely satisfied with the salary gains won for them by the UFT; the traumatized old-timers who remember the days of the Stalinist-dominated College Teachers Union and the witch-hunt repressions; and the younger group, which up to now has had the mobility of the individual academic entrepreneur.

6. Finally, I most emphatically take issue with the implication that the UFCT was a factory-oriented "bread-and-butter" business union. The UFCT's struggles at St. John's University and in a myriad other instances involving academic freedom are well known. The Union also pioneered the concept of the City University program of SEEK and College Discovery which enables high school graduates from ghetto areas to get into college with the necessary remedial and financial assistance. It clearly established its position in opposition to the AFL-CIO policy on the war. It seeks to restructure colleges and universities along more humane and democratic lines. This is hardly traditional unionism.

ISRAEL KUGLER
President

Peace Program

Editor:

Your readers might appreciate some information about an Intern Program in the field of public opinion and international conflict, sponsored by the World Without War Council of the United States, for which applicants are now being sought.

An interne in this program is expected to commit at least one year of full time work to developing knowledge and experience in three fields: the nature of international conflict; techniques for influencing American public opinion and foreign policy; and professional means for dealing with these problems in the public arena.

The program is conducted by the World Without War Council of the United States, a cooperative effort by organizations and individuals who

share the goal of a disarmed world under law in which free societies can grow and flourish. Among the members and consultants of the Council are: Roger Baldwin, John C. Bennett, Norman Podhoretz, Bayard Rustin, and Leon Shull.

Internships are being offered in New England, New York City, the Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and California. Anyone wishing application forms should write to: Interne Program, World Without War Council of the United States, 218 East 18th Street, New York, New York 10003.

MAX GREEN
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The HHH Award

Editor:

Bayard Rustin [DISSENT, May-June 1961] says that "Our main job today is to reunite the Democratic Left, not to splinter it or disdainfully exclude those who eminently belong within it." Grant the claim. Does Rustin believe what he says?

Does one serve the cause of unity by singling out from among all candidates for an annual [LID] award one of the few men who, for millions of Democrats, symbolizes the forces that betrayed the Democratic mandate of 1964?

Does one serve the Democratic Left by singling out a man whose ambition led him to endorse American policy in Southeast Asia, not grudgingly but with famous ebullience?

Does one serve even the best interests of the nation by singling out for special distinction the

man who insists that he is still titular head of the Democratic party, though he knows that his pretension is treated laughingly by millions of liberals?

How often in the recent past have we heard those who take divisive action demand support on the grounds that opposition would break political unity? It is after all those within the League for Industrial Democracy who decided to give Hubert Humphrey their annual award who recklessly endangered the fragile coalition the LID is supposed to represent. The act makes little political sense except as an expression of contempt for millions of people who will be needed if the coalition Rustin favors is to be rebuilt. Or perhaps those members of the LID who ignored strong disagreement with their decision think that the dissenters can be written off as politically irrelevant. In that event, they had best think again.

Remember, we are not discussing the endorsement of one of the two candidates who, by extraordinary twists of fate, happened to be running for President. We are discussing a deliberate decision to single out from hundreds of potential candidates a man who, more than any other save one, was bound to strain to the breaking point relations with those with whom Rustin claims he wants to reunite.

When will those who made the LID decision learn a simple lesson: that the strength of coalition depends partly on deference to other people's opinions when the matters at issue are not related to vital values or policies? Or do they think that awarding a prize to Hubert Humphrey was a crucial element in the general effort to reunite the Democratic Left? If they can believe that, they can believe anything.

ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN


THE FAILURE OF LYNDON JOHNSON (continued from page 366)

role himself at a time when the President was busy with legislative matters and Mrs. Johnson had chosen beautification of the landscape as her major work. From the beginning, the mountain of memoranda he produced had no impact on anything. The informal "brain trust" he assembled soon faded away. The Presidential scholars' program would have worked just as well if not associated with the White House. The one-day Festival of the Arts at the White House was a fiasco. Even Goldman's resignation figured in a petty political intrigue. Exit intellectual.

It is best, I think, to serve your country as

a specialist doing the thing you know best how to do, on call to the White House or Congress for a specific assignment, and not as an intellectual utility infielder.

That is why the improbable team of President Richard Nixon and Urban Affairs Adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan has at least some chance of accomplishing something. Mr. Moynihan's status is clear; he is being paid to think about the urban crisis and to prepare policy material for the President. If it does not work, as seems likely, he will quit and we will know why. Nobody will blame the *New York Review of Books*.



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